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Abstract
This thesis reports four studies of a particular type of cooperation where the formation of coor-
dinated groups through favour exchanges benefits the connected few at the expense of the many.
This process is labelled back-scratching, and is a common feature of political decision-making
where institutional powers allow for a large amount of discretion and the imposition of external-
ities in situations where property rights are not well-defined. Chapter 1 introduces the concept
of back-scratching in as a coordination game with negative externalities, providing a common
framework within which to incorporate the studies that follow.
The first study in Chapter 2 uses a natural experiment to quantify the gains from back-scratching
in political decisions about value-enhancing land zoning. The effectiveness of a variety meth-
ods used to support implicit favouritism are examined, including political donations, employing
professional lobbyists, and investing in relationships. Using micro-level relationship data from
multiple sources, characteristics of landowners of comparable sites inside and outside rezoned
areas are compared. ‘Connected’ landowners owned 75% of land inside rezoned areas, and only
12% outside, and captured $410 million in value gains, indicating a trade in favours amongst con-
nected insiders. Marginal gains to all landowners of connections in our sample were $190 million.
Engaging a professional lobbyist appears to be a substitute for having one’s own connections.
The second study in Chapter 3 offers a theoretical explanation for the unusual hedging and
partisan patterns of political donations observed in Australia, Canada, UK and Germany based
on a model of donations as reputation signals, and where reputation levels determine the political
distribution of the economic surplus. Simulating optimal signal investments in a population
of agents distributed within a reputation space results in a clustering of signalling strategies
consistent with political donations data. The model shows how the entrenchment of interests
can occur through exclusive access to a ‘social ladder’ for elites engaged signalling reputations,
offering a potential underlying explanation of Mancur Olson’s (1982) institutional sclerosis.
To explore more closely potential institutional changes to curtail back-scratching a new exper-
iment is introduced in Chapter 4 that allows for back-scratching between player pairs to arise
within a group of four players. In each of the 25 rounds of the experiments, a player (the ‘al-
locator’) nominates one of three others as a co-worker (the ‘receiver’), which determines the
group production that period to be the productivity of the receiver (which varies by round),
but also gives the receiver a bonus and makes them the allocator in the next round. Alliances
form if two individuals keep choosing each other even when their productivities are lower than
that of others, causing efficiency losses; a situation that occurred in 84% of experiment groups.
Males and business students were found to be more likely to form alliances. Random allocator
rotation policies and low bonuses fail to significantly improve overall welfare: rotation policies
significantly reduce the rate of formation of new alliances but do not lead to the breakdown of
existing alliances, while low bonus policies are only found to be effective when alliances are well
established. This points to the importance of the strength of existing alliances for the chances
of institutional interventions curtailing back-scratching.
Institutional changes creating greater transparency are tested in the new experimental setup
and reported in Chapter 5. The main treatment reveals photographs of each player in order to
deter bilateral alliances and encourage cooperation with the group as a whole in the absence
of punishment. Transparency does not affect the probability of alliance formation due to two
countervailing forces; more rapid alliance formation due to the use social cues from the photos as
a coordination device, and more pro-sociality at the group level that leads to shorter alliances.
There are policy lessons about when transparency may curtail corruption, or facilitate it.
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Chapter 1
Back-scratching in groups and
networks
Abstract
At the intersection of economics, political science, sociology, and evolutionary biology, is the
study of groups and networks as meso-level elements of human cooperation. This thesis looks at
a particular type of cooperation where the formation of coordinated groups is costly to those out-
side the group, or where relationships are used to support coordinated economic activities for the
benefit of the connected few at the expense of the many. Such a process of implicitly exchanging
costly favours is labelled back-scratching, and is a common feature of political decision-making
and is an inherent feature of corruption. In this chapter I provide an introduction to the core
economic elements involved in the study of the economics of back-scratching, including a clas-
sification of back-scratching types in terms of the relationship between internal group benefits
and external costs, and also the use of reputation mechanisms to provide common knowledge
about cooperative intentions that sustain group coordination. This provides a backdrop to later
thesis chapters which address particular open questions, such as how big the losses from back-
scratching might be, what patterns of political reputation signalling might be expected, and
what sort of institutional designs might discourage back-scratching by encouraging cooperation
at the broadest levels.
1.1 Introduction
In this thesis I look at a specific social process of favour exchange, or back-scratching, whereby
discretionary favours are made to related others which come at a high cost to the non-favoured,
generating losses in economic efficiency. It is a process that is both supported by, and a cause
of, meso-level structures of groups and relationship networks. I bring an economic lens to the
topic of back-scratching in a number of new ways: first by quantifying the payoff to relationship
networks using a natural experiment where the social loss from political favouritism is clearly
defined; second, by looking at how maximising behaviour through the use of signals to boost
reputations can add to the explanation of the patterns of donations to political parties and the
entrenchment of interest groups, and; third, by designing and implementing a new experiment
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whereby costly back-scratching alliance are able to be formed within larger groups, and using
that experiment to test which institutional designs can curtail back-scratching and promote
the broader economically efficient and equitable outcome. This chapter provides the necessary
framework of key ideas that underpin the analysis in later chapters.
A common view across the social sciences is that human societies as a whole, whether that whole
be considered a country, State, or city, contain meso-level structures of either nested groups
or relationship networks, or perhaps both (Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998; Jackson et al. , 2012;
Granovetter, 2005; Burt, 2000; Frijters & Foster, 2013; Jackson et al. , 2012). These structures
allow for clustered cooperation within groups and between related individuals, while at the same
time generating economic competition between groups and the unrelated.
Figure 1.1 shows a rudimentary conceptual diagram of these views of meso-level structures,
and the potential complexity that arises due to the interactions of groups, or across complex
relationship networks. The idea that society as a whole is comprised of loyal groups, which
themselves might be nested within one or more larger ‘groups of groups’ is shown through the
overlapping circles and the individuals marked by points within them. Here the individual
labelled A is part of the same group as B, but not as C. Though at the broadest level they are
all part of the same social group contained in the diagram.
A
B
C
Figure 1.1: Conceptualisation of groups and networks as meso-level structures in the economy
Groups can represent any institutionalised loyalty, either families, companies, government de-
partments, clubs, not-for-profit institutions and many more, as long as it captures the defining
characteristic of loyalty to cooperate in the interests of joint outcomes above individual outcomes.
In the language of utility, each member of a group internalises the payoffs to others in the groups
in their own utility function, resulting in cooperate behaviours that maximise joint outcomes,
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even if they conflict with pure selfish rationality.
Why should this behaviour come to predominate within groups? One answer is that acting
out of pure loyalty towards groups norms is an evolutionarily successful default strategy under
uncertainty. Rather than requiring the analysis of every possible consequential outcome from
each decision in terms of individual self-interest, pro-social defaults towards own-groups side-step
this impossible calculation yet result in dominant replication of members of cooperative groups
above the members of other selfish groups. In the language of evolutionary biology this is simple
multi-level selection between groups.1
With this in mind, individual A in the Figure 1.1 example will have different expectations about
the behaviour of B compared to that of C when facing a cooperative dilemma because they know
that B’s behaviour will be directed towards maximising their joint payoff, while C’s behaviour
will not. In a simple one shot prisoner’s dilemma, for example, the loyalty to the group shared
by A and B might enable them to mutually cooperate, while A and C would fear defection by
the other and resolve to the instrumentally rational outcome.
The potential complexity of competing interests within the macroeconomy also arises when agents
are members of more than one group, perhaps at different levels in the group hierarchy. Agent
B in Figure 1.1 is required to juggle their common group interest with A as well as their group
interests with C, even though A and C might often have conflicting interests.
The overlaid relationship network in Figure 1.1 shows how these same nested layers of group
loyalties, and potential conflicting loyalties, can be characterised by a structure of relationships
between individuals. Relationships represent unique individual-level knowledge about the loyal-
ties between the connected individuals. In this view cliques and clusters of loyal relationships
result in the emergence of what can be classified as groups. These two meso-level concepts
can be seen as consistent ways of representing the same underlying concepts of cooperative and
conflicting loyalties.
To be clear, meso-level structures of groups and networks co-evolve with the actions of individuals
within them; no simple causal story adequately captures the complex system emerging from
the circular flow of behaviour → loyalties → new behaviour. Where there is a possibility for
sub-groups to form where the benefits of doing so improve mutual and individual interests of
sub-group cooperators, and there is an environment in which individuals can identify who is
likely to be trusted to cooperate at this sub-group level, then the formation of nested competing
groups, and ultimately the splintering of larger groups into competing groups, can occur. A key
example of this co-evolution of groups is from Zachary (1977), who analysed friendship networks
in a university karate club in which there was disagreement in key pricing policies between
the club president and the external instructor. Loyalties to the instructor or club president
where in conflict with the higher level group loyalty to the club as a whole. By observing
the degree of cooperation amongst club members outside of the club it could be predicted which
members would follow the instructor, and which would follow the president, when the two parted
ways. While loyalties are a characteristic of established groups, this study clearly documents
how loyalties also contribute to the breakdown and reformation of group-level structures when
conflicts arise at different levels in the social group hierarchy. Such patterns of group evolution
have also been observed in legislator voting records of the U.S. House of Representatives, where
loyalty to party lines has become more dominant over time under party-level selection pressures
1A vast literature in evolutionary biology has covered the underlying debates surrounding multi-level selection
which have in the past decades been brought into the realm of economics. Eldakar & Wilson (2011) provides
a useful summary of group selection and the debates within evolutionary biology, while Bergstrom (2002) and
Henrich (2004) provide clear explanations of how these ideas can be incorporated into economic analysis.
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and hence decreasing congressional cooperation and increasing party-level conflict (Andris et al.
, 2015).
Even though groups do evolve over time, in most societies major groups, such as firms, political
parties, clubs and societies and so forth, are typically very stable over time even when there are
opportunities for sub-groups to emerge that can increase their own relative payoffs. The main
reason for this apparent stability is that groups develop institutions, or sets of rules and norms,
that promote loyalty to cooperative behaviours, particularly when there is competitive pressure
to coordinate against a group-level competitive threat. Such loyalty allows group members to
trust other members to conform to cooperation in the interests of maximising group payoffs, and
also to stymie behaviours like free-riding through costly punishment (van den Bergh & Gowdy,
2009; Frijters & Foster, 2013; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Rules and norms within a group may
themselves evolve over time as new ways to free-ride or to back-scratch emerge, yet as long as
the group has an institutional structure for creating and enforcing new rules they may continue
to protect themselves from back-scratching and free-riding from within, and reinforce the group
as a coherent social structure.
Another avenue for ensuring compliance with group rules and norms is a process of indoctrination
which can ensure the majority of group members internalise the idea that behaving in the interests
of the group is in their own interests, even if it may not always be (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005).
Internalisation allows for many members to invoke costly punishment or to report dissent, free-
riding, corruption or back-scratching despite the fact that their own payoffs may be higher
from joining the back-scratching alliance or sub-group. Such indoctrination of group identities
occurs at many levels. The nation state ensures citizens identify by nationality through years of
schooling, annual rituals and holidays, while many clubs and societies have ritual rites of passage.
Military units often have mythically intense selection regimes involving both intense physical
effort, and psychological challenges arising from elaborate punishments and humiliation which
serve to highlight the futility of non-conformance. Indoctrination is one important, and often
low cost, way that groups maintain stability and overcome threats from free-riding and back-
scratching, particularly when there are few group-level competitive threats that would incentivise
each individual to rationally choose cooperation at that group-level.
An economic understanding of these meso-level structures, and institutions that support them,
is so far limited in comparison to other social sciences (Frijters & Foster, 2013; Bergstrom, 2002;
Henrich, 2004). Perhaps this is because in a world of rational optimisers, market pricing and
negotiation can appropriately organise all production rendering the existence of such structures
superfluous. Indeed one of the great conundrums for economic theory is explaining the existence
of the dominant meso-level organisation for production activities, otherwise known as a firm. A
view first developed by Coase (1937) is that coordination through market prices has a cost, and
that there may be more efficient ways to cooperate, based on loyalty, trust, and reciprocity, that
emerges within firms as a result of selection mechanisms, which allow exclusion and inclusion
into group rewards via a system of internal rules.
How these non-market group systems function, along with their associated costs and benefits both
within and between groups, should be of considerable economic interest. While the potential
applications of such meso-level analysis in economics are vast, this thesis looks specifically at
the case of back-scratching, where loyal group (or sub-group) behaviours come with negative
externalities to those outside the group, making them inefficient for society as a whole. Political
rent-seeking, and corruption in particular, is likely to be prone to highly costly back-scratching
due the power to set new rules outside of market forces that advantage one group over another.
In economic analyses of political rent-seeking meso-level group structures that allow for political
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favouritism are usually ignored, with favours instead conceptualised as a lottery in which political
donations and lobbying activities are in effect the purchase of a lottery ticket (Lambsdorff, 2002a).
Armed with a framework of groups and networks, a better understanding of non-market co-
ordination can help design institutional rules and guide market regulations to ensure hinder
rent-seeking by ensuring that that intra-group cooperation and inter-group competition provide
benefits that exceed their costs. This is the common thread that flows through the following
Chapters, with each studying a specific element within this meso-level view of back-scratching.
The remainder of this chapter provides a broad but brief background on the process of trusted
favour exchange in groups and networks, narrowing down to the gaps in understanding of the
potential economic costs of these processes. It concludes with a road map of how the remain-
ing Chapters of the thesis contribute to filling some of these gaps in the particularly important
context of political favouritism and corruption.
1.2 Knowing which groups and networks
Groups and relationships primarily function as a means of establishing the trust necessary for
low-cost cooperation via reciprocation (Berg et al. , 1995; Buskens & Weesie, 2000; Mui, 2002;
Jackson et al. , 2012; Ga¨chter & Fehr, 1999; Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2000; Fischbacher et al. , 2001; Fehr
et al. , 2002; Efferson et al. , 2008; Fehr, 2009). Without offering a review of the debates around
exactly what trust is or is not, the basic function of trust is to allow one individual to voluntarily
make oneself vulnerable to incurring the costs or benefits arising from the discretionary choices
of others (Fehr, 2009). In practice this occurs in settings where an individual, A, requires at one
point in time to commit resources to another individual, B, who will then decide on the returns
to A from their prior commitment, and where a potential conflict exists between their individual
and joint interests. In experimental settings this dynamic occurs in many cooperative games,
including the public goods and ultimatum games, and in all repeated cooperative games. In real
life the cooperative settings requiring a degree of trust are even more pervasive, from dining at
a restaurant (trusting that food will be delivered as promised, and trusting that customers will
pay after eating), to financing a new business, to lending your car to a friend. Just about every
cooperative arrangement requires a degree of trust that the others involved will act in your joint
interests, in effect creating an ongoing gift exchange game.
How then do individuals identify who to trust, and who not to trust, in cooperative dilemmas?
The best answer relies on the use of signals as a way to provide common knowledge to others
about loyalties to competing reciprocal groups or relationships in cooperative settings involving
many individuals. Signals contain predictive value about the expected reciprocal behaviour of
others in a world where not everyone can observe the full history of past reciprocal behaviour
amongst all others. They allow each person to classify others according to a level of expected
reciprocity and sort their choices of cooperative partners based on those levels, which for the
sake of simplicity are called reputation.2 Typically it is understood that the costliness of signals
is what makes them ‘hard to fake’, in that they are only affordable to those individual for
2Reputation levels come under a variety of names depending on the specific application, including tags (Masuda
& Ohtsuki, 2007), reputation (Akerlof, 1980; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Bolton
et al. , 2005), image-scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al. , 2001; Bshary &
Grutter, 2006), types (Ones & Putterman, 2007; Ambrus & Pathak, 2011), signals (Lotem et al. , 2003; Huttegger
et al. , 2014), social capital (Fukuyama, 1999; Jackson et al. , 2012) or social approval (Ga¨chter & Fehr, 1999).
These same sorting effects from reputations also occur across species (Bshary & Grutter, 2006; Akc¸ay et al. ,
2010).
15
which the signal reflects true information. When it comes to reputation levels any signal can
be considered costly if an individual’s reputation level with one group creates material costs to
signalling reputation with other groups. As a result populations will sort over time into loyal
groups through selection of cooperative partners based on reputation signals (Wilson, 1974).
Reputation signalling as a way to evaluate the cooperative intentions of others, and hence choose
cooperative partners, is a common theme across many social sciences. It is one potential mech-
anism leading to homophily in social networks, a property that well connected individuals share
many common traits which they may use as signals (McPherson et al. , 2001; Masuda & Oht-
suki, 2007). An extreme example of this occurs in organised crime, where criminal gangs face
the complex problem of trusting a partner in crime to be loyal to gang, but not loyal to the
laws of society at large, reputation signalling can become an elaborate game itself, requiring
hard-to-fake commitments such as facial tattoos which generate often insurmountable costs to
leaving one group for another (Gambetta, 2009; Meier et al. , 2014). A similar dynamic is at play
in the evolution of religious cooperation where rituals help identify cooperative groups on a large
scale (Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011). In-group bias observed in social psychology is also consistent
with the idea of identifying signals of group loyalty being a primary consideration in cooperative
decisions, where in this case such identification leads to biases towards in-groups who exhibit
common traits, than out-groups, regardless of the arbitrariness of these categorisations (Tajfel
et al. , 1971; Hewstone et al. , 2002; Smith, 2011).
Reputation signalling is a consistent framework underpinning these findings, but it also allows for
meso-level structures of groups and networks to coevolve over time as evolutionary selection pro-
cesses favour particularly successful cooperative groups over others (Henrich, 2004; Efferson et al.
, 2008). Indeed there is a strong evolutionary logic behind cooperation in groups, particularly
the moral underpinnings of group selection. As Greene (2013) explains
Biologically speaking, humans were designed for cooperation, but only with some
people. Our moral brains evolved for cooperation within groups, and perhaps only
within the context of personal relationships. Our moral brains did not evolve for
cooperation between groups (at least not all groups). How do we know this? Because
universal cooperation is inconsistent with the principles of natural selection. I wish
it were otherwise, but there’s no escaping this conclusion
One important element within the signalling framework is the idea of an information thresh-
old for cooperation, or a minimum reputation level above which cooperation occurs. Within a
diverse population the general cooperative dilemma faced is whether individual i trusts indi-
vidual j to cooperate where individual i is only able to gauge the probability of individual j’s
reputation level based on observable signals. The probability of i making a cooperative choice
is then P (C|rj)P (rj), where the interpretation of signals generates expectations of reputation
levels P (rj) which in turn determines the likelihood of cooperation. Individuals face such co-
operative dilemmas both within and outside their own groups, and those with close or distant
relationships. The resulting patterns of cooperative outcomes can be economically efficient when
high reputation cooperation within groups is associated with positive externalities to those out-
side the group, or economically costly when the same cooperation is associated with negative
externalities to outsiders.
This framework generalises a common view of trust as being either particularised or generalised.3
3Generalised trust is often taken to be an aggregate nation-level measure of trust, typically determined with
the aid of survey questions such as In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or cant you be
too careful in dealing with people?. Yet the question is generally ambiguous in terms of the relevant reference
group of trusted others (Bjørnskov, 2007). It is easy to imagine that respondents from small towns who have
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Generalised trust is regarded as trust being extended to people where the parties have no direct
information about each other, yet the basics of the signalling framework that underpin individ-
ualised trust based on direct relationships are still present. This is easy to see when living and
travelling in foreign countries, where people often segregate into groups based on their country
of origin, where their generalised trust is conditional on certain observable factors that indicate
nationality. One could easily imagine a person with Thai parents, who grew up in Australia,
being able to pass off as a native when in Thailand. This would provide them higher trust with
Thai people, and lower trust with Australian tourists in Thailand. But by speaking English with
an Australian accent, wearing typical Australian clothes for their age, and talking about their
life in Australia, they could signal to others their membership of the ”Australian group” and
capitalise on the trust within that group.
Experimental evidence for this view of reputation-contingent cooperation comes form a number
of sources. Wedekind & Milinski (2000) enacted a repeated donation game in which groups of
eight players over six rounds could make a donation of 1 SFr to one other player which would
increase the payoff of the receiver by 4 SFr, meaning the optimal group outcome arises from
maximum donations by all players who earn their incomes from reciprocal donations in future
rounds. The twist is that each player has an observable image-score, or reputation, that increases
by one in a round where they donated, and decreases by one where they choose not to donate.
The main outcome is that a player’s image-score increased their chance of receiving a donation
over the game as others began to use that score as a signal of expectations of future reciprocation.
Higher average reputations increased group payoffs through increased trust which allowed for the
exchange of favours. In later work Milinski et al. (2002) used a mixed public goods and donation
game within groups to show how frequent interaction in donation games can foster a reputation
for indirect reciprocity, which influenced cooperation in a later public goods game within the
same group. In Pfeiffer et al. (2012), a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game was implemented
with an observable ‘good’ or ‘bad’ reputation score which is determined by a player’s previous
round cooperation. Adding just this score increased mutual cooperation from around 20% of
rounds in the no-score baseline, to around 80% with scores. These experiments demonstrate
that the degree to which individuals exhibit trust towards others is perhaps not an underlying
individual preference, but rests more on the ability to signal trustworthiness in order to provide
for mutually beneficial outcomes.
In these experimental studies it was clear to players in advance what meaning should be attributed
to reputation levels, yet in reality a core puzzle is how a diverse range of potential signals can
be interpreted as a reputation level in order to estimate P (rj) itself. Experimental evidence also
suggests a wide array of otherwise arbitrary markers can become signals when they are routinely
observed to be associated with certain behaviours. In an experiment by Efferson et al. (2008),
players were given arbitrary symbolic markers, either a, or e, which they kept for 80 rounds
of an experiment where they were required to choose a partner from their group in order to
play a coordination game either by i) a random other player, or ii) a random players with the
same marker. Where players where able to choose a partner with the same marker they began
to associate that marker with a particular coordination choice and greatly increased their joint
payoffs. Over time the experience of a choice-marker association allowed the marker to develop
into a reliable cooperative signal.
To summarise, trust is the missing economic ingredient for facilitating cooperation through the
regular face-to-face interactions with the majority of people in their town, which is the defining characteristic of
particularised trust, answer positively to this question not because of trust towards unknown others, but because
they most frequently encounter people with whom they have particularised trust.
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exchange of favours through time. Without trust, strictly rational defection in pursuit of in-
dividual self interest would predominate in all cooperative dilemmas. Individuals communicate
trust through reputation signals which acquire meaning through their observed ongoing asso-
ciation with particular cooperative choices, or identifiable groups who are observed to make
such choices. A relationship network reflects a mapping of individual-specific reputations, which
aggregate though others to create variation in observable reputations and hence patterns of co-
operative action which rely on a specific meso-level network structure. Such a structure can
also be represented by a nested pattern of group loyalties, where signals of group memberships
perform the role of reputation signals. These patterns of coordination are a core interest of this
thesis, particularly how it relates to aggregate patterns of signals in political environments, such
as donations, and how these lead to entrenchment of overlapping groups. This is the focus of
Chapter 3. Furthermore, the back-scratching situation where internal trust leads to inter-group
conflicts and aggregate inefficiency is common in many institutional settings. In Chapters 4
and 5 new experiments are used to look at potential policy tools for improving cooperative out-
comes in total where multiple conflicting sub-group outcomes are possible. The mechanisms of
coordination are important in both of these settings, but so are the costs.
1.3 Costs and benefits of groups and networks
Cooperation over time on the jointly beneficial outcome within a group can be seen as a system
of favour exchange via indirect reciprocity. Whether such exchanges are economically efficient in
aggregate depends on whether they are associated with positive or negative externalities to those
outside the group. Relationships often support efficient coordination with positive externalities,
though more recently there has been a research focus on cooperation across relationship networks
that is costly to others, often referred to as the ‘dark side’ of social networks, and obviously a
key element in the study of criminal organisations (Boettke, 2008; Graeff, 2009; Gambetta,
2009). The same potential for positive or negative externalities from favouritism occurs in rent-
seeking. If rent-seeking enables the use of trust and favour exchange to bypass cumbersome
legal constraints it can lead to an efficient outcome, greasing the wheels of productive commerce.
However most research finds that such political favours are purely a ‘grabbing hand’ method of
gaining internal benefits at the expense of others (Cingano & Pinotti, 2013; Del Rosal, 2011),
which in this thesis is called ‘back-scratching’.
Framing cooperative choices of groups in terms of the internal, external and aggregate economic
costs and benefits can be done as follows. An individual, i faces the choice of whether to cooperate
with individual j where that cooperation comes with an externality to individuals not chosen
to participate in the cooperative game. Cooperation between i and j on mutual choices relying
on a degree of trust, communicated through signals, creates a ‘group-like’ association between i
and j, such that their payoffs can be jointly considered as internal to the group and compared
to any externality imposed on others in order to judge the efficiency and distributive effects of
that cooperation.
Table 1.1 shows the two archetypal back-scratching scenarios. Payoffs represent a change relative
to an alternative cooperation option with no externalities. Two in-group players, i and j, are
able to coordinate on either A or B where A has the lower joint payoff, though higher than
the alternative, and B the highest, while mis-coordination decreases joint benefits below the
alternative available cooperative outcome. If the group, i and j, are able to coordinate on A or
B they are able to increase their own payoffs at a cost to others.
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Table 1.1: Examples of Type 1 and 2 cooperation compared to reference
j
Group A B Ext. Total
A 1 , 1 -2 , 1 -1 0 1 -1
i
B 1 , -2 2 , 2 0 -5 -1 -1
The cooperative choices shown in Table 1.1 represent two distinct classes of back-scratching.
First is the redistribution class represented by cooperation on A. With an internal group payoff,
g, and externality, e, this class occurs where g > 0, e < 0, (g + e) > 0. Total social payoffs
are higher than the next alternative, though there is a degree of redistribution. Second is the
corruption class, represented by cooperation on B, where g > 0, e < 0, (g + e) < 0. This type of
cooperation is economically inefficient for society as a whole because the external costs outweigh
the internal gains to the group. Such a situation was argued to be prevalent in economic and
political matters by Olson (1982) who remarked that groups will impose external costs as they
redistribute gains towards themselves that can “exceed the amount redistributed by a huge
multiple.”In the absence of negative externalities, a cooperative outcome that increases within
group payoffs and total payoffs could be classed as a ‘helping hand’ type of cooperation.
In light of the potential economic importance of back-scratching, researchers have adopted nu-
merous approaches to quantifying the internal benefits and external costs in a variety of settings.
Because counterfactual outcomes are rarely observable in reality, back-scratching classes of co-
operation have also been extensively studied in experimental conditions. A selection of the more
pertinent empirical and experimental studies from this vast literature are reviewed below with
the intention of revealing some of the gaps in understanding of back-scratching processes.4
To identify winners and losers from back-scratching and quantify external costs in a corporate
environment, Baker & Faulkner (2004) studies a white collar crime case involving 230 investors
in the Fountain Oil & Gas Company which raised $11.5million from its 230 investors in the two
years prior to 1988. The company was subject to financial fraud by the owner Charles Fuentes
and his brothers James and Kenneth who were also managers, and went bankrupt in March 1989
after drilling a number of dry wells. The researchers used a telephone survey of 31% (or 72)
of the investors in 1998 to elicit information on relationship networks on investment decisions.
While 67% of investors lost all their money, those who relied in interpersonal relationships to
guide their decision to invest were far less likely to lose money. The protection from loss afforded
to the well-connected investors arose from favourable ex post allocations of proceeds, despite
investing in the same oil wells, “indicating illegal practice of preferential treatment of investors.”
The gains to connected ‘in-group’ investors were a direct transfer from unconnected investors,
indicating the presence of corruption class back-scratching.
In a similar vein Cingano & Pinotti (2013) evaluated the private returns and social costs of
corporate political connections to Italian local governments over the 1985-97 period using a
sample of longitudinal firm-level micro-data matched with the complete set of local politicians.
This allowed for the estimation of productivity losses or gains arising from obtaining relationships
to elected officials, thus quantifying whether back-scratching was occurring. The crux of their
method is the estimation of two equations; one for the impact of political connections on firms
4The growing literature documenting reliable correlations between firm value gains and new political connec-
tions is also informative in terms of the cooperative benefits from relationships and common group memberships
(Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Engelberg et al. , 2012; You & Du, 2012; Cingano & Pinotti, 2013; Hasan et al. ,
2014; Amore & Bennedsen, 2013; Gray et al. , 2014)
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revenues, which they find increases revenues by 3.2% per additional year of being connected to
an elected official, and one for the impact of political connections on firm productivity, for which
they find no significant effect. They conclude that the economic losses arise from distorting the
allocation of public expenditure, though the scale of any losses will depending the elasticity of
substitution between public service inputs. There is hence clear evidence of redistribution class
back-scratching, though not corruption class back-scratching, being sustained by these political
relationships.
Two more studies are informative of the challenges facing identification of back-scratching classes
due to the lack of a counterfactual. Faccio (2006) look at the probability of International Mone-
tary Fund and World Bank bailouts to politically connected firms in 35 countries between 1997
and 2002, finding a 2.7% increase in the likelihood of a bailout from direct political connections.5
They note however, that “[t]racing through the ultimate beneficiaries of a bailout is difficult”
and that lenders, borrower and politicians all appear to obtain some benefits. They find that
the return on assets of bailed-out connected firms is significantly lower that for bailed-out non-
connected firms two years after the bailout, suggesting a degree of inefficiency from the preference
of bail-outs to connected firms. Engelberg et al. (2012) also evaluate the role of direct relation-
ships in supporting back-scratching in the context of favourable lending conditions by banks to
firms. Relationships between banks and firms come from overlapping periods at the same college
or employer for firm executives and the bank managers who extended them commercial loans.
They use US data on 20,000 commercial loans between 2000 and 2007, with 5,000 borrowers
and 1,900 lenders along with 65,000 unique directors and executives, finding a strong correlation
between the number relationships between the bank and borrower and lower interest rates. In
terms of economic efficiency, their analysis of firm performance indicates that connected firms
with favourable borrowing conditions perform better ex post. The authors conclude that there is
hence little economic cost to favouritism due to this performance measure, though they do not
fully consider the counterfactual world in which unconnected firms obtained lenient borrowing
would therefore have had a greater chance of higher performance. These results are supported by
those of Hasan et al. (2014) who find a positive correlation between recent political connections
and access to bank financing in Poland. Together these studies are indicative of widespread
redistribution class back-scratching, yet also highlight the identification problems of empirical
verification of cost and benefits.6
Experimental approaches to back-scratching centre around the Repeated Bribery Game (RBG)
first developed by Abbink et al. (2002), with a growing array of approaches are now taken to
capture the economic elements of corruption under different institutional settings (see Abbink &
Serra (2012) for an extensive review). The main differentiating feature of corruption experiments
from other cooperative experiments is that increasing one’s own payoff requires cooperation of
at least one other player, which increases those cooperative player’s payoffs while imposing costs
on others. Shirking in a public goods game, for example, will increase payoffs for that player but
requires no ‘partner in crime’ to do so, and hence does not capture the core element of corruption
5“[A] company is defined as politically connected if at least one of its top officers (defined as the companys
chief executive officer, chairman of the board (COB), president, vice-president, or secretary of the board) or a
large shareholder (defined as anyone controlling at least 10% of the companys voting shares) was head of state
(i.e., president, king, or prime minister), a government minister (as defined below), or a member of the national
parliament, as of the beginning of 1997” (Faccio, 2006).
6Other work quantifying the value of relationships within groups include You & Du (2012), which find a positive
correlation between politically connected CEOs in China and their firm performance, and Amore & Bennedsen
(2013), who find that even in the low-corrupt country such as Denmark family local council connections lead to
higher firm values when those connections gain political power through the amalgamation of council areas. Both
of these studies are also unable to provide a reliable quantification of the externalities.
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as a group process.
The basic RBG stage game involves two players in the role of briber and public official, where
the briber first makes a choice of how much to offer as a bribe (if any), after which the official
makes the choice to accept the bribe (or not), and then makes an allocation decision from two
alternative, one which favours the briber. A public official’s allocation choice in favour of the
briber triggers a negative externality determined by the experimenter, either by subtracting
earnings from other subjects in the experimental session (Abbink et al. , 2002; Abbink, 2004),
or by reducing the size of a charity donation by the experimenter (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010;
Schikora, 2011b; van Veldhuizen, 2011). In the original design of Abbink et al. (2002), where the
externality is -3 experimental currency units on 16 other players in the experimental session. The
joint payoff to the potential briber i and public official j is 72 (36 each) under the non-favoured
choice with no externalities.
The change from this baseline with optimal bribing and reciprocation of favours between the
briber-official pair is g = 24 and e = −48, providing a clear corruption class setup with a
quantifiable counterfactual. Compared to the case where reciprocation is possible with no exter-
nalities (g = 24 and e = 0) there is no significant difference observed in bribery or cooperative
favouritism. This result is supported in the later work of Bu¨chner et al. (2008) and Cameron
et al. (2009) who find that the size of the externality makes no difference to cooperation in the
RBG and its variations, although Barr & Serra (2009) finds an effect in a one-shot version of the
game. Cameron et al. (2009) found that even with the chance of punishment by a third player
78- 93% of players in the RBG will offer a bribe, with 77-93% of bribed officials reciprocating by
making an allocation decision that favours the briber even with corruption class externalities.7
The basic RBG design has since been augmented to allow for whistle-blowing (Schikora, 2011a;
Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010), an outside informed monitor (Schikora, 2011b), payoff variations
that mimic high non-bribery wages (van Veldhuizen, 2011; Armantier & Boly, 2008), and ‘citizen’
and probabilistic punishment (Abbink et al. , 2002; Serra, 2012; Cameron et al. , 2009). Abbink
(2004) cautions though that the fixed briber-official setup of the RBG, where the experimenter
determines the only possible alliance pair, or in-group, does not fit situations where unobserved
alliances already exist before policy interventions take place, nor where the composition of groups
or alliances is completely indeterminate ex ante and where potential partners have to find each
other rather than be paired by the experimenter.
A useful contrast to the RBG approach to back-scratching is in Smith et al. (2012) who use a
loose experimental setup in which payers can devote their resources to the formation of groups,
and to expend pooled group resources to capture the resources of other groups. This setup reflects
corruption class back-scratching, where internal group benefits from capturing resources of others
come with an external cost that exceeds the gains. In the treatment allowing the formation of
groups, resources devoted to combative and defensive activities were lower (65%) than in the
treatment where players could not pool resources (72%). While groups did form endogenously
due to the cooperative advantages for members, stability of groups was not apparent and they
often broke down through the formation of sub-groups. These results suggests that the stability
of groups is an important element in the economics of back-scratching, and a potential focal
point of policy interventions seeking to curtail it.
7Participants in India were on average 15 percentage points more likely to bribe than the participants in
Australia, 9.9 percentage points more likely to bribe than participants in Indonesia, and 5.4 percentage points
more likely than participants in Singapore.
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1.4 Contributions
To improve understanding of back-scratching and the economic consequences of it, requires
studying individual components in detail in particular circumstances. To that end, each chapter
of this thesis studies a specific elements of this type of cooperation. Each of these chapters stands
alone and they can be read in any order.
First is the quantification of the size of internal gains and external costs from corruption class
back-scratching amongst political elites in routine policy decisions. Establishing that favours
given to related insiders are in fact costly to society is a challenge of the empirical literature. In
Chapter 2 I report an event study in Queensland, Australia, using value-enhancing land-rezoning
as a political favour able to be given to selected landowners. Using relationship networks of
landowners who were rezoned, compared to landowners of comparable sites immediate outside
rezoned areas, I tease out the degree to which relationships determine rezoning and hence support
a back-scratching type trade in favours amongst the well-connected. Moreover, using historical
sales data of these inside and outside lots I estimate the size of the value gains from rezoning,
which are transfers from the public at large who could have instead sold the additional rights to
landowners. The peculiar shapes of the rezoned areas, which conflict with previous plans, indicate
that these rezoning decisions not only involved a redistribution of value from the public at large
to the connected landowners, but were also where inefficient compared to alternatives and hence
a clean example of corruption class back-scratching. The size of the gains to connected insiders
from rezoning are estimated at $410million, suggesting that this type of political back-scratching
can have high costs to outsiders even in relatively low corruption countries like Australia.
A second contribution is to frame political donations as public reputation signals, which is the
focus of Chapter 3. Doing so provides a much better understanding the process of entrenchment
of elite political groups, or institutional sclerosis in the vernacular of Olson (1982), whereby
special interest groups incur great economic cost on the community as they reallocate wealth
towards themselves. By incorporating the element of signalling as a group formation process,
the model introduced in Chapter 3 also provides a useful interpretation for the hedging donation
strategies commonly used in Australia, Canada and Germany, whereby political donors give
money to two or more political parties, often in equal proportion. In the language of groups
and networks these donors have reputations above a threshold value amongst multiple political
parties, and like agent B in Figure 1.1, are able to cooperate within two or more identifiable
groups. The predictions of the model are also tested by looking at corporate directorship roles
as an alternative reputation signalling mechanism, with hedging donors also showing clustering
in the corporate cross-directorship network in Australia.
Third, and perhaps the obvious next step, is to investigate the type of institutional designs that
could discourage back-scratching by interfering with the ability to sustain implicit favour ex-
changes that are costly to outsiders. Chapters 4 and 5 report two experimental approaches to
this problem, utilising a new experimental design that requires the selection of cooperative part-
ners from a larger group and hence relies on some kind of signalling to sustain the group loyalty
necessary for corruption class back-scratching. Chapter 4 reports the results on implementing a
rotation system and a low rent policy in this new setup. The rotation system, much like com-
mon staff rotation procedures in sensitive matters such as auditing and customs, is designed in
inhibit the ability to create loyalty with new partners through repeated favour exchange. The
low rent policy decreases the value of discretion decisions, effectively reducing g below zero in a
corruption class cooperative outcome, and reflects the implementation of bureaucratic rule-based
institutions. As an example of this low rent idea, the rezoning event studied in Chapter 2 is one
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where high value rezoning decisions are given to landowners at no cost. A policy that required
additional development rights to be sold would decrease the value of the discretion about which
areas to rezone, and hence reflect a low rent policy.
Chapter 5 uses the new experimental design to test the efficacy of transparency policies in
curtailing corruption class back-scratching by interfering with group reputation signalling. In
terms of the signalling framework presented earlier, enabling outsiders to see who is favouring
who and the costs to them from it, may discourage the in-group from maintaining the alliance as
it may cost them reputations at a higher level group in which they are nested. Two transparency
methods are used. First players are merely notified of the group-optimal outcome after a decision
to ensure that outsiders have full knowledge of the occurrence and cost of back-scratching.
Second, player photographs are used to identify each player. The first information treatment
does not break down back-scratching alliances. The second identification treatment using photos
does not change the probability of alliance formation due to two countervailing forces; more rapid
alliance formation due to the use of signals, or social cues, from the photos as a coordination
device, and more prosocial forces at the group level that lead to shorter alliances. For policy
makers there are lessons about when and where transparency may curtail corruption, and where
it may in fact facilitate it.
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Chapter 2
Clean money, dirty system:
Relationship networks and land
rezoning
Abstract
We use a unique regulatory event that occurred in Queensland, Australia, from 2007-2012, to
examine the predictive power of landowner relationship networks and lobbying behaviour on
successfully gaining value-enhancing rezoning. A State authority, the Urban Land Development
Authority (ULDA), took planning control away from local councils in selected areas in order to
increase the speed and scale of development in those areas, in the process increasing land values.
Using micro-level relationship data from multiple sources, we compare the relationship-network
characteristics of landowners of comparable sites inside and outside the ULDA areas, finding
that ‘connected’ landowners owned 75% of land inside the rezoned areas, and only 12% outside,
capturing $410 million in land value gains out of the total $710 million from rezoning. The
marginal gains to all landowners of becoming connected in our sample were $190 million. We
also find that engaging a professional lobbyist is a substitute for having one’s own connections.
Scaling up from our sample of six rezoned areas to the hundreds of rezoning decisions across
Queensland and Australia in the last few decades, suggests that many billions of dollars of
economic rent are being regularly transferred from the general population to connected land
owners through political rezoning decisions.
2.1 Introduction
Land rezoning involves two distinct decisions, one is to rezone more land to be higher-density
and the second is the precise area where new planning rules apply. Political pressure to expand
higher value zoning areas is usually argued to come from owners of undeveloped land who directly
benefit, in concert with a wide range of secondary beneficiaries who live in the wider region, such
as banks and construction companies, in a type of ‘growth coalition’ (Molotch, 1976; Terhorst
& Van De Ven, 1995; Strom, 1996; Grabowski, 2013). The secondary decision, where exactly to
rezone, involves the allocation of property rights from the community to the owners of the land
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within the rezoning boundary at the moment of rezoning. In the absence of mechanisms such
as land value taxes or betterment taxes that recoup the value of the resulting price-differential,
there is scope for bargaining between politicians and land owners of different areas, including
the potential for corruption and bribery during the final determination of rezoning boundaries.
We study this secondary decision in Queensland, Australia, where we look at the influence of
political connections on rezoning, documenting the relations that predict political favours and
calculating the value of those favours. We look at six rezoning area decisions taken long after an
announced intention to rezone, comparing the political connections of landowners on the inside
with those just on the outside, where the inside areas differed greatly from areas that were flagged
previously as subject to imminent rezoning, which is exactly what you would expect if political
insiders were maximising their rents by rezoning in unexpected places.1
Our method is to combine longitudinal data on land plot owners and sale prices with data on
the connections between landowners and a large set of entities involved in rezoning.
One might think political influence goes via donations to political parties. Surprisingly, in our
data the observed donations from landowners do not predict rezoning decisions, perchance be-
cause in Australia the role of campaign funds that pay for media exposure is very limited. To
document how political influence is then attained, we combine a myriad of related data into
a single network so as to find out whether positions in whole networks help explain political
favours.
Our relationship network comprises corporate ownership and directorship connections of landown-
ers and their companies; connections from employing professional lobbyists; property industry
group membership; and many other connection types. We uncover marked differences in the
network characteristics of the successful landowners and the unsuccessful ones, in accord with
the idea that advantageous positions in relationship networks help to make implicit deals that
take advantage of a missing formal market in political favours(Sobel, 2002; Jackson et al. , 2012;
Coleman, 1990; Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 2005). This adds to the literature on urban develop-
ment and zoning decisions, where very little is currently known about the role of such relationship
networks in rezoning decisions, though the role of relationships has been widely argued to be
important (Simon & Henneberry, 2000; Calabrese et al. , 2007; Sole´-Olle´ & Viladecans-Marsal,
2012; Dehring et al. , 2008; Hilber & Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Engle et al. , 1992; Sole´-Olle´ &
Viladecans-Marsal, 2013).
Our findings are remarkably similar to those in a recent working paper by Mastrobuoni (2015).
They looked at the relationship networks of US mafiosi from the 1950s and 1960s and found
that those who were in close-nit cliques, as measured by network closeness centrality, had higher
wealth in terms of the value of their property holdings. We find the same: the landowners who
were part of close-nit cliques and hence had high closeness centrality were much more like to be
favourably rezoned, even conditional on the contribution of more simple indicators of political
connections such as donations and the use of professional lobbyists.
Using historical sale price data, we calculate the implicit transfer from the community to these
favoured connected property developers to be 58% of the $710 million of improved land value of
the rezoning, which they received by owning 75% of the rezoned areas, implying that very little
1Our paper mainly relates to the urban planning literature on political determinants of planning decisions,
particularly event studies of political favouritism (Lubell et al. , 2005; De Figueiredo & Richter, 2013; Calabrese
et al. , 2007; Sole´-Olle´ & Viladecans-Marsal, 2012; Dehring et al. , 2008; Hilber & Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Engle
et al. , 1992; Sole´-Olle´ & Viladecans-Marsal, 2013; Schone et al. , 2013; Amore & Bennedsen, 2013; Ahlfeldt &
Maennig, 2015).
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of the price benefit of rezoning goes to the general public. At the margin, the value gains to all
property holders from becoming connected were $190 million. When scaled up from our sample
to the national level, these results suggest that each year many billions of value gains are being
redirected toward well connected land owners at the expense of the unconnected, which includes
the general public that has the ex ante property rights over the rezoning decisions.
Whilst we do not directly observe the quid pro quo aspect within these relationship networks
(apart from the publicly available political party contributions, which are relatively small), there
have been many criminal cases and scandals that are informative about that quid pro quo. Several
high-profile cases document how the property developers are often direct family members of the
politicians involved2 or how the politicians, either before they run for office or once out of office,
join property developers as directors or co-owners (Dodson et al. , 2006).
The picture that emerges from our analyses is that property development and rezoning is one of
the biggest rent-seeking activities for local and State politics in Queensland, with a small set of
connected property developers getting the lion’s share of the new property rights from rezoning,
in a process involving politicians from both the major political parties over long periods of time.
This favours a view of political rent-seeking as a process of entrenchment of insiders who are
well-informed and well-connected to the bureaucratic procedures and work the system to their
mutual advantage at the expense of outsiders. For instance, simply being connected to the
main component of the relationship network in our sample increases the probability of being
favourably rezoned by 19 percent, while a move from the minimal to maximal level of centrality
in that network provides an additional 25 percent increase in rezoning probability. Employing a
professional lobbyist increases this probability by 37 percent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the related literature,
followed by the institutional background to our event study in Section 3. Section 4 outlines our
data and methods of analysis, with the results presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the
result and potential policy options for pricing the political favors done in rezoning.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper mainly contributes to the literature on social and political determinants of urban plan-
ning decisions and the use of event studies, or quasi-natural experiments, to tease out potential
causal relationships in terms of political favouritism at sub-national levels of government (Lubell
et al. , 2005; De Figueiredo & Richter, 2013; Calabrese et al. , 2007; Sole´-Olle´ & Viladecans-
Marsal, 2012; Dehring et al. , 2008; Hilber & Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Engle et al. , 1992; Sole´-Olle´
& Viladecans-Marsal, 2013; Schone et al. , 2013). Additionally, the paper is a demonstration of
how relationship networks, in addition to direct political connections, can enable valuable favour
exchanges in local and State level politics in a relatively low corruption country. We briefly
review the papers closest to ours.
Sole´-Olle´ & Viladecans-Marsal (2012) look at political determinants of the ratio of new land
assigned for urban development within Spanish municipalities, using a data sample of 2,034
municipalities over the period 2003-07, which covers a single municipal political term. They
ascertain that electoral margins are significantly related to the decision of how much land is
rezoned for development, with tighter margins resulting in less rezoning. In later work, Sole´-Olle´
2For example former Brisbane Mayor and Queensland Premier Campbell Newman’s close school friends and
father-in-law are property developers (Callinan, 2012).
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& Viladecans-Marsal (2013) use this data to look at the influence of political parties on urban
zoning using a regression discontinuity design that looks at party incumbency while controlling
for the vote share, finding that left-wing governments rezoned 65% less than similar right-wing
governments in their preferred model specification. These two studies primarily concern the
decision to rezone in the first place. Where we differ from these studies is that our primary
interest is the secondary decision of the precise locations of newly rezoned areas, which is where
the winners and losers are ultimately determined and where relationships and organised interests
perhaps play a greater role. We hypothesis that for the ‘growth coalition’ it is not so important
where the precise boundaries are, but such knowledge is crucial for the individual property
developer who has taken up an asset position prior to rezoning.
In a study of the role of these competing interests in urban planning decisions, Schone et al.
(2013) look at the taxe locale d’e´quipement (TLE), a local development tax similar to North
American impact fees in the 293 municipalities in the French Rhoˆne Department. TLE is paid
to the municipality by developers when they are granted a building permit and is levied at
a politically determined rate of the estimated building value (which can be up to 5%). By
examining variables capturing lobbies of aligned interests3 and controlling for interactions with
neighbouring municipalities, they find that a larger homeowner lobby is related to a higher TLE
rate, while a larger undeveloped landowner lobby is related to lower TLE rate, indicating that
urban planning policies can be swayed by their direct beneficiaries. They found no effect on TLE
rates from the size of the construction sector, indicating that the ‘growth machine’ alliance differs
due to local circumstances: a lower TLE rate is beneficial only for owners of undeveloped land
and may not affect the rate of new construction. Like our study, Schone et al. (2013) cleanly
identify the winners and losers of an urban planning decision, and look closely at the relative
dominance of vested interests in planning outcomes. Where we add to these results is that we
more directly measure both ownership of actual properties and the network characteristics of
owners.
In terms of quantifying the payoffs from direct political connections to local government, Amore &
Bennedsen (2013) use an event study of changes to municipal boundaries in relatively uncorrupt
Denmark where the number of politicians-per-person exogenously decreased in some municipal-
ities but not others, which the authors interpreted as an increase of the political power of the
population in municipalities. They test whether this increase in political power had an effect on
the profitability of firms with family ties4 to those politicians, finding an increase in operating
return on assets for family-connected firms of 3.3%, reflecting an elasticity of firm performance
to political power of family members approximating unity. This strong effect of family ties in
a low-corruption country suggests that local level corruption in property zoning allocations is
easier to sustain and harder to eradicate than corruption at the more visible national level. Our
study too deals with relationships at a sub-national governments level, though we more directly
observe the full set of winners and losers, as well as non-family relationships with others in the
property market networks.
This clear evidence of payoffs from direct reciprocity between family members is broadly in line
with many other findings of the payoffs to direct political relationships in other countries such as
Italy (Cingano & Pinotti, 2013), China (You & Du, 2012) and Indonesia (Fisman, 2001), amongst
3Their variables are somewhat indirect since some the key variables are unobserved: they hence proxy ownership
of existing developed land in a municipality by the home ownership rate; ownership of undeveloped land is proxied
by the proportion of farmers in the population; and the ‘growth machine’ lobby is proxied by the share of employees
in the construction sector.
4Parent, child, sibling and current or former spouse(s).
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others5 (Hillman, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al. , 2006; Chen et al. , 2011). A dominant focus of
this literature is on stock market effects to changing connections, such as in Hillman (2005) and
Fisman et al. (2012), while effects on direct policy variables are rarely observable. We therefore
add to new elements to this literature by documenting the policy effect of indirect connections
on policy outcomes that favour the connected.
At a more general level, these studies fit into a growing literature demonstrating the role of
relationship networks in sustaining implicit favourable exchanges at the political level (Fischer,
2013; Dassen, 2010; Howlett, 2002; Jackson et al. , 2012). Typically an advantageous position in
a relationship network is described by the term ‘social capital’. Yet, exactly which characteristics
of the relationship network provide value remains contested (Burt, 2000; Durlauf, 2002; Svendsen
& Svendsen, 2009; Chai & Rhee, 2010). Coleman’s (1990) view is that value arises from closure
within a network, that is, the local density of relationships provide the mechanism for small
groups to monitor and pressure each other to behave in a particular cooperative way. In contrast,
Burt (1995) suggests that brokerage across structural holes, connecting otherwise disconnected
parts of the network, provides a positional monopoly that has value for an individual as they
are the sole broker across different parts of the network.6 By looking at multiple relationship
network metrics we are able to provide some evidence on which underlying network characteristic
appears dominant in terms of payoffs from rezoning decisions in Queensland: having close ties in
a sub-group (‘closeness’) or being the common element across many sub-groups (‘betweenness’).
These indirect network characteristics are particularly important because direct relationships
between land owners and politicians arouse suspicion, and have the potential to lead to corruption
complaints and prosecution (CMC, 2009).7
In sum, the main contribution of this paper is to look at the micro-mechanism of influence by
vested interests in rezoning decisions, thus complementing previous work showing that indeed
urban planning outcomes at municipal levels reflect local interests. As the mechanisms for
influence we examine relates to the position of land owners in a relationship network, our study
also provides evidence to discern between two major competing theories of network influence.
2.3 Institutions
2.3.1 Timeline and planning processes
In Queensland, property owners and property developers who want to change the use of their
land have to go through an approval process with their local council. Approvals can be sought for
increasing the building-density (floor area ratio), and/or building-type, to the maximum allowed
for the zoning type the land falls within. Both the decision to approve land use changes within
a zone, and the decision of what the zone and its associate development limits will be in an
area, is mainly a matter for local councils, of which there are 77 in Queensland. Our focus is on
the period 2004-12 in which the State took both these planning responsibilities away from local
councils in a number of areas.
5Though in contrast, Gray et al. (2014) found that in Australia during the 2004-2011 period the appointment
of a politically connected directors had no substantial direct impact on shareholder value for listed companies.
6This is a reformulated and extended view of the ‘strength of weak ties’ argument (Granovetter, 1985, 2005).
7Many direct relationships that exist in reality are likely to be concealed from the public records used to
assemble our dataset. This is likely to bias results against an importance of centrality, since the single valuable
bridging relationship, such as a family member with connections to both politicians and property owners, is the
very type of relationship likely to be concealed from public records.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Queensland’s parallel planning processes
Following the early 2000s house price boom, the Queensland government implemented two par-
allel planing processes: first, in 2004, it published an overall plan establishing an intention to
rezone, as well as an initial map of the relevant potential rezoning areas; second, it took planning
powers away from local councils in designated areas by way of the Urban Land Development
Authority (ULDA), set up in 2007 and in operation until 2012, during which the ULDA decided
on 17 new rezoning areas. A decision by the ULDA on a rezoned area thus reset the area’s
zoning-type and simultaneously designated the rezoned areas as falling under the approval pro-
cess of the ULDA, not the councils. A timeline of these two distinct and conflicting planning
processes, including the various drafts and amendments, is provided in Figure 2.1.
The first of these planning processes was the South East Queensland (SEQ) Regional Plan 2005-
2026, the purpose of which was to
...guide growth and development in SEQ to 2026. It also identifies areas that,
subject to further investigation, may be suitable for medium to longer-term develop-
ment. The extent to which this urban pattern is achieved will depend upon a number
of factors, including future growth rates, community attitudes and behaviours, gov-
ernment regulation, the ability to provide infrastructure efficiently and technology
(Mackenroth, 2004).
This State-level plan occupied the top of the planning hierarchy, meaning that local councils
were to ensure their planning schemes were consistent with this overarching plan. Thus through
this process the State indirectly controlled planning outcomes, but local councils still determined
their own zoning areas and approved new developments. The plan itself evolved through time,
with multiple drafts and amendments reflecting results of various consultation efforts, and an
updated plan was finalised in 2009.
Alongside this supposedly technical planning process, the State government announced on 25
July 2007 a Housing Affordability Strategy which flagged the creation of a statutory body, the
ULDA, via the Urban Land Development Authority Act 2007, which was passed just 6 weeks
later on 6 September 2007. The stated intention was:
For sites nominated by the Queensland government, the role of the Authority
will be to undertake land use planning, land amalgamation and acquisition, land
improvement, development assessment and then on-sell land and development rights
to private sector developers (DIP, 2007).
Nine areas were flagged for inclusion: Woolloongabba, Bowen Hills, Northshore Hamilton,
Fitzgibbon, Mackay showgrounds, Yarrabilba, Caloundra South, Coomera, and Ripley Valley.
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Of these areas, Woolloongabba, Fitzgibbon and Mackay showgrounds were fully State-owned or
controlled sites, and Coomera never came under ULDA control. Of the 5 areas later declared
under the control of the ULDA four of these, with the exception of Greater Flagstone, were also
State-controlled sites. In the remaining areas, most land was privately owned, meaning that all
benefits from the increased development densities that accompanied ULDA declaration would
accrue to private land owners.8 It is thus these six areas that we focus on, since the determina-
tion of these exact rezoning areas may reveal the political influence of land owners in and around
these areas. The exact rezoned areas were declared between 2008 and 2010: Bowen Hills (BH)
and Hamilton Northshore (HN) - 28 March 2008, Greater Flagstone (GF), Ripley Valley (RV)
and Yarrabilba - 8 October 2010, and Caloundra South - 22 October 2010. By law the ULDA
was to take advice from the relevant Minister when considering the declaration of areas to fall
within its planning power, providing an avenue for political influence.
Figure 2A.1 in the Appendix shows the evolution of the intended rezoning areas as identified in
the SEQRP process, as well as the final ULDA areas. What is striking is how different the actual
decisions are from the previously stated intentions: in all cases, the final decision is in another
place and comprises a much smaller area than in the original SEQ Regional Plan, or even of
the updated SEQ Regional Plans. For instance, for Greater Flagstone and Yarrabilba, the final
rezoning in 2010 is in a completely different place to the intended rezoning area of 2009. For
the Ripley valley and Caloundra South, the eventual zone is a small subset of the intended zone
announced as late as 2009.
Since the councils were supposed to be preparing for the future based on the SEQRP plans,
we consider the local Council planning process underway for each eventual ULDA area in turn,
providing prima facie evidence of whether the councils were responsible for the eventual rezoned
areas or whether other interests drove it.
First, the Ripley Valley area falls within the borders of the Ipswich City Council, which flagged
this area for future development in their Ipswich Consolidated Planning Scheme, implemented in
December 2005, which fed into the draft of the first SEQ Regional Plan. The eventual outcome
was a subset of the area that the council had in mind, and had little to do with the area that
the SEQRP had designated as an area worth investigating.
The Caloundra South area fell within the borders of the Caloundra Council prior to its amalga-
mation into the Sunshine Coast Regional Council in 2008. The eventual ULDA area at Caloundra
South was first promoted as a location for urban development in 1988 by the Emanuel Group
corporation, but even up till 2004, the Caloundra City Plan designated the area no more than a
‘Further Investigation Area’ with no firm plans for rezoning, essentially because of environmental
protection concerns (the area was covered by flooding and wetlands protection legislation). Yet,
in 2004, Stockland, a stock-exchange listed Queensland developer, acquired Lensworth Ltd, a
Fosters Group company that had owned the site since 1998. In that same year, the site suddenly
became a feature of State-level planning documents, including the first Draft SEQRP. When the
site was declared by the ULDA, the local media reported that then State Premier Anna Bligh
acknowledged she had received representations from the developer prior to taking the step of
declaring the area under the control of the ULDA.
Yarrabilba and Greater Flagstone fell within the jurisdiction of Logan City Council. Prior to the
ULDA declaration in October 2010, Logan City Council had adopted its own Yarrabilba Land
8While the ULDA did implement a variety of infrastructure charges, including a ‘value uplift charge’ that was
an additional fee per lot designed to capture some of the value gains from the ULDA declaration, the net effect
of the declaration was a windfall gain to landowners.
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Use Structure Plan (LUSP) in March 2010 that complied with the SEQ Regional Plan and that
in large part was consistent with its own 2004 plan. Yet, the eventual ULDA decision bore no
resemblance to either the 2004 plan, or the March 2010 plan.
Importantly, at the time of the ULDA declaration, Yarrabilba contained a large tract of land held
under option since 2003 by the Lend Lease company, which had already lodged a development
application to override the Council planning scheme (zoning). A screenshot of internal Lend
Lease documents in Figure 2A.2 of the Appendix details the long and complicated process that
Lend Lease had gone through, unsuccessfully, to get approval from the Logan council. Where
the company failed with the council, it succeeded with the ULDA, to the apparent surprise of
the council.
The case of Yarrabilba shows a direct and successful attempt of a property developer getting
the State to do its bidding, in the form of a ‘grabbing hand’ series of planning decisions by the
State. Even as of 2015, there is likely to be continued influence by Lend Lease on the planning
process, as their internal reports suggest a strategic goal to develop the whole area for urban
development, even though most of the site remains outside of the urban footprint designated in
the current SEQ Regional Plan.
The Greater Flagstone ULDA area included a relatively small area determined as suitable for
urban development by the Logan City Council in 2009 following a ‘structure planning process’,
and reflecting the March 2006 SEQ Regional Plan Amendment. The eventual ULDA area only
contained previously announced areas in about 20% of the ULDA area, with 80% being outside
of announced prior plans. Importantly, one large corporation owned the 20%: the MTAA Su-
perannuation fund, which purchased 1,244Ha of land in March 2000, the majority of which falls
within the ULDA boundary. That corporation had in fact already started construction prior to
the ULDA announcement and was a recognised lobbyist and donor.
The timelines, land purchases, and evidence of direct lobbying, show the political importance of
a few major and visible developers at the State level for three of the six ULDA areas. Whether
this pattern systematically holds for less influential land owners and developers is crucial to
understanding the complete picture of political influence in rezoning.
2.3.2 History of corruption in Queensland
The Queensland State government has a well-documented history of corruption, particularly in
regards to property markets (Jackson & Smith, 1995; Williams, 1999; Dodson et al. , 2006).9 The
biggest effort to make Queensland politics more accountable followed a high-profile inquiry led by
former judge Tony Fitzgerald, whose 1989 report prompted the establishment of anti-corruption
institutions and lead to the imprisonment of several politicians.
However, Tony Fitzgerald had this to say twenty years later in 2009 about the state of cor-
ruption in Queensland: “Access to government can now be purchased, patronage is dispensed,
mates and supporters are appointed and retired politicians exploit their political connections to
obtain success fees for deals between business and government” (McCutcheon, 2009). Similarly,
Dodson et al. (2006) provides a coherent summary of the extensive criminal investigations into
misconduct surrounding building and planning permissions in Australia, and a selection of cases
where criminal misconduct was found to occur. They note that
9One potential reason for this is the lack of democratic control: Queensland only has one house of parliament,
with the ruling party being in near total control of the state. Queensland has also seen long periods of one-party
rule: 32 years by the Nationals from 1957 to 1989, and then 22 years by the Labour government till 2012.
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[t]here is barely a week that passes without a media report somewhere in Australia
alluding to an improper governance or procedural action in the land development.
Queensland is particularly renowned as a place where corrupt land development prac-
tices were allegedly allowed to flourish for decades... (Dodson et al. , 2006).
The incidents referred to include corruption from local councils, who typically control the major-
ity of planning decisions. A recent example is given by Campbell Newman who failed to declare
his wife Lisa Newman’s stake in a property that won high rise development approval from lo-
cal Brisbane City Council at the time that he was Lord Mayor of Brisbane, providing his wife
windfall gains of millions of dollars (Wardill & Helbig, 2011). In Queensland such connections
are not strictly illegal, and there were no adverse consequences to Newman from this incident.
Similarly, the former Minister for Planning and Infrastructure, Terry Mackenroth, was investi-
gated by the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) following allegations he had “improperly
influenced a review process by which certain land came to be included in the urban footprint
contained in the 2009 SEQ plan” (CMC, 2009). Upon retirement he became a board member
of Metro, a local property development company run by industry heavyweight David Devine.
He was later criticised in the media for abusing his personal connections to gain development
approvals for Metro beyond the scope of zoning limits (Hele & Stolz, 2006).
Other evidence of the importance of connections in the property markets in Australia comes
from a recent inquiry by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC), Operation Spicer, that lead to the resignation of over a dozen politicians. This inquiry
exposed the repeated circumvention of political donations laws prohibiting property developer
donations. Such laws restricting developer donations have never existed in Queensland, and were
only introduced in the state of NSW by amendments to the NSW Election Funding, Expenditure
and Disclosure Act 1981 in 2009 due to the ongoing suspicion that rezoning decisions were being
bought through political donations.
Additionally, 44 of Queensland’s top 100 wealthiest families made their money in the property
and construction industry.10 From an economic perspective this should be surprising since these
industries appear competitive, with low barriers to entry and stable technologies. However,
their reliance on discretionary government decisions in the form of land zoning, development
approvals, and tendering construction contracts, makes them prime candidates for political rent-
seeking. Relatedly, property developers and construction companies dominate the registers of
political donors in Queensland and elsewhere in Australia.
The ULDA itself builds on this history, with their CEO Paul Eagles being a previous Director at
the development company Lend Lease, which owned the land at Yarrabilba which was rezoned.
Interestingly Eagles biography in the ULDA Annual Reports does not disclose this previous role,
merely noting the fact that he has “held senior positions with national development companies
working on large master planned communities in south-east Queensland.”
2.3.3 The other ULDA re-zoned areas
One might think that our selection of privately owned ULDA areas implies the absence of political
rent-seeking problems in the other areas that were exclusively State-owned. This, however, is
not necessarily true.
Take the example of the area of Fitzgibbon. Robertson (2011) notes that
10Based on News Corp Australia’s Richest 100 List (The Sunday Mail, 2008).
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Land is not available to be purchased by individuals, only by preferred developers
and builders. These preferred developers and builders then on-sell land to purchasers.
The developers are selected through an open tender process “to become partner
builders.”
Hence, again, the political process created clear discretion to select the politically connected
preferred developers on favourable terms. There is thus little a priori reason to expect the
political favouritism in land development for these State-owned areas to be qualitatively different
than for the privately-owned areas. It is only because we are unable to know which builders and
developers lost out in this selection process, that we focus on the ULDA areas where the majority
of the land was privately owned prior to rezoning. We can add that the Lend Lease company
was chosen as the preferred partner developer for some of the State-owned land at Bowen Hills,
which is not surprising given that the company’s former director Paul Eagles was the CEO of
the ULDA.
2.3.4 Identification
In general, a correlation between land owner relationships and rezoning success does not imply
causation. The main alternative hypothesis is that well-connected land owners may simply pos-
sess expertise that allows them to better predict which areas will be suitable for urban expansion.
Our land owner sampling method controls for this possible causal relationship by ensuring our
control group of non-rezoned land owners possess close to identical locational and land size char-
acteristics. We discuss in detail the sample selection criteria in Section 2.4.1, but here note
that our procedure of selecting the ‘losers’ from rezoning as landowners immediately outside
the ULDA boundaries, controls for land size and location relative to natural boundaries such as
rivers, rail lines and highways. This method is illustrated by examining the Greater Flagstone
and Yarrabilba ULDA areas shown in Figure 2A.1 of the Appendix. In the early versions of the
SEQRP a large Beaudesert Investigation Area encompassed both of the eventual two rezoned
areas. Our sample of land owners just outside the ULDA areas are contained within the inves-
tigation areas, and as such, control for locational characteristics and the previously best public
information about future rezoning intentions.
The regression discontinuity assumption we now rely on is that the boundary location decision
should have been exogenous to political connections from the hypothesis that rezoning follows
the legal framework around it. That legal framework directly presumes that rezoning should be
for economic efficiency reasons, which we assume are identical on the boundaries of the rezoned
areas. 11
2.4 Data and Methods
We assemble two types of data: core data on land, land prices, and rezoning status over time;
and a database of all elements we can measure that will co-determine the political connectivity
11Informal interviews with public servants, developers and former politicians also point to a widely held view
within the industry that selectively rezoning land owned by developers is better at promoting development than
rezoning land ‘owned by grandmas’. Not only does this suggest that indeed there is favouritism occurring, but
even if this rationale had merit on efficiency grounds there would be no justification on welfare grounds to refrain
from pricing the value gains from rezoning rather than giving them to particular landowners for free, and not
giving such favours to unconnected landowners.
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of a large set of individuals and entities (corporations, politicians, bureaucrats, landowners). We
then use network techniques to extract measures of political connectivity of the landowners in
our core database, which is subsequently used for our main analysis on who gets the political
favours and how much those favours are worth.
2.4.1 Data
Land
Land records for the sample come from the database of Queensland land titles reseller, RP-
data.com. We use a custom map logging tool to capture land ownership and sales details of land
lots that fell inside and immediately outside each of the six ULDA areas of interest. The outside
control group includes sites between the zoning boundary and the next ‘natural’ boundary, which
we consider to include major watercourses, highways and railways. Ownership of land parcels
that had been developed between the ULDA declaration date and the time of the data gathering
was tracked back through titles searches from the Department of Environment and Resource
Management (DERM), and company records where available.
From this initial data of 1.997 lots, land parcels outside ULDA boundaries were excluded if they
were owned by a public entity, already developed12, or if the lot size was smaller than the smallest
lot inside that ULDA area which may also indicate prior subdivision or development13. This
filtering ensured that outside lots remaining in our sample were comparable in terms of location,
size and level of development, with the inside rezoned lots. This procedure resulted in a sample
of 1,192 land parcels, 274 of which were inside ULDA boundaries. These 1,192 parcels had 1,137
different registered owning entities. Details of the land and owner sample are in Section 2.5.2,
and an example of the sample of landowners is shown in Figure 2.2.14
For each lot, we record historical sales dates and prices in order to test for differences in price
paths generated by the ULDA declaration, enabling us to estimate the likely size of the rent
allocation towards the rezoned landowners.
Political donors
Two data sources were used to generate a list of political donors that was then merged with
the landowner data: the Electoral Commission Queensland (ECQ) records of political party
fundings, which covers all transactions from party accounts above $1,000, and the Australian
Electoral Commission (AEC) records of all donations above $10,000.15 Records from the ECQ
for the period 2007-2012 were manually transcribed into a database from ECQ archives, including
donations that were being funnelled through associated entities, such as Labor Holdings Pty Ltd
and Forward Brisbane Leadership, providing a list of 1,537 donors and the amount donated, of
which 613 were donors to the Labor party which held power during this time.
12Land titles in Queensland are recorded under a number of codes (e.g. RP, BUP, GTP, VP) which reflect the
type of use. For example, BUP is a building unit plan that indicates that the plot has been subdivided, usually
in strata, for a multiple unit dwelling. All title codes except RP indicate some kid of intensive development and
are hence excluded due to the gains from rezoning accruing primarily to landowners with undeveloped lots. This
excluded 573 lots from the sample.
13This filter excluded an addition 232 lots from the sample
14Clockwise from top left: Ripley Valley, Northshore Hamilton, Yarrabilba, and Greater Flagstone.
15The threshold for declaration was set at $10,000 in 2005 and has incrementally been increased to $12,800.
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Figure 2.2: Land sample (solid blue/dashed red disks are inside/outside lots, sized by area)
Lobbyist clients
Since 2010, following the passing of the Integrity Act 2009, the Queensland Integrity Commis-
sioner has maintained a register of Queensland lobbyists, their staff and clients, both current and
historical. The full register was included in our database in July 2012. These records cover enti-
ties that carry out lobbying activity to a third party for “a fee or other reward”, which means it
very narrowly covers some professional lobbyists, many of whom are former politicians or senior
government employees. It does not include industry groups or professional bodies whose main
role is to lobby government in the interest of its members. Since the records match clients to
lobbyists, these records provide a landowner characteristic variable to the data in the form of
whether the landowner is a client of a professional lobbyist, and also provides a link from client
to lobbyist in the construction of a relationship network.
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Industry associations
The Property Council of Australia (PCA) and the Urban Development Institute of Australia
(UDIA) are the two major property development industry groups in Queensland. The existence
of such professional groups provides another potential avenue to generate corporate and political
connections. Online records of individual and corporate members of these respective groups
where compiled in March 2012, with additional records for the PCA obtained from 31 July
2008 via the WayBack Machine internet archive. This produced 1,065 individual and corporate
entities associated with the PCA, and 253 entities associated with the UDIA, with 1,283 unique
entities altogether. The data are used to both generate UDIA and PCA industry group dummy
variables for land owners, but also to create a core network of relationships between members;
that is, all members of each industry group in our network are connected to all other members.
Politicians
Queensland Parliament publishes a Re-Member Database of biographical information on current
and former members of Parliament. We use this database to generate a list of elected parliamen-
tarians from 1998 to 2012. These names were included in the relationship network, connected
to other entities through lobbying activities, industry groups membership, or corporate connec-
tions. Because family member names were only sporadically available in this database, such
relationships are not used in this paper.
ULDA staff
All ULDA staff and board member names were sourced from published annual reports till 2012
and included in the data set, with network connections to their published previous employers.
Corporate relations
For the 174 corporate land owners in the sample, records from the Australian Security and Invest-
ment Commission (ASIC) of current and historical office holders, senior staff and related entities
were compiled. This data generated network links between corporate land owning entities, their
directors and principle owners in the combined data set. In all 1,795 entities were linked by the
resulting networks of corporate connections.
Data were cleaned and matched. Following basic automated name matching, manual matching
was undertaken to unify the data using web-search checks to identify companies and institutions
that had new and old names recorded from different data records, and to merge individuals where
they sometimes recorded common nicknames.
Matching our data created a network of 13,740 entities with 272,810 edges, consisting of all
entities, individual and corporate, from all the above mentioned datasets combined. Edges in
the network arise from corporate connections, industry connections, lobbyist connections and
former employers of lobbyists, and the corporate and internal connections of the ULDA board
of directors and senior staff.
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2.4.2 Methods
Rezoning success model
Our main outcome of interest is whether landowner i gets a favourable rezoning decision or not,
depending on landowner characteristics, using the following linear probability model
Ii = X
′
iβ + PolCiγ + ei (2.1)
where Ii is the share of land of each landowner i that fell within the rezoned area; Xi is a matrix
of characteristics of the land in the sample; PolCi is a measure of the political connectivity of
each landowner, implying that γ denotes the increase in the chances of getting favourable land
rezoning due to political connections; and ei is the error term. PolCi includes whether or not
a landowner uses a lobbyist, makes donations, is well-connected in the relationship network and
so on. The construction of the variables in it are revisited later.
Price model
To identify the price effects of the rezoning decisions, which enables an estimate of the size of
the economic rents allocated to rezoned land owners, we model lot prices using historical sales
records, and include a number of control variables, such as lot size, a Brisbane house price index,
and ULDA area dummies in the form
ln(Pit) = X
′
iα+ aWit + bLit + ei (2.2)
where ln(Pit) is the logarithm of the sale price per hectare of lot i and time t, Xi is a vector of
control variables for each lot, Wit is dummy variable for lots i at time t that fall within ULDA
areas after the time of their declaration, and Lit is the dummy variable for lots outside the ULDA
declared area but that could have been inside in terms of proximity and land characteristics. In
this linear probability model, the price variable is a log price per area, meaning that the estimated
coefficients can be used to discern the price impact of the ULDA decision to rezone in the form
(eaˆ− ebˆ). This relationship is also tested with a number of leads and lags around the declaration
date in order to better understand the price path: if rezoned land owners posses political privilege
then it could be expected that other speculators move in to the area in anticipation of favourable
decisions, bidding up land prices prior to the actual declaration.
Using the estimated parameter coefficients from Equation 2.2, along with a vector of land sizes,
Ai, we can for each plot of land calculate the expected price as
E[P |X ′i] =
∫
[Pr{W = 1, L = 0}eXα̂+a+ei + Pr{W = 0, L = 1}eXα̂+b+ei ]dG(ei)
= eXα̂+σˆ
2/2 × [eaˆ Pr{W = 1, L = 0}+ ebˆ Pr{W = 0, L = 1}]
where G(ei) is the distribution of ei, α̂ is the vector of coefficients estimated from Equation 2, aˆ
and bˆ are now the coefficient estimates from Equation 2.2, and Pr{W = 1, L = 0} denotes the
probability of successful rezoning. If we first look at potential rents available had all lots in our
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sample been rezoned, R, we can calculate this as the expectation of the price-difference inside
and outside the rezoned areas for all lots using the point-estimates of the coefficients, and taking
the expectation over the error term in Equation 2.2 as
R =
∑
i
eXα̂+σˆ
2/2 × (eaˆ − ebˆ)×Ai (2.3)
where X now is used to denote the matrix of the control variables used in Equation 2.2 for our
sample of landowners, and Ai is the area of land for each i landowner in the sample.
To calculate the size of the actual rent allocation in our sample from the rezoning boundary
decisions, we can premultiply Ai by a vector of land-shares falling inside the rezoned areas for
each owner, Ii. Of those actual gains we can estimate the share that went to rent-seekers by
premultiplying Ai × Ii by a vector of {0, 1} dummies that denote our classification of being a
rent-seeker in terms of being connected or undertaking any lobbying and donation activity.
In terms of the marginal gains to political connectivity for all landowners, Rc, we premultiply R
by PolCiγˆ, which is a direct measure of the gains to successful rezoning by political connections
in these areas, i.e. it is
Rc = E
∑
i
Ai(P [PolCi]− P [PolCi = 0]) (2.4)
=
∑
i
eXiα̂+σˆ
2/2 × (eaˆ − ebˆ)×Ai × PolCiγˆ (2.5)
where the only difference between P [PolCi] and P [PolCi = 0] is due to the higher probability
of getting favourable rezoning.
Network measures
There are a large number of ways in which we can use our network data to generate landowner
specific measures of connectivity. Since we have little ex ante theory to guide our choice of
measure, we adopt the measures used by previous scholars that arguable match the competing
conceptions of social capital.
Figure 2.3: Conceptual diagram of network neasures
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Our closeness centrality (or closure) measure of land owners in the relationship network is de-
rived from the mean length of all shortest paths from them to every other node connected in the
network, providing an measure between 0 (completely disconnected) and 1 (directly connected to
every node in the network).16 In previous studies, this measure has been shown to predict evalu-
ated individual job performance, and is argued to be the primary measure of mutual supervision
and ability to coordinate (Brass et al. , 1998; Sparrowe et al. , 2001).
To proxy for Burt’s (2000) view of social capital as bridging structural holes, we also include a
measure of betweenness centrality17, which is a measure of the centrality of a node in a network
based on the number of shortest paths that pass through it, indicating a positional monopoly on
information flow through the network.
To clarify the intuition behind these two measures we use the example network in Figure 2.3
with node (or vertex) size scaled by each centrality measure. Notice that in terms of betweenness
centrality, node 5 has by far the largest measure. This is because all paths between nodes 6, 7
or 8, and nodes 1, 2, 3 or 4 must pass through it, meaning that for any information to flow from
the nodes on the left to those on the right relies on node 5 having access to that information.
This monopoly on the information flow provides the underlying logic of taking the ‘bridging of
structural holes’ as a measure of connectedness.
Closeness centrality on the other hand represents, in economic terms, having a large closely con-
nected network which can sustain and reinforce norms of behaviour due to intensive monitoring
ability (everybody is well connected enough to observe most other’s behaviour). Node 4 has a
well connected clique18 involving nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5. Hence, while node 4 has no monopoly in
information flow (a zero betweenness centrality because of the shorter substitute paths through
their clique from nodes 1 to 6, 7 and 8), it forms a critical element of the formation and enforce-
ment of norms within its clique and thus has a high closeness centrality measure. These two
network measures hence capture different elements of coordinating behaviour that may comprise
social capital.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Political connectivity
We first analyse the relationship network data in order to look at political connectivity. The
main component in our network is made up of the largest set of connected nodes, which in
our network contains 6,729 entities which are either individuals or companies. The next largest
connected component in the network comprises just 44 entities and hence is only of marginal
relative interest.
Only one politician is in the main component while 56 landowners are. This is surprising, given
the widespread media focus on the revolving-door between politics and property developers. One
reason for this is the difficulty of tracing suspicious relationships. For instance, we know from the
corporate website at the time that the former Minister for Planning Terry Mackenroth was on
16Closeness centrality for vertex i in a graph is given by 1
li
where li is the average distance from vertex i to all
other vertices connected to i.
17Betweenness centrality for a vertex i in a connected graph is given by
∑
s,t∈v∧s 6=i∧t6=i
nis,t
ns,t
where ns,t is the
number of shortest paths from s to t and nis,t is the number of shortest paths from s to t passing through i.
18A grouping of nodes with all possible edge combinations.
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the Board of Directors for Metro Properties, a land owner in our sample. Yet, because we cannot
observe such connections with the same degree of certainty for all the politicians and others in
our network sample (simply because the data is unavailable and subject to privacy legislation),
we cannot use this type of information. We thus have to rely on the assumption that what is
important about the observed relations (betweenness or closeness) is also what matters for the
unobserved relationships.
Figure 2.4: Relationship network main component (clustered on RHS)
Table 2.1: Network clustering characteristics
Cluster Nodes Edges Average Average Land owner Lobbyist Industry Corp. ULDA
close. between. node share client group edge staff
cent. cent node share node share share edges
4,016 12,953 0.22 1.1 0.0230 0.77 0.01 0.07 1
653 170,770 0.32 3.3 0.0026 0.25 0.62 0.01 6
463 62,894 0.25 0.32 0.0088 0.02 0.81 0.12 105
426 447 0.21 0.80 0 0.95 0 0 0
279 25,526 0.27 0.44 0.0018 0.16 0.64 0.20 0
Betweenness centrality rescaled by 1/10000
The main component in the network can be subdivided in 5 main clusters19 shown in Figure
2.4 and also in Table 2.1. The figure shows the rather high degree of connectedness of the main
component, with 268,233 edges. The red cluster contains 4,016 entities, of which 26 are land
19Modularity clustering algorithm used based on Newman (2006) and implemented in Mathematica 10.0.1
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owners, and the majority of connections arise from connections through professional lobbying
activity. The central yellow cluster comprises 653 entities with the majority of edges formed by
industry groups connections. The third largest cluster is the top right purple cluster consisting
of 463 entities connected by a mix of lobbyist, industry and corporate edges, and many of the
ULDA board members and senior staff.
As Table 2.1 further shows, the clusters largely reflect the data sources used to generate the
network: the third cluster is largely from PCA membership and the fifth cluster largely from
UDIA membership. We do find though that employing a lobbyist and being a member of an
industry group seem substitutes, with very rare cases of overlap. The second and third largest
clusters (yellow and purple) display the closeness one needs for mutual monitoring: these clusters
have relatively few nodes (653 and 463), yet an exceptionally high number of relationship edges
(170,770 and 62,894) in comparison to other clusters in the main component. If members of
these clusters are hence particularly often successful in terms of favourable rezoning decisions,
then that would show up in our analyses as a high importance of closeness centrality.
2.5.2 Summary data on ULDA areas
Table 2.2: Land lot sample summary
ULDA area Lot Area Details (Ha) Total lots
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Total
Bowen Hills Whole 0.11 0.05 3.3 0.03 20.9 191
Inside 0.12 0.06 3.3 0.03 14.4 124
Outside 0.10 0.05 1.3 0.03 6.5 67
Caloundra Sth. Inside 1,040 107 2,984 29.5 3,120 3
Hamilton Nth. Whole 0.68 0.40 8.9 0.08 53.0 78
Inside 0.75 0.41 8.9 0.08 30.2 40
Outside 0.60 0.35 2.5 0.12 22.8 38
Gr. Flagstone Whole 14.4 2.02 3,723 0.28 8,900 614
Inside 193.5 4.02 3,723 0.28 6,384 33
Outside 4.3 2.02 293 0.40 2,501 581
Ripley Valley Whole 10.5 0.8 210 0.22 2,270 212
Inside 16.3 10.5 210 0.22 1,134 67
Outside 7.9 0.5 110 0.40 1,136 145
Yarrabilba Whole 31.6 4.02 2,015 1.8 3,056 96
Inside 255.8 3.24 2,015 1.8 2,046 8
Outside 11.4 4.02 288 1.9 1,010 88
Whole sample Whole 14.6 1.8 3,723 0.03 17,351 1,192
Inside 46.3 0.3 3,723 0.03 12,675 274
Outside 5.1 2.0 293 0.03 4,676 918
Areas are totals for the sample of properties that met our criteria for entry into the data set, not the
whole ULDA declared areas.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 give the key statistics on the land sample inside and outside of the ULDA
rezoning decisions. A key point in the construction of the outside area was to ensure all lots are
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at least as large as the smallest lots from the sample inside the ULDA area. For the Caloundra
South area it turned out that no adjoining lots are at least the size of the three lots within the
ULDA area, which means the Caloundra area only has an internal area treated on a par with
the other five internal areas. The main point of the Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are that the inside lots
are usually larger than the outside lots, meaning that lot size is an important variable to account
for in regressions.
In Table 2.3 we see some of the key distinctions between the characteristics of land owners who
own land parcels inside and outside the ULDA declared areas. Corporate ownership is far more
common within rezoned areas, as are other connectivity characteristics we capture in our data.
Industry group members owned almost 40% of the rezoned area combined, but only 1.2% of
the comparable areas outside rezoned areas. Critically, lobbyists appear to be extraordinarily
effective at ensuring land is rezoned, with no Queensland lobbyist clients owning lots that fell
outside rezoned areas while lobbyist clients owned around 30% of the rezoned land.20
In terms of the political connectivity network variables, we see that those in the main component
of the network own very little of the outside area (3.9%) but much of the inside area (41.2%).
Similarly, those with above-median (above zero) closeness connectivity own 75.4% of the inside
land area, and only 12.2% of the outside land area, with a similar pattern for betweenness
centrality (40.9% inside land and 2.5% of outside land in the sample). Landowners we classify
as rent-seekers bought land inside ULDA areas on average 7 years prior to rezoning, compared
to 10 years on average for other landowners.
2.5.3 Land owner characteristic correlations
We then look at the correlations between various land owner characteristics including those
derived from this relationship network in Table 2.4. We see that most of the landowner charac-
teristic variables show a high degree of correlation with each other, even more so than with the
rezoning indicator variable in the bottom row. Liberal party donations, though only a charac-
teristic of ten of the 1,137 land owners, highly predict whether a land owner is also a) a Labor
party donor, b) a client of a professional lobbyists, c) a member of the PCA industry group,
or d) a part of the main component of the corporate network. Political donations are often re-
garded as ideologically motivated, yet we see in this data a pragmatic hedging strategy adopted
by landowners who donate to politics: seven out of the 14 political donors donate to both sides
of politics, and donations to both sides of politics are equally correlated with rezoning success,
which is unexpected in light of the long term political dominance of Labor at the time.
Some of the correlations between the variables are not surprising when understood in the context
of the methods used to assemble the data. For example, the corporate network is produced by
using edges from common membership of industry groups. Hence, the high correlation between
PCA membership and membership of the main connected component of the network should be
expected, since a large proportion of the relationships (edges) in the main component of the
network arise from common membership of the PCA. The same logic applies to the relationship
between lobbyist clients and the main component variable.
We highlight in Table 2.4 the very low correlation (0.07) between whether the land owner is a
lobbyist client, and the closeness centrality of the land owner. It is somewhat surprising that
these variables are uncorrelated, since connections to lobbyists, and as a consequence, to other
20Only one lobbyist client land owner had a portion of their land outside the area, and that portion is included
in the area share in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Summary of land ownership characteristics
Mean lot % of Sample % of Inside % of Outside
size (Ha) Owners Area Owners Area Owners Area
Corporate 59.9 14.9 0.55 40.6 75.3 8.4 12.5
Asso’n / Union / Trust 3.0 1.1 0.2 2.9 0.3 0.7 0.1
Individual 7.5 84.3 17.8 57.0 24.5 91.1 87.5
PCA member 851 0.5 29.5 2.1 39.9 0.1 1.2
UDIA member 1,013 0.3 17.5 0.8 23.5 0.1 1.2
Liberal donor 515 0.9 29.7 3.3 40.1 0.2 1.4
Labor donor 468 1.0 29.7 3.3 40.1 0.3 1.4
Any Donor 368 1.2 29.7 4.1 40.1 0.4 1.5
Lobbyist Client (Qld) 565 0.8 29.3 3.7 39.7 0∗ 1.2
Lobbyist Client (Any) 465 1.0 29.5 4.1 40.0 0.1 1.2
In main component 96.6 4.9 31.1 13.5 41.2 2.6 3.9
Closeness cent. > 0 59.2 15.0 58.4 40.6 75.4 8.1 12.2
Betweenness cent. > 0 311.6 1.5 30.5 5.7 40.9 0.3 2.5
‘Rent-seeker’∗ 58.6 15.2 58.4 40.9 75.4 8.2 12.2
Total sample size is 1,137.
∗ Defined here as a landowner that exhibits any positive values for rent-seeking activities; either
being the main component of the relationship network, having a closeness centrality > 0, having a
betweenness centrality > 0, or being a lobbyist client or political donor.
clients of that lobbyist, is one input into the generation of the network. It lends weight to the
idea that employing a professional lobbyist is a substitute to being well connected oneself.
2.5.4 Landowner rezoning success
We now turn to the results for the estimations of Equation 2.1 in Table 2.5, which includes five
model variations for the construction of PolCi. Outside of owner characteristics, land size is an
important factor in determining rezoning success, but in a non-linear way. Extremely large land
lots are highly predictive of successful rezoning, though at the lower end of the land size spectrum,
the relationship between land size and successful rezoning is reversed. We caution that our land
size variable may pick up part of the effect of political connectivity in that those who know that
they can change rezoning decisions buy very large plots, or ‘land banks’, strategically on the
urban fringe. Differences in lot sizes might also pick up artefacts of our sampling methodology;
plots outside the zoning border to the next barrier are relatively smaller, something we need
to control for. Thus we are likely to underestimate the full effect of political connectivity by
controlling for land area.
Comparing Model 1 to Model 2, we can see that the inclusion of political donations and in-
dustry group membership increases the size of the lobbyist client coefficient from 0.23 to 0.38,
indicating that employing lobbyists and direct donations or industry group membership are not
complements (collinear), but are more likely to be substitute methods for gaining political favour.
However, the large standard errors of the coefficients for each industry group and political dona-
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Table 2.4: Correlation matrix for variables of interest
Liberal Labor Lobby. PCA UDIA Main Close. Betw. Land Ln(L. Inside
Donor Donor Client Mem. Mem. Comp. Cent. Cent. Size Size) Share
Liberal 10
Labor 0.66 11
Lobby. 0.38 0.27 11
PCA 0.64 0.61 0.24 6
UDIA 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.23 3
Main 0.33 0.23 0.39 0.32 0.23 56
Close. 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.10 All
Betw. 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.66 0.45 0.27 0.05 All
Land 0.11 0.10 0.28 0.38 0.32 0.12 0.07 0.62 All
Ln(L) 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.06 -0.02 -0.20 0.17 0.31 All
Inside 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.12 -0.19 243
N=1,137. Diagonals are counts of non-zero variables,
Darker highlighted cells show variables highly correlated with rezoning but not each other.
Bold indicates correlation coefficient greater than 0.50.
tion type in Model 2 arise partly of due to the high collinearity of these variables in the dataset,
which is evident in the Table 2.4 correlation matrix.
Model 3 looks to overcome the collinearity of the political donations and industry group member-
ship patterns by combining all donor relations into a single variable, and likewise for all industry
group members, as well as removing the main component variable that is correlated with in-
dustry group membership. This does not reveal any reduction in standard errors for industry
group (coeff. -0.6, s.e. 0.16) and political donor (coeff. 0.04, s.e. 0.12) variables, suggesting
that it is not a raw characteristic of being in an industry group that is advantageous, but how
that membership translates to positional gains in the broader relationship network. This lack of
predictive power of political donations is also a quite interesting result in light of the institutional
background and public focus on donations as methods for buying political favours.
Model 4 includes only variables capturing positional characteristics of the relationship network.
The coefficients change little from Model 1 with the removal of the lobbyist client variable and
the inclusion of the betweenness centrality variable, confirming previous suggestions in the data
that employing a lobbyist is a substitute for advantageous position in the relationship network
in terms of being connected to the main component, and in terms of closeness centrality (how
well connected to each other your own connections are). Betweenness centrality shows a small
insignificant negative coefficient level in Model 5 where all main variables are included. While
the raw correlation of betweenness centrality with rezoning success is positive, as seen from Table
2.4, this type of network position appears of relatively low value compared to other variables for
gaining political favours in our setting, or is perhaps costly for those with many other political
advantages due to connections to competitor cliques in other parts of the network.
The picture emerging from these models is that one’s position in the relationship network is the
underlying mechanism that allows for implicit favouritism, and that political donations may be of
secondary importance in that they may be merely a way of signalling loyalty in order to improve
one’s relationships. In general we see closeness centrality, reflecting the Coleman (1990) view
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Table 2.5: Models of rezoning success
Share of land inside Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Labor donor 0.08 0.05
(0.18) (0.18)
Liberal donor 0.16 0.10
(0.16) (0.16)
Any donor 0.04
(0.12)
Lobbyist client 0.23∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.22∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
PCA member -0.08 0.16
(0.21) (0.23)
UDIA member -0.13 0.02
(0.23) (0.24)
Any industry group -0.06
(0.16)
Main component 0.20∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Closeness centrality 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Betweenness cent. -0.004 -0.01∗∗
(0.002) (0.00)
Ln(area) -0.05∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(area)2 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. N = 1,137
p values ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
of social capital, as a key mechanism at play in predicting favours in the Queensland property
industry.
2.5.5 Robustness checks
The main concern with the results is whether there are unobserved characteristics of land which
attract well-connected institutional landowners and independently determined the rezoning de-
cisions.
One such objection is that it might have been the process of rezoning that attracted the politically
connected landowners and that they were simply better able to spot the prime pieces of land than
others. If that was the case, then it should be true that the more recent buyers of land should be
more connected, with no particular affiliation amongst landowners who owned their plots before
the whole rezoning process started in 2004. To check this we divide our sample into land owned
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less or more than six years ago, which denotes the time between the first SEQ Regional Plan
and most of the ULDA rezoning decisions, and re-estimate Model 1, with the results in Table
5.4.7. Of the three main variables - lobbyist client, main component and closeness centrality - the
direction and magnitude of the estimated coefficients are very close, indicating that connected
landowners were not responding to the intention to rezone indicated by the SEQ Regional Plan,
and that rezoning was more likely responding to landowner connections.
The second way we partition our data is by distance to the geographic centre of our sample
areas. If connected landowners had bought into the area on the expectation of potential future
development, then lots further from the centre of the region may have merely had a lower
probability of rezoning and attract fewer informed developer buyers, who are likely to be more
connected. To control for this potential effect, we exclude land parcels near the centre and at
the furthest parts of each area. We thus take the middle 30% and 70% of land by distance to the
centre of the rezoned area to see if the results are sensitive to how closely we select properties
on the boundary. The results of these models also reported in Table 5.4.7. Again the sign of
the coefficients is preserved and the network measures are again significant when we select the
middle 70% of the sample. If we only select the middle 30% then we are down to only 353 land
parcels and even though the coefficients remain similar, significance is lost.
Another robustness check is to match the sample of inside lots with the nearest outside lot to
create a dataset with more balanced location dispersion in order to reduce the danger of selection
bias on the outside plots. Matching greatly reduces the sample size and diversity of outside lots,
yet as we can see from the results in Table 5.4.7, the lobbyist client and closeness centrality
retain significantly large effects of 0.31 and 0.16 respectively, while the main component dummy
becomes insignificant. We did a similar matching exercise on the basis of size, which results in
the closeness centrality measure remaining significant at 0.14, while the two other main variables
of lobbyist client and main component have smaller and insignificant coefficients.
A final check is to see whether our network has added value over simpler measures of connect-
edness. We thus create a new ‘developer’ variable that captures whether on owner is a lobbyist
client or in the main component, representing all activities potentially related to being a profes-
sional developer, including membership of industry groups. When this new variable is regressed
alongside the closeness centrality measure the developer coefficient is 0.38 (p < 0.01), but the
closeness centrality coefficient is still large and significant at 0.42 (p < 0.01), indicating that both
capture important variation.
Summarising, though we can lose significance if we reduce the sample enough, the results are
remarkably robust to how long ago the property was bought, to how close the property is to the
boundary of the rezoned area, to whether we select only those outside plots that are the best
match to the inside plots, and to the inclusion of additional simple measures of connectedness.
2.5.6 Rent transfer
To estimate the value of the rent-transfer from ULDA rezoning decisions, we estimate the price
model of Equation 2.2 over a number of leads and lags and summarise the results in Table 2.7.
Since there are only a few sales in some years, the errors around the a and b coefficients of the
W and L dummy variable are quite large. All models have high explanatory power, with an
R2 of around 0.90, and consistent directional estimates of a and b coefficient through all time
periods. The general interpretation from this exercise is that land prices increased more rapidly
for land inside the ULDA boundaries, with a particularly large change immediately following the
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Table 2.6: Robustness of success models
Share of land inside Time owned Distance from centre Nearest matched
> 6yrs < 6yrs Middle 30% Middle 70% Location Size
Lobbyist client 0.18 0.27 0.19 0.13 0.31∗ 0.16
(0.14) (0.24) (0.45) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Main component 0.23∗∗∗ 0.13 0.15 0.22∗∗∗ -0.04 0.12
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Closeness centrality 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.12 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln(area) -0.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(area)2 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.05 0.03
N 726 411 353 803 474 474
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
p values ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
rezoning, reflecting the value of increased possible development density. For clarity, we present
this analysis graphically in Figure 2.5, showing deviation from predicted price paths estimated
due to the W and L dummy variables.
One might wonder why the price of the areas does not increase immediately in the year of
declaration. This is partially by construction of how the ULDA worked, in that they did not
merely rezone the areas but also provided a conduit for land re-use permissions to those who
owned properties inside the zone. Hence the property developers who bought land may have used
their connections to get favourable permissions, selling the redeveloped land in future years. This
is probably why the price increase is so pronounced in the year after the declaration as it denotes
the moment at which there is true resale to the general public.
Using these regression results, we are able to estimate the size of the rent transfer to land owners
in the ULDA areas using Equation 2.3. We use the one year lag results from Table 2.7 as most
likely to reflect the cumulative gains from this rezoning decision,
We estimate the gains in terms of economic rent transferred to land owners within the ULDA
areas, R to be $710 million (or $56,000 per hectare) of which the 100 land owners who qualify
as rent-seekers as per Table 2.3 captured $410 million, or 56% if the total rents allocated due
to owning 75% of the rezoned land. In contrast, by the same rent-seeking classification we use,
such land owners held only 12% of land outside rezoned areas. The marginal gains to political
connectivity, as per Equation 2.4 and using γˆ estimates from the Model 5 implementation of
PolCi, is $190 million. We consider this as a return for land owners from becoming connected
to the relationship network in the case of the ULDA rezoning in Queensland, i.e. the gain of
becoming connected over and above merely ‘being in the game’ and thus speculating on property
rezoning without being connected.
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Table 2.7: Price model
Ln(price/hectare) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Three yrs Two yrs Year prior Declaration Year after
Time 1.05∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗ 0.92∗∗
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39)
Bris. house price index 1.08∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Vendor relationship -0.60∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Declared inside dummy (a) 0.19∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.36 0.94∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.32)
Declared outside dummy (b) 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.12
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.16)
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
N 822 822 822 822 822
N, inside dummy, W = 1 47 35 27 8 4
N, outside dummy, L = 1 151 151 75 26 16
Dependent variable for each i lot is ln( pit
ai
). Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
All models include dummy variables of each ULDA area, and control for Ln(area) and Ln(area)2.
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we utilised a unique regulatory change in Queensland, Australia, that allows us to
disentangle the political intention to rezone as a growth imperative from the politics of precisely
where the rezoning takes place. Following a prior decision to coordinate large scale regional
rezoning, the state of Queensland decided in 2007 to create a new institution that would decide
on the precise areas to be rezoned, which in reality turned out to have little bearing on the
intended rezoning areas that followed previous technical assessments, such as suitability and
accessibility. This allows us to look at the importance of the political connectivity of the various
landowners in getting favourable rezoning decisions and hence obtaining a valuable new property
right.
We combined a number of disparate datasets in order to compile a relationship network con-
taining connections deemed relevant to supporting the allocation of mutual favours within a
network, and showed that the network characteristics of landowners strongly determined re-
zoning success. Being in the main component of the relationship network increases the chance
of favourable rezoning by 19%, while improving one’s network position in terms of closeness
centrality offers a 25% increase in the chance of rezoning success. Network variables provided
far greater explanatory power of rezoning decisions than more simple observable characteristics,
such as political donations and being a member of an industry group; showing that it matters
to have information on the whole network of relations rather than simply binary indicators of
political connectedness. Yet, our network measures were still not able to capture many direct
links to politicians because such information is not publicly available, meaning that our results
are probably an underestimate of the true importance of political connectivity. For example,
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Figure 2.5: Deviation from predicted price for land inside and outside ULDA areas
records of politicians’ family members are not widely and consistently available, yet previous
research suggest that such connections are highly valuable in sub-national politics even in low
corruption countries (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013).
Using land sales data we estimate that the value of the additional development rights granted
by the ULDA declarations is $710 million, of which $410 million was captured by landowners we
are able to classify as rent-seekers; that is, landowners who exhibit some degree of connectedness
in our observable relationship network. At the margin, the gains to becoming connected in our
scenario is estimated to be $190 million.
While the scale of the value transfer from this process may appear modest in relation to aggregate
wealth in cities in Queensland, we must keep in mind that this represents a tiny sample of
planning activities Statewide. Indeed, we have investigated just a 12,675Ha sample of single
planning decision, much of which remains relatively low value land on the urban-rural boundary.
Given the additional historical evidence in Section ??, the thousands of rezoning decisions over
the last decades are likely to be an avenue for allocating many billions of dollars in development
rights to connected landowners annually across the country.
Our results are consistent with a number of previous estimates of the payoff to political connec-
tions and returns to social capital (Faccio et al. , 2006; Cingano & Pinotti, 2013; Bertrand et al.
, 2011; Engelberg et al. , 2012; Hillman, 2005; Faccio et al. , 2006; Chen et al. , 2011; You &
Du, 2012). Where we differ is that we do not look at specific relationships to politicians, but
the nature of positions within a larger network of relationships which reflects a broader view of
social capital. We find that it is more important to be part of a close-knit group that all have
strong ties with each other, i.e. to have ‘closeness centrality’ (a concept due to Coleman (1990)),
than it is to bridge many different groups. Specialisation of relations matters more for getting
favourable rezoning than knowing lots of people. Corruption investigations by media and state
prosecutors suggest that the actual quid pro quo mechanism works via a revolving door where
property developers and the key political/bureaucratic positions are the same people, exchang-
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ing positions over time. Employing professional lobbyists, who are effectively selling their own
advantageous position in the relationship network, appears a substitute to this revolving door.
Whilst we cannot say for certain whether the rezoning decisions imply efficiency losses, rather
than just representing an economic transfer from the population to connected landowners, we
can note that the rezoned areas are highly disjointed and irregularly shaped, not what one would
expect from an efficiency point of view (see the rezoning areas in Figure 2A.1 of the Appendix).
The rezoning decision clearly appears to have incurred efficiency losses as the eventual rezoned
areas were very different from the previously announced areas that councils were forced to plan
for, incurring unnecessary expenses. Furthermore, we cannot claim that the political influence
of landowners is greater at the State than the local level. One barrier to studying rent-seeking
at the local level is that in Queensland there are fewer disclosure requirements for councils. The
prima facie view is that the greater ability to conceal favouritism would results in significant,
perhaps greater, favouritism occurring at this level of government, in keeping with findings of
Mookherjee (2014).
From a standard economic point of view, rezoning transfers new property rights from the com-
munity to specific individuals; rights that could be priced in a market rather than allocated
politically and incurring the associated costs of rent-seeking. One option for pricing rezoning de-
cisions is to tax either the increased value of land (a betterment tax), tax land values completely
(a 100% land value tax), or sell additional development rights to landowners through a local
auction process. Alternatively, democratic mechanisms for directly deciding new development
areas could allow for competing interests to be better balanced, and perhaps also ultimately lead
to pricing of rezoning decisions. While much research remains to be done to see just how these
options might be implemented in Australia and elsewhere, the same relationship networks that
allow current favouritism to thrive in rezoning decisions will surely hinder any systematic reform
of the rezoning process.
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Figure 2A.1: Comparison of SEQRP (shaded areas) and ULDA areas (bold outline, Yarrabilba is right side area of top panels)
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Figure 2A.2: Copy of Lend Lease document with timeline of planning amendments sought for Yarrabilba
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Chapter 3
Gifts to power as a mechanism for
institutional sclerosis
Abstract
The entrenchment of favoured elites in political processes is best understood as a repeated coop-
erative game. In this game reputations sustain mutually beneficial outcomes at the expense of
others, and additional reputation can be gained via costly signals or gifts. Here a key element
of such a game is considered; the optimisation of signalling efforts in order to maximise returns
to reputation. Simulating this optimisation game with agents distributed within a reputation
space results in a clustering of signalling strategies consistent with patterns of political donations
data in the UK, Germany and Australia. The simulations also demonstrate the entrenchment of
interests over time occurring through exclusive access to a ‘social ladder’, highlighting a potential
process underpinning Olson’s (1982) idea of institutional sclerosis. Framing political processes
in this way is consistent with other puzzling aspects of political favouritism, such as loyalty, ex-
clusivity, and low rent-seeking costs, and offers a new lens through which to view anti-corruption
policy.
3.1 Social dimensions of political influence
If political donations do not directly buy favours1, then what are they for? Why do some political
donors hedge their bets by donating to multiple parties, yet lobbyists rely on loyalty to their
existing relationships to influence policy?2 Is political influence merely a repeated cooperative
game, in which only the select few are invited? And do these questions contain important clues
to understanding Olson’s (1982) idea of institutional sclerosis, whereby special interest groups
incur great economic cost on the community as they reallocate wealth towards themselves?
In this paper we offer the framework of optimal reputation signalling within a repeated coopera-
tion game as a way to model the micro-economic process of entrenchment of elites in the political
system,leading to the economic rigidness implied by Olson’s institutional sclerosis. While most
1An argument made by Stratmann (1991); Ayres & Bulow (1998) and Ansolabehere et al. (2003).
2Evidence of these patterns is in Harrigan (2008); Bertrand et al. (2011); Koger & Victor (2009); McMenamin
(2012).
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component ideas are borrowed from across the social sciences, the nesting of an optimal reputa-
tion signalling problem, where payoffs are proportional to the change in stock of reputation, is
an original insight. The particular way in which these ideas fuse together in a simulated agent-
based model makes sense of complex social interactions involving competing political parties,
and provides coherent answers to, and new insights about, the above questions.
Understanding political action in democracies typically focuses on competition for voters by
established political parties (Downs, 1957; Prat, 2002; Page & Jones, 1979) or through coalition
formation of parties in the interests of electoral success (Dhillon, 2005). The domain of interest
of the model presented here is quite different in that it takes the stability of political parties
and their voting blocs as a starting point, and looks at the rational response to that political
structure by individuals and firms seeking political gains. Political parties use their power as
‘payoff machines’ to encourage cooperation of elites in a repeated game that can further entrench
both their own political power, and the wealth and power of game-players in the private sector.
The main element of interest in this repeated game is how donations, lobbying, revolving-door
employment, and other such methods of influence, comprise a signalling repertoire used to invest
in, and maintain, party-specific political reputation; a reputation which itself determines the
political allocation of the economic surplus conditional on anti-corruption monitoring efforts.
Providing common knowledge in multi-player cooperative games through information mecha-
nisms such as reputation is a now-standard tool in the analysis of collective action, falling under
a variety of names depending on the specific application, including tags (Masuda & Ohtsuki,
2007), reputation (Akerlof, 1980; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Bolton
et al. , 2005), image-scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Milinski et al. , 2001; Bshary & Grutter,
2006), types (Ones & Putterman, 2007; Ambrus & Pathak, 2011), trust (Luhman, 2000; Mui,
2002), peer pressure (Barron & Gjerde, 1997), signals (Lotem et al. , 2003; Huttegger et al. ,
2014), networks (Granovetter, 1978), social capital (Fukuyama, 1999; Jackson et al. , 2012) or
social approval (Ga¨chter & Fehr, 1999).3 These mechanisms provide both material costs and
solidary incentives4 to maintain cooperation within a group (Wilson, 1974), and offer a partial
solution to the common knowledge problem of players understanding the logic of the cooperative
game. Most reputation signalling mechanisms contain the idea of an ‘information threshold’ for
cooperation, below which non-cooperative outcomes occur; a characteristic that appears crucial
in political cooperation where elites appear to ensure that most of the population is excluded
from the game.
The focus of this model is the link between current reputation, investment in signals to ‘buy’
reputation gains, and payoffs. Payoffs arise under the assumption of a stable political party
structure that distributes economic rents based on the party’s relative power to do so, and the
party-specific reputation of agents in the economy. That is, beneath the media fuelled vote-buying
propaganda, political parties are assumed to be social structures for redistributing economic
wealth to cooperative partners in a type of gift-exchange game. Because the specific focus of the
model is on the signalling element of this game, there is no need to make assumptions about the
evolutionary fitness of cooperative strategies or the need for punishment, as the model will fit
the data so long as the jointly cooperative strategy is reasonably common in the population.
A number empirical regularities that cannot be easily explained either by the standard economic
3In experimental studies the use of arbitrary symbolic markers (Efferson et al. , 2008), non-verbal social cues
(De Kwaadsteniet et al. , 2012; Kwaadsteniet & Dijk, 2010; Rosenblat, 2008), and previous costly cooperation
also play a similar coordinating role as reputation.
4Cooperation improves reputation, which in turn facilitates lower cost future cooperation amongst the same
group above other groups.
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view of rational responses in conflict games, or by rent-seeking approaches to the allocation
of political favours, are consistent with this model. First is the clustering pattern of political
donations observed by Harrigan (2008) in Australian data, and McMenamin (2012) in Canadian
and German data also, around partisan (exclusive donations to one political party) and hedging
strategies (splitting donations between parties at certain ratios, usually 50:50). Rent-seeking
theory, whereby donations purchase a lottery ticket in a regulatory payoff, make no prediction
about such patterns.
A second empirical regularity is the loyalty of lobbyists to their political connections. Evidence
that lobbyists suffer financial losses when their connections leave office(Bertrand et al. , 2011;
Koger & Victor, 2009) suggests that their relationships themselves have value, perhaps because
some barrier exists for others to gaining such advantageous relationships. Third is the observed
limits to political participation, whereby political access is reserved for some interests but not
others (Shughart II et al. , 2003; Bihagen et al. , 2013). Usually this is explained by a failure
of selective incentives in large groups (Olson, 1965), or costs of monitoring contributions to
the common good in dispersed networks (Granovetter, 1985). Yet such views cannot explain
how small interested groups, such as new entrants in disruptive industries, also find themselves
excluded, while entrenched elites in a particular country or region maintain cohesion within
very large groups. Such phenomena contradict the precise sclerosis prediction of Olson (1982),
though they nevertheless indicate a process of entrenchment of some interests above others. A
final puzzle is lack of extortion in politics, with evidence suggesting that in contrast to the basic
rent-seeking prediction, favours are made without politicians earning close to the full value of
those favours from rent-seekers (Del Rosal, 2011).
The model here takes as a starting point the mutual choice of a cooperative equilibrium amongst
politicians and private interests in a coordination game, which may or may not incur negative
externalities on non-cooperators and individuals not playing the game, and looks at the optimal
signalling choice of an agent within that environment given their current political party-specific
reputation level. Payoffs from signals to each party are a function of current reputation and
the relative political power of each party over a stable period, as well as the anti-corruption
monitoring effort. The introduction of monitoring generates one of the more practical, yet
perhaps unsurprising conclusions; that increased monitoring leads to increased costly efforts
to conceal reputations for high-reputation well-connected individuals. Diminishing returns to
reputation lead to a cutoff point for those with low reputations, who will find that there are
never positive returns to signalling, again supporting the evidence of limited political access
and the potential for professional lobbying to in fact broaden the representation of interests in
politics. A major result is that the hedging behaviour of political donors is the natural result
of the existence of agents with sufficient reputation across multiple political parties, and that
the point of convergence of hedging donors corresponds to the ratio of power between political
parties.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2 prior literature is discussed in the
context of the current approach with a focus on how the use of signals to generate reputation
as a mechanism for coordination is widespread, yet the additional incentive to optimise the
investment in those signals is largely overlooked. It also expands on the empirical puzzles the
model seeks to explain. Section 3.3 then introduces the model and clarifies the economic concepts
and relationships being represented. This section concludes by simulating the model in a multi-
agent environment. A summary of the model insights and applications comprises Section 3.4,
while Section 3.5 looks at corporate cross-directorship data test whether patterns of political
donation signals are consistent with patterns in the network of cross-directorships, which are an
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alternative was to signal reputations. A final discussion and remarks are in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
The coordination of groups occupies a prominent space across the social sciences and a complete
review is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we start from the broad ideas of institutional
sclerosis as a group coordination problem, to signals and reputation as an approach for solving
repeated coordination games where there choice of who to cooperate with, narrowing down to
the application of this idea in political analysis. In the process some of the puzzling stylised facts
of political lobbying are discussed both from the standard economic perspective, and from the
framework of reputation signalling.
Olson (1965) viewed groups as a coordinative mechanism for self-interested individuals seeking
access to non-excludable payoffs from collective action. He characterised the problem whereby
the cost of collective action in a group, C, is constant for each group member, and yet the value
from the public good to a group member, Vi, shrinks in proportion to group size, meaning that as
groups get larger there is less chance for individuals to gain positive profits, (pii = Vi−C), through
costly participation in collective action. Olson (1982) develops this group logic to an underlying
cause of stagnation and social rigidity in political stable environments via the accumulation of
small special-interest groups, or distributional coalitions, which devote resources to protecting
interests from competition and reallocating wealth towards themselves through political means
at the expense of others. This is institutional sclerosis, and there is growing evidence of this
type of entrenchment of interests over time. For example, Bihagen et al. (2013) shows that
not only have class divisions, in terms of access to elite business positions, increased over recent
decades in Sweden, but education as a tool for reducing equality is becoming less beneficial
over time. Evolving social structures entrenching elites are now limiting access to advantageous
positions, and hence reducing pay-offs to education for those in less beneficial parts of the social
network. Shughart II et al. (2003) estimate a long-term inverse relationship between the Gini
coefficient and interest group dominance in US states, suggesting that even with many interest
groups involved in politics, the interests of broad swathes of the community remain excluded
from political access.
While highly influential, the original view of sclerosis has been challenged in respect to the
assumptions about the necessity for selective incentives to sustain larger groups, even if their
interests are aligned (Wilson, 1974; Hardin, 1982; Ude´hn, 1993; Cheikbossian, 2012).5 To be
clear, selective incentives are only loosely defined by Olson as vaguely involving coercion or power
to enforce group membership and cooperation, yet are the hook upon which his explanations
for coordination in large groups hang. As Ude´hn (1993) explains, if any selective incentive si
is allowed to explain coordination in large groups, it becomes an unlimited reservoir of ad hoc
explanations which ensure that pii = Vi−C+si > 0 in any instance of large group organisations.6
Indeed if selection incentives are available, why would groups bother with investing in collective
public goods at all and not simply enforce club-good arrangements?
If selection incentives in some form are widely available, Olson’s logic of groups becomes a
5A similar logic arises in sociology whereby the density of relationships in a network are said to enable moni-
toring of free-riders, and hence smaller and more dense groups will be able to better coordinate in their interests
(Brass et al. , 1998; Granovetter, 2005).
6Similar ad hoc explanations occur widely in explaining cooperation, for example the entertainment value
term, E in Tullock (1971)
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special case rather than a general rule (Trumbull, 2012), bringing into question the extended
logic of institutional sclerosis as well. Yet even if Olson’s collective action logic is not robust, the
empirically informed arguments for stagnation in stable economies maybe still be quite valid but
be the result of a slightly different underlying process of group entrenchment (Coates et al. , 2007;
Horgos & Zimmermann, 2009). Indeed, a broad range of mechanisms of social organisation may
be consistent with the sclerosis and stagnation view, and this paper puts forward one potential
story relying on the idea of individual reputations as selection incentives in repeated games;
allowing for a sorting mechanism that ensures cooperative individuals are rewarded for group
participation. Signals are widely observed to sort players via reputations but more than that, the
requirement of some sort of existing reputation in order to interpret signals means that the same
signal can be interpreted differently if it arises from two individuals with different reputations,
providing a hard-to-fake selection mechanism (Goffman, 1959).
Understanding political actions as a cooperative game sustained by signals is a minority view
(Potters & Winden, 1992; Ayres & Bulow, 1998; Ackerman & Ayres, 2008). Yet outside this view
empirical regularities in in political donations and lobbying behaviour are difficult to interpret.
Harrigan (2008) and McMenamin (2012) find surprising regularities in the patterns of political
donations in Australia, UK, Canada and Germany.7 Figure 3.1 shows the frequency distributions
of donation splits between dominant political parties in each jurisdiction, with distinctive peaks
at a 50:50 splits at the federal and state level in Australia and in Canada, no donation splitting
in UK, and a cluster at a 65:35 split in Germany.8 These clusters of splitting donors are called
‘hedgers’ or ‘pragmatists’ or other distinctive motivational labels, yet if donations merely reflect
attempt at influence by particular interests, it is not clear what these clusters represent in Olson’s
view of entrenched interest groups. Nor does the traditional rent-seeking view of donations
representing the purchase of tickets in a lottery for a political payoff have much to say about
these patterns, nor the relatively low size of donations compared to political gains (Del Rosal,
2011). Why hedging donors are also the largest donors, as shown by the donation-weighted plots
in Figure 3.1, also requires an explanation.9
Moreover McMenamin (2008) finds evidence of ship jumping, or shifting donation biases, in
Australian political donations data close to elections as a response to polling. He finds that
political donors “direct more money to the party that is ahead in the polls, increasing the bias
as an election approaches.”
A logic to this clustering and bias-shifting behaviour arises when donations are framed as rep-
utation signals. It may be possible for a small well-connected group, with sufficient existing
reputation to both major political parties, to signal simultaneously to both sides and gain joint
reputations, while also giving a slight preference to those with more political power at any point
in time. Such a frame also helps explain the evidence of loyalty to political connections rather
than issues in professional lobbying. If relationships represent reputation signals then the logical
result is that favours may only be sought from those with existing high reputations. Koger &
Victor (2009) for example, demonstrates how this logic plays out using a large network dataset
of US lobbyists and their relationships to Congress members, candidates, and political action
committees, finding strong patterns of overlapping service committees and voting blocs, and
7Donors, each one perhaps an organisation of thousands of members, is a rather large group of interests by
Olson’s reasoning.
8Figure 3.1 uses data from McMenamin (2012) for Germany and Canada, UK Electoral Commission data as
at July 2014 for UK, and Australian Electoral Commission data as at July 2014 for Australian and its states.
9It has been argued that loyalties to one party or another can be expressive acts that confirm one’s identity,
providing direct utility gains from the act of donating rather than from future gifts. However, there is no reason
that such acts be excluded from this analysis just because it this behaviour feels like the right thing to do.
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Figure 3.1: Discrete probability density function of donor frequency (by party share of donation
and weighted for donation size)
concluding that
...lobbyists tend to concentrate their attention on political allies, avoid their ideo-
logical adversaries, and infrequently lobby fence-sitters, suggesting that they are not
buying votes or persuading legislators on a case-by-case basis. More importantly, lob-
byists appear to systematically switch issues as the politicians they were previously
connected to switch committee assignments, hence following people they know rather
than sticking to issues.
Bertrand et al. (2011) also find that lobbyists are loyal to their ministerial contacts and only
change issues when their contacts change committees, while i Vidal et al. (2012) estimates that
lobbyists whose US Senate connections leave office suffer a 24% decline in revenue, suggesting
that the value of social connections is significant and that relationships rather than expertise
are the main source of political influence. If lobbyists are selling access to their reputation
with certain politicians, essentially vouching for the client as a mafia member would vouch for a
cooperative intent of a new recruit by risking their own reputation, these empirical findings of
loyalty are exactly as expected from a reputation signalling viewpoint.
While donations and relationships appear to be reliable reputation signals, the overarching co-
ordination problem is one of interpreting signals. In repeated coordination games many types
of information, both verbal and non-verbal10 (Kurzban, 2001; Bolton & Brosig-koch, 2012) can
10Indeed language itself is a complex signalling system relying on common knowledge to be useful (Ja¨ger, 2007;
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evolve as signals of cooperative intent based on past associations with cooperative choices. Cer-
tainly many activities outside of political donations, such as common memberships of exclusive
clubs, are costly signals that can become associated with a particular type of cooperation neces-
sary for political favouritism. It is the culmination of all signals taken together that represent the
reputation stock of one individual with respect to another (Hechter, 1992), allowing for accurate
expectations about future cooperation, and a selection incentive for inclusion or exclusion in
future coordinated activities. Together the evidence points to political favouritism and entrench-
ment of elites, or institutional sclerosis, being a game of group formation around stable political
parties, whereby reputations and the signals that generate reputations, provide the selection
incentive necessary to ensure cooperation of the elite group at the expense of outsiders.
3.3 Model
The following sections introduce the key conceptual ingredients in this model in a way that gives
the readers from broad social science backgrounds grasp the fundamental idea
3.3.1 Cooperative game
A ‘one-sided’ signalling game, shown in Table 3.1, captures the political environment of interest
whereby agents prefer political allocations of rent, b, and political parties prefer beneficial public
signals (such as donations) that come at cost c. Agent’s reputation effects are included in
parentheses, and represent a change in the stock, r, of political party-specific reputation. In the
one-shot game there is no unique Nash equilibrium, though in a repeated setting a strategy of
conditional cooperation, or win-stay, lose-switch (where losing involves a payoff of zero or less)
renders mutual cooperation evolutionary stable.11
In this game c is the cost of a signal type, s. Signals types capture the range of ways in which
individual and firms can provide direct benefits to political parties, such as through donations.
But it also captures the idea of joining exclusive clubs, providing favourable media coverage or
industry support for political decisions, and other activities that are costly to the individual but
provide a political benefit through reinforcing their institutional power, and in doing so improve
the reputation between the political party and the individuals or firms involved.
In reality each stage game need not be a simultaneous choice, as sequential choices by signallers
and politicians may also support a jointly cooperative strategy using reputations. Moreover,
as long as cooperative strategies are reasonably widespread in the population the predicted
behaviour should closely match data on political donations, revolving door appointments, and
other forms of political signalling and favouritism. Hence, it does not matter what proportion of
the population are playing a cooperative strategy as only the cooperative strategy is observable
in the data.
Ja¨ger et al. , 2011; Franke & Wagner, 2014; Tse, 1998) with research in the evolution of language analysing similar
cooperative dilemmas.
11Mutual cooperation leads to ‘stay’ in the win-stay, lose-switch strategy, hence the stability of this outcome.
Mutual defection leads to both players switching to mutual cooperation. Defection by the agent and cooperation
by the political party leads to the political party party defecting next period, creating mutual defection. The
agent cooperating and political party defecting leads the agent to switch to defecting next period creating mutual
defection. Even where the lose criteria is shift from zero to strictly negative, mutual cooperation remains a ‘stay’
for any agents who start by chance at that point.
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Table 3.1: Payoff (reputation) structure for implicit political cooperation stage game
Political party
C D
A
g
en
t C
b− c , c −c , c
( e ) ( d )
D
b , 0 0 , 0
( d ) ( 0 )
C is cooperate, D is defect.
Stage game payoffs are 0 < c < b.
Reputation effects are change in reputation level r, where 0 < d < e.
The main element interest in this game is how signalling is optimised when the payoff b is the
politically allocated rent, c is the cost of a signal, and the size of both depends on the current
reputation level r. The relationships between these variable open up an array of cooperative
outcomes for agents with different reputation levels, some of which may have zero or negative
payoffs. This means that not all people will be able gain by attempting to cooperate on {C,C}
because their reputation level is insufficient to generate a positive b− c payoff.
3.3.2 Reputation mechanism
The reputation level performs two functions in the model. First it determines the size of the
rents allocated to each agent, i, by a political party, j, in a given time period. The underlying
assumption is that rents are predominantly allocated by politicians on the basis of relationships
and reputations, rather than some objective criteria, such as productivity. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the reputation level provides a way to interpret signals, and hence determines
the the relationship between the quantity of signals and the reputation gains which lead to payoffs
b.
It is first worth discussing the general concept this reputation variable is capturing. Like an
image-score, tag, or other stock indicator of trustworthiness, the reputation level functions as a
selection incentive that allows cooperation to be sustained between those with sufficient repu-
tation and to exclude those with insufficient reputation. If the reader prefers, a simple way to
understand reputation in terms of relationships networks is as a generalisation of the network
distance between two individuals. Figure 3.2 shows how a relationship network can be mapped
into a simple single variable measure of social distance, which is a reasonable proxy for the idea
of reputation if each relationship is uniform in terms of trust between agents. In a single com-
ponent network there is hence a minimum and maximum distance to any other node, and hence
a closed range of social distance or reputation (which is an assumption of the model). The point
here being that the reputation concept is a general one that is consistent with alternative ways
in which scalar measures of relationships are characterised.
The interpretation function of reputation level captures the idea that some previous knowledge
about an individual is required in order for a signal to be interpreted. As Goffman (1959)
explains, [i]nformation about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to
know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may expect of him. Informed in
these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to call forth a desired response from
him.” After all, a political donation from an unknown source provides little information about
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Figure 3.2: Generalisation of relative social space from network
how to sustain the jointly cooperative outcome and avoid defection in the one-sided signalling
game.
Incorporating this idea into the model, reputation r for an individual i with political party (or
politician) j can be said to evolve as follows
ri,j,t = γri,j,t−1(1 +
∑
s
αs,i,ts
β
i,j,t) (3.1)
where ri,j,t−1 is the last period reputation between i and j, which decays in the absence of new
signals by 0 < γ ≤ 1. Reputation gains, ei,j,t = ri,j,t − ri,j,t−1, arise from the total signalling
effort in a period, where si,j,t is the size of a signal type from i to j, αs,i,t is a weighting factor for
each signal type, and β captures the diminishing returns to each signal. This setup captures the
incentive to use a wide variety of signals to gain reputation, rather than rely on a single signal
type. Equation 3.1 also describes a process of cumulative advantage via signals in a reputation
space, since additional reputation allows for better interpretation of signals, and hence the same
gains for fewer or smaller signals. The unit costs of a signal type is assumed to be constant,
which simplifies signal type costs to cs,i,j,t = si,j,t.
3.3.3 Use of political power
Political parties are assumed to allocate the economic surplus based on reputation levels. Rather
than the payoff to cooperation being the result of an increase in combined output, here the
cooperative game relies on pre-existing institutional power of political parties to merely allocate
away from a large surplus pool to their cooperative partners. The cooperative payoff b, for agent
i cooperating with political party j, is therefore a function of their reputation at the time, ri,j,t.
12
For each j political party, their power to allocated economic rents, κj,t, will affect the payoff
to cooperative partners. This weighting parameter depends on the political environment and
each party’s relative ability to change policy. In a very even two party system like Australia,
the weighting of the two major political parties will be roughly equal. Whereas in Germany,
for example, the political power of the Social Democrat Party of Germany (SDP) is less than
the combined power of the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and its sister party the Christian
Social Union (CSU), and hence the political power of the CDU/CSU alliance will be significantly
larger than for the SDP.
12This assumption is supported by the results of Engelmann & Fischbacher (2009), whereby the helping rate
in repeated donation games was proportional to the public reputation score.
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Additionally, institutional constraints can have an effect on the relationship between reputation
and rents. The practical level of political influence, or the ability to capture economics rents from
the favour exchange, Ii,j,t, need not be directly proportional to the reputation level ri,j,t. Under
a regime of political monitoring, whereby political allocations of rent to close acquaintances
(e.g. nepotism and cronyism) are either strictly illegal, electorally costly to the political party
or politician involved, or result in some other cost due to community expectations, the practical
political influence will not be strictly monotonic in reputation, ri,j,t.
13 Because of monitoring
of close acquaintances there will be a peak in the functional relationship of Ii,j,t with ri,j,t as
shown in Figure 3.3, where m is the degree of monitoring and determines how far from the
maximum ri,j,t the peak of Ii,j,t is.
14 This implies that to gain influence it may be necessary
for high-reputation close acquaintances to socially distance themselves from specific politicians
or political parties to gain rents.
Min Max
ri, j,t
I i,
j,t
Monitoring
effect
Figure 3.3: Typical relationship between reputation and political influence
In terms of our one-sided signalling game setup, the payoff to an agent’s political cooperation, b,
is the change in influence during that period, scaled by their ability to capture economic rents,
ω, and by the political party’s relative power κj,t, or b = ωi,tκj,t∆Ii,j,t. The ωi,t scaling factor
accounts for the differential ability of firms and individuals to capture economic rents due to
their ‘skin in the game’. A large landowner with a high reputation might find it easy to gain
rents due to rezoning and public investment decisions, but a high reputation acquaintance with
no business or asset market interests might be unable to gain such valuable favours despite their
identical reputation.
13Monitoring captures the idea that outside the system of favour exchange there are often institutions that
effectively enforce laws surrounding conflicts of interest of political decision-makers when they are overly blatant.
In Australia examples include the Crime and Corruption Commission in Queensland, and the Independent Com-
mission Against Corruption in New South Wales. These institutions investigate allegations of alleged corruption,
specifically in cases of nepotism and cronyism.
14The qualitative model results hold for a variety of functions forms. This curve is of the form Ii,j,t = r
τ
i,j,t)
−
mrϕi,j,t, where τ = 0.5 and ϕ = 5 over the reputation range {0, 11}, and is the function used in later simulations.
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3.3.4 Agent optimisation problem
Agents seeking to cooperate in the ‘one-sided’ signalling game choose signals to maximise profit,
pi (or b− c), subject to current reputation, public monitoring of political favours, and their ‘skin
in the game’. They solve the following dynamic signalling problem with respect to all j political
parties.
max
st
pii,t =
n∑
j=1
bi,j,t − ci,j,t (3.2)
subject to ci,j,t = f(si,j,t)
bi,j,t = f(ri,j,t, si,j,t,m, κj,t, ωi,t)
ei,j,t = f(ri,j,t, si,j,t)
A summary of all the variables and parameters is in Table 3A.1 of the Appendix. The solution
to the profit-maximising problem in each period arises when
∆bi,j,t
∆ci,j,t
=
∆ci,j,t
∆si,j,t
∀ i, j, s (3.3)
Because we simplify that cs,i,j,t = si,j,t, which is clearly the case in signals such as political
donations, then this solution occurs when
∆bi,j,t
∆ci,j,t
= 1. In the case of one signal type to a single
political party a typical qualitative result for the optimal signal size across reputation levels is
in Figure 3.4.
ω constantω ∝ ri,j,t
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Figure 3.4: Optimal solution for one signal type across reputation space
This solution contains a number of elements suggesting a close correspondence between the model
and key characteristics of political favouritism. First are the two shaded reputation ranges where
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optimal signalling is negative. On the left is the low reputation range, a disengagement range,
where agents have insufficient current reputation for any positive signals to be reliably interpreted
as an intention to cooperate. That is b − c is negative for any signal. The vast bulk of the
population is likely to reside in this range, and hence the model suggests that most individuals
will be unable to participate in a repeated political cooperation game of this nature. If this is
the case then over time the model will see an entrenchment of elites and a rise in inequality due
to political access of the few over the many.
The shaded negative signal range near the maximum reputation is the concealment range, where
the gains to signalling for already high reputation individuals are negative due to monitoring of
political favours to close acquaintances. Instead of signalling, it pays for these agents to invest
in signals that distance themselves from the political party in order to capitalise on reputations.
These ”negative signals” could better be described as concealment efforts, and might include
activities such as sheltering business connections through trusts and shelf companies, actively
avoiding being seen together in public, or employing lobbyists as intermediaries. Such conceal-
ment efforts can have an economic cost by diverting resources away from productive activities.
A third feature of this optimal signalling relationship is the effect of ‘skin in the game’. In
the dashed plot the ω parameter is proportional to the reputation level, as would typically be
expected. The effect is to first extend the disengagement range further up the reputation level
when ω is small, but also to shrink the concealment range and increase signals for individuals
with a large ω at high reputation levels.
3.3.5 Simulating agents in a reputation space
The above optimisation problem generates a basin of attraction towards each political party for
agents whose current reputation lies within the positive signal range. For those agents, if they
choose to participate in the cooperative equilibrium, they will ultimately increase their reputation
through repeated signalling towards the attractor point at the high end of the range; a point
where signals remain necessary only where the decay parameter γ < 1. In a two party system an
agent’s reputation level for each party leads their total signalling effort, though variation between
these two reputations can lead to combinations of signals or concealment effect.
Figure 3.5 shows the regions in a two-party, (ri,j1, ri,j2), reputation space that contains all pos-
sible joint signalling outcomes. Above each blue line, which represents the reputation attractor
point for each political party, is the ‘concealment range’ for each of the two reputation levels,
where optimal concealment reduces reputations towards the attractor. Below the dashed line is
the ‘no signal range’, indicating an insufficient reputation to engage in the cooperative equilib-
rium of the signalling game. The blue dot represents a third attractor point for agents who find
themselves in the signalling range of both parties, where it is optimal to ‘hedge’ their signals,
leading them from any starting point in the hedging space to the attractor point.
The relative position of this third attractor point, the hedging equilibrium, depends on the
relative power of each political party. Where the relative power is roughly equal, this point
will result in signals being equally split near that point. Where one party has more power,
the hedging equilibrium will shift towards that more powerful party, with signal sizes to the
two parties at the equilibrium point being proportional to their relative power. Where three or
more stable established parties exists, there will be additional hedging regions representing each
two-party combination, and all three parties, with the shared signal size in any of these hedging
regions proportional to the relative power of each party. The resulting aggregate patterns of
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Figure 3.5: Regions arising in two-party reputation space
observable signals are the result of the distribution of the agents in the political economy within
these reputation spaces.
To show the aggregate patterns of signalling emerging from this type of game we simulate a simple
version of the model for a two-party system15 for a population of individuals in a reputation
space using two distributions of agents.16 We use two different distributions of 2000 agents in
the initial period of the simulation; first, a uniform distribution across the full range of the
two-party reputation space, and second, a power law distribution, which is typically a more
common pattern arising in other agent-based interactions in networks that might be operating
alongside the particular favour-exchanges captured in this model (Page, 2012).17 We also use two
relative weights to the political parties to show the impact to the hedging region, with an equal
weighting, κj1,j2 = 1, reflecting very even powers of political parties in systems such as Australia
and Canada, and an unbalanced weighting, κj1 = 1 and κj2 = 2, representing a relatively more
powerful j2 party.
Signal patterns for each agent in the first simulation time period are in Figure 3.6, which closely
reflect the political donations data. Of note is that hedging signallers use larger or more costly
signals on average, as the weighted frequency distributions show higher peaks near the even split
15 γ = 0.8, αs = 1, β = 1, τ = 0.5, φ = 5,m = 6× 10−6, ω∀i = 0.5, κ∀j = 1.
16Unlike typical agent-based simulations we do not consider the roll of feedback in the system as agents react to
the changing conditions of peers in their environment. This model merely focusses on the one-way attraction to
stable political power structures, capturing the idea of institutional sclerosis, and not the evolutionary dynamics
that allow the political power structures to evolve over time.
17Pareto distribution is r−0.2i,j : 0.1 < ri,j < 11.
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Figure 3.6: Frequency of j2/(j1 + j2) signal ratio in one period of a two-party simulation
between parties, and lower peaks at the partisan ends of the distribution. In the unbalanced
political power setup hedging signallers shift the balance of signals towards the more powerful
party, reflecting the case of the CDU/CSU alliance in Germany. In this model the ratio of hedging
signals at any point in time arises a direct result of the relative power of the political parties. This
offers a story consistent with the results of McMenamin (2008) in that when relative power shifts
prior to elections, political donations shares for hedging donors shift toward predicted election
winners.
In a repeated setting, agents optimising their signalling are able to build reputations towards
the attractor points in the reputation space. Figure 3.7 plots reputations over time for a sample
of the 2,000 agents in the simulation as they make use of optimal signals, capturing the idea
of a ‘social ladder’ that can be climbed in this type of game for agents with sufficiently high
starting reputation. A full suite of intermediate summaries in the repeated simulation are in
Figure 3A.1 of the Appendix. Over time convergence towards the three attractor points creates
a clusters of highly reputable and favoured agents quite separate from the many agents who are
perpetually excluded from the game. The model therefore captures a process of entrenchment
of elite political groups emerging over long periods of time.
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Figure 3.7: Sample of agent’s simulated optimal ’social ladders’
3.4 Insights and applications
3.4.1 Concealment trade-off
A key insight of the model relevant to anti-corruption public policy is that observable signals,
such as political donations and lobbying, are not monotonically related to successful political
favouritism. Indeed, for a large part of the positive signalling range of reputation space, higher
reputations and greater political favours are related to smaller, or fewer, signals. Large political
donors in this model are likely to be those who came into wealth aided by luck, who are now
looking to play the political game from a relatively low reputation starting point.18 Thus the
model points to political favouritism being dominated over time by those close to the reputation
space attractors who either a) need only minor signals to sustain their reputation, or b) need
only put in a minor concealment effort to distance oneself to escape monitoring and policing of
political favours.
Figure 3.8 shows that under a power law distribution of agents there is an expectation of a group
of agents close to the third hedging attractor engaging in a great deal of hedged concealment, but
if reputations are more uniformly distributed, that group will be much smaller than the groups
concealing reputations to only one political party. Such results may indicate that the focus of
monitoring efforts by public authorities should add to their remit the investigation of concealed
relationships as well as monitoring signals such as political donations.
18The case of billionaire miner Clive Palmer in Australia is a good example of this, whereby his rapidly expanding
mining interests prompted him to become the largest donor to the conservative party in Queensland. Though he
later left the party to start his own party, indicating that his reputation was not high amongst the party and he
was not receiving favours as expected. Another case is Huang Changran, a wealthy Chinese property developer
who arrived in Australia in 2011. With his large ‘skin in the game’ and lack of strong relationships he quickly
became the largest political donor in New South Wales (Welch & Noyce, 2015).
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Figure 3.8: Optimal concealment effort ratios from κj1,j2 = 1 simulation
3.4.2 Distribution of power and monitoring
An assumption of the model is that the degree of relative power of a political party affects the
size of the payoff from cooperative signalling. It is therefore of interest how the size and scope
of political signalling changes as political power is shared amongst more political parties.
Two parties, κj1,j2=1
Single party, κj1=2
Three parties, κj1,j2,j3=0.67
Min Max
ri,j ∀ j
∑s i,j
Baseline, m = 6×10-6
m = 3.5×10-6
m = 9×10-6
Min Max
ri,j ∀ j
Figure 3.9: Optimal signals for combinations of relative political power, κj
The left panel of Figure 3.9 shows the optimal total signal to all parties in our baseline simu-
lation, and varies the way total political power is shared amongst one, two and three political
parties, holding all else constant. As the power of a party declines, and where monitoring is
held constant, the range of reputations that find it advantageous to engage in the cooperative
signalling equilibrium reduces. Not only that, but the total signalling activities for agents in that
range also declines. These results suggest that the more widely political power is shared, the less
signalling activity devoted to reputation-building occurs at any reputation level. Whether this
results in lower total signalling in aggregate will depend on the complete set of reputations of all
agents, though the general model prediction is that more dispersed power structures reduce the
degree of participation in the signalling game.
To expand on the role of the monitoring trade-off, the right panel of Figure 3.9 shows the effect on
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optimal signal size across reputation space in the two-party baseline under different monitoring
regimes. Greater monitoring leads to lower signalling for those in the positive signalling range,
but greater concealment by those at high reputation levels, while also decreasing the reputation
level that maximises political influence. In all there is less signalling but more concealment,
both of which divert resources from productive economic activity and are therefore economically
costly.
3.4.3 Equality and efficiency
One application of this model is to demonstrate the potential complexity of the relationship
between equality and efficiency as a result of optimised cooperation in the repeated signalling
game. In terms of the larger debate about institutional sclerosis, understanding the economic
costs associated with this process of entrenchment is important. The aggregate equality and
efficiency outcomes in this model depend first on the economic cost of signals in terms of resources
able to be used productively, and second, on the distribution of reputations in the population.
If all agents are near the attractor points in the reputation space the distribution of political
favours will be roughly equal, resulting in a roughly equal distribution of wealth as a result of
the game. If signals required to sustain reputations are economic transfers, the efficiency loss
will be zero. Outside of these extremes a great deal of complexity arises.
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Figure 3.10: Simulated total signal and concealment costs over time
Recall that the political allocation of economic rents accruing to each individual is proportional
to their reputation. We can thus use the sum of an agents reputations to each political party,
weighted by political power, as a proxy for individual wealth at each point in time in the model
simulation. The left panel of Figure 3.10 shows the change in the wealth Gini coefficient of
the agent population over time for the simulated baseline with both power law and uniformly
distributed initial reputations for all agents (with a normalised starting point), and additionally
with ‘skin in the game’, ωi proportional to reputation. The range of Gini coefficient paths
demonstrates that increasing inequality is not a fundamental feature of the game, but is a
product of the distribution of agent reputations. While in this case the power law distribution
resulted in increasing equality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, the ratio of the top 1% of
wealth to the bottom 20% still increased from 32 to 36 over the 20 period simulation. Thus
the net distributional effect across the whole population of agents is highly dependent on the
distribution of reputations.
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In terms of efficiency, while many signals involve diverting resources from productive activities,
such as professional lobbying, costly luncheons and industry conferences, many are mostly trans-
fers. Donations are pure transfers, while other more subtle reputation signals, such as attending
exclusive private schools, clubs, owning a home in the ‘right’ suburbs, driving the ‘right’ car
and dressing the ‘right’ way, are not clearly unproductive. People need to be schooled, housed,
and dressed even in the non-cooperative part of the game. Any costs also need to be evaluated
against alternative institutional or social arrangements that would provide sufficient levels of
trust to enable a highly function system of production and trade. There may also be additional
‘growth costs’ from the game if political allocations of economic rent constrain investment and
innovation in order to protect the interest of the cooperative counterparts.
What can be shown using this model is that because signalling efforts transform the social
space they may generate a reputation distribution that can result in total signalling effort either
increasing or decreasing over time. The right panel of Figure 3.10 shows the total size of positive
signals over the simulated population under various conditions. In the two scenarios where ‘skin
in the game’, ωi, is fixed, signalling effort first increases before decreasing, and the signalling
agents moves towards the attractor points in the reputation space where optimal signals trend
towards zero. There is thus no general rule of thumb arising about the expected trends in the
size of total signalling efforts across the population. Any efficiency loss arises when signals are
mostly resource investments rather than transfers, and where a larger share of the population
has reputations within the positive signal range but further from the attractor points. While
the aggregate economic costs in terms of efficiency losses are highly dependent on a number of
factors, from an individual agent’s perspective the marginal gains are equal to the marginal cost
from rent-seeking signals.
3.5 Signalling across domains
Another key element of the model presented here is that because of diminishing returns to
individual signal type, signalling efforts should be spread across a number of types and show
consistent patterns across these alternative signalling domains. Does the same clustering around
the reputation attractor points occur in signalling domains apart from political donations? To
answer that question we look at the patterns of cross-directorship in Australian listed companies,
which is a domain in which signals of reputation are able to be made not just directly to politicians
and political parties, but to other firms who may form part of a group of politically-connected
insiders who all jointly play a cooperative signalling game. That is, increasing one’s reputation
with another firm, which itself has a high political reputation with one or more parties, is one
way to improve one’s reputation with the political party and the other firm. There also a
pattern of entrenchment in this domain, with Alexander (2003) finding that over the period
1976-1996 the cross-directorship network of Australian listed companies became significantly
more interconnected and clustered. To see whether the clustering patterns in Australian political
donations data corresponds to the clustering patterns in this cross-directorship domain, we use
the cross-directorship network of the 2,159 companies on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)
in June 2013, of which 117 are also political donors, and 28 directors are donors in their own
names. Figure 3.11 shows the large component of this network, highlighting the location of
hedging donors (yellow), Liberal donors (dark blue) and Labor donors (red), with the size of the
company node corresponding to betweenness centrality, a measure of how well-connected ones
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own connections are to each other,19 in the network. The location of each node, or director,
relative to each other reflects the number of direct and indirect connections between them.
Graphically, patterns corresponding to political donations were present, red and blue nodes
would be clustered together amongst a sea of yellow. This is not clearly the case.
Figure 3.11: Large component of ASX cross-directorship network in 2013
From Table 3.2 we see that the hedging donors in the network are tightly connected within their
own group, with 47% of firms being connected to each other by an average distance of 5.7 edges,
and 43% being connected by a single edge. Labor donors are less connected amongst themselves
(average distance 10.4, and no direct connections), with Liberal donors showing similar charac-
teristics. While the partisan patterns are not clear, the extensive clustering of hedging donors
in the cross-directorship network offers some support for the idea that cross-directorship is an
additional reputation signal that sustains cooperation of political favour exchanges.
3.6 Discussion and conclusions
The above optimal signalling model nested in a ‘one-sided’ signalling game is a broad framework
that captures many intuitive elements of political favouritism. It relies on the following key
assumptions
19Betweenness centrality for a node i in a connected graph is given by
∑
s,t∈v∧s 6=i∧t 6=i
nis,t
ns,t
where ns,t is the
number of shortest paths from s to t and nis,t is the number of shortest paths from s to t passing through i.
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Table 3.2: ASX cross-directorship network characteristics of donor groups
Hedgers Labor Liberal
Total donors 61 15 41
Within-group share of connections 0.47 0.31 0.34
Mean in-group graph distance 5.7 10.4 8.1
Out-group share of connections 0.40 0.39 0.38
Mean out-group graph distance 7.4 7.5 7.3
Share direct connections 0.43 0.00 0.05
1. Reputations are a coordinative mechanism capturing the ideas of image-scores, tags, or
other stock indicators of trustworthiness that allow cooperation to be sustained and offer
a selection incentive for groups to coordinate on a cooperative equilibrium.
2. Political allocations of economic rents occur in proportion to reputations to each political
party, scaled by each party’s power and augmented by monitoring and policing of favours.
3. Agents are distributed in the reputation space and optimise their use of available signals
to increase their reputation level.
From these starting propositions a number of key relationships arise. First, there is a finite repu-
tation range that allows for positive signals to be interpreted. This means that many individuals
will in general be excluded from the cooperative game and be unable to gain reputation and po-
litical favour. Exclusivity of elites is a key element of Olson’s sclerosis, and the model captures
this idea through the disengagement range, which is a low end reputation cut-off for participation
in the cooperative strategy, and the entrenchment over time of agents in the positive signalling
region above that point. Figure 3.7 shows this preferential attachment process when political
power structures are stable over long periods.
At the high end of the reputation range is the concealment range, where monitoring of political
favours results in efforts to distance oneself from political parties in order to be able to gain
political influence. In the model an increase in monitoring will decrease positive signals, but this
will come at a cost of increase concealment efforts. Moreover, the empirical prediction is that
political favours will not necessarily be well correlated with positive signals, such as political
donations, if there is an ability to control for reputations. Exactly this result was found in
Murray & Frijters (2015) (Chapter 2), where centrality in relationship networks was used as a
proxy for reputations, in line with the network concept of reputation in Section 3.3.2, in a model
that predicted political favouritism. In that study political donation coefficients were positive,
but not significant, while the coefficients of reputation proxies where all positive, large, and
significant.
In terms of observable signalling patterns between political parties, the model makes clear that
hedging is a viable option for individuals who have a reputation level in the positive range for two
or more political parties. Moreover, the ratio of signals between parties in this hedging region
is the direct result of the relative political power of the parties. In the data reviewed earlier,
all Australian states and Canada see hedging donors offering even split between major parties,
while in Germany hedging donors cluster around a 65:35 split between the CDU/CSU alliance
and the SDP, indicating that donors believe the CDU/CSU alliance is almost twice as powerful
as the SDP.
Signalling behaviour in this model responds to political power. This contrasts to the standard
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view that small well connected groups can act in their collective interest more easily, and hence
the signals used to coordinate small groups are what leads to the group becoming powerful.
While this may be true as a general observation, the model here deals with the case of a stable
power structure and the entrenchment of elites within an existing power structure over time.
Certainly there is scope for signals amongst the individuals unable to participate in this political
signalling game (i.e. those with low reputations to current political parties) to use signals to
coordinate their own groups and pool resources in order to tackle the political power structure
through the creation of new political parties. The model here is consistent with this view,
though the additional implication is that due to the distribution of current reputations amongst
the population, new political parties are likely to arise from groups of disaffected individuals,
rather than from current political elites.
Reframing political favouritism in terms of a cooperation game supported by reputations suggests
a reexamination of how anti-rent-seeking, or anti-corruption, policy is assessed. Consider the
argument of Ayres & Bulow (1998) that mandating donor anonymity would disrupt the market
for political influence, since donations are identifying reputation signals in a game of favour
exchange. If we believe that signalling trust through donations is only required for less connected
firms, then restraints on donations will result in the market for political influence constricting to
a smaller, but more reputable group, but also the use of alternative reputation signals that may
be more economically costly than donations which are pure transfers.
It is also not clear whether caps on lobbying decrease the economic cost of political favour
exchanges in terms of signalling activity (Che & Gale, 1998; Kaplan & Wettstein, 2006; Pastine
& Pastine, 2010). If professional lobbying is merely one way to signal reputation by being vouched
for by someone with a higher reputation, capping or outlawing it would result in a narrowing of
the field of influence to only current high reputation individuals, or perhaps lead to the formal
market for lobbying becoming informal, in a similar manner to the signalling game itself. Given
the reliance on the reputation mechanism, regulating the way signaller’s identities are concealed
or revealed could be disruptive to the coordination of political favours. For high reputation
individuals revealing identities to the public, such as through the disclosure of corporate records,
may reduce their influence.
While there are limitations of this model in some areas, particularly the measurement of repu-
tations and the interpretation of the wide array of activities that could be signals, the overall
framework offers a new direction in understanding political favouritism, the mechanisms that
sustain it, and the likelihood of different policies to curtail it. The influential idea of institutional
sclerosis, whereby elites become entrenched over time and divert resources to themselves at an
economic cost to others, now has a new plausible underlying mechanism that is consistent with
a range of empirical regularities.
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Appendix
Table 3A.1: Variable and parameter description for political signal model
Variable Description Relationship
bi,j,t Economic rent given to individual i from political party j f(ri,j,t,m, ω)
ri,j,t Reputation level between individual i and political party j f(ri,t−1, si,j,t)
si,j,t Signal size between individual i and political party j Choice
cs,i,t Total cost of a signal type, s, for individual i at time t f(si,j,t)
ei,j,t Marginal reputation level gains from cooperative signals ∆ri,j,t
m ‘Strength of monitoring’ for all political parties m ∝ strength
βs Parameter for diminishing returns to a signal type s 0 < β ≤ 1
αs,t Relative strength of signal type s
∑n
s=1 αs,i,t = 1
γ Decay factor for reputation ri,j,t 0 < γ ≤ 1
ωi ‘Skin in the game’ for individual i ωi > 0
κj,t Relative power of political party j 0 < κj,t
Variables and parameters with subscript t represent values at a particular time period only.
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Figure 3A.1: Simulated evolution of signalling and reputations
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Chapter 4
Give and you shall receive: the
emergence of back-scratching
Abstract
We develop a new experiment to study the emergence of welfare-reducing bilateral alliances
within larger groups, and the effectiveness of institutional interventions to curtail this reciprocal
alliance behaviour. In each of the 25 rounds of our experiments, a player (the ‘allocator’) nomi-
nates one of three others as a co-worker (the ‘receiver’), which determines the group production
that period to be the productivity of the receiver (which varies by round), but also gives the
receiver a bonus and makes them the allocator in the next round. Alliances then form if two
individuals keep choosing each other even when their productivities are lower than that of oth-
ers, causing efficiency losses. Males and business students are found to be more likely to form
welfare reducing alliances. Random allocator rotation policies and low bonuses fail to signifi-
cantly improve overall welfare: rotation policies significantly reduce the rate of formation of new
alliances but do not lead to the breakdown of existing alliances, while low bonus policies are
only found to be effective when alliances are well established. This points to the importance of
the strength of existing alliances for the chances of institutional interventions curtailing welfare
reducing reciprocity, i.e. ‘back-scratching’.
4.1 Introduction
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008, triggering
a collapse in financial markets. A lack of diligence by regulatory authorities in the United States,
whose impartiality was undermined by the ‘revolving-door’ of personnel between private banks,
lobbyists and regulators, is arguably a key element in the crisis (Roubini & Mihm, 2010; Levine,
2012; Matthews, 2014; Barth et al. , 2012).1 For instance, Rohit Bansal and his superior Joe
Jiampietro, Goldman Sachs investment bankers who had previously worked at the NY Fed and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), were alleged to have obtained market sensitive
1Leaked recordings by Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NY Fed) whistle-blower Carmen Segarra provide
evidence as to the degree of favouritism regularly shown between regulators and the regulated.
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information from another former NY Fed employee, Jason Gross, that undermined regulatory
oversight (Silver-Greenberg et al. , 2014).
Like most instances of favouritism, Bansal and Jiampietro’s case does not cleanly fit the definition
of corruption by Jain (2001) as “acts which utilise the power of public office for personal gain in
a manner that contravenes stipulated rules” due to substantial grey areas in the interpretation
of confidentiality rules. Yet it is a clear example of where a degree of discretion can give rise to
quid pro quo alliances formed on bases other than merit. Such alliances can be payoff-increasing
for the insiders, but come with efficiency losses that are hard to measure. Faccio et al. (2006)
for instance, find that companies are more likely to be bailed out with public money when they
have political connections, though the authors were not able to observe the actual pay-backs to
politicians. Mancur Olson (1982) nevertheless surmises that alliances can impose external costs
as they redistribute gains towards themselves that can “exceed the amount redistributed by a
huge multiple”, which raises the question of what institutions can reduce this kind of welfare-
reducing reciprocity, or ‘back-scratching’.
Because costly alliances are hard to observe in real markets, we develop a new experimental design
that captures their two key elements. First, alliance partners have to actively find each other
and develop the trust necessary to sustain an alliance, and second, there is a conflict in payoffs
between direct reciprocity within an alliance, and indirect reciprocity amongst a larger group.
This design adds to existing experimental approaches to corruption and costly reciprocity.2 An
influential prior design is the Repeated Bribery Game (RBG), pioneered by Abbink et al. (2002).
The basic stage game of this experiment involves two players in the role of briber and public
official, where the briber first makes a choice of how much to offer as a bribe (if any), after which
the official makes the choice to accept the bribe (or not), and then makes an allocation decision
that may favour the briber. A public official’s allocation choice in favour of the briber triggers a
negative externality determined by the experimenter, either by subtracting earnings from other
subjects in the experimental session (Abbink et al. , 2002; Abbink, 2004), or by reducing the
size of a charity donation by the experimenter (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010; Schikora, 2011b; van
Veldhuizen, 2011).
A wide variety of interventions have been tried in the RBG setting. A key finding by Abbink
(2004) is that staff rotation is effective at reducing bribery and corrupt decisions, where rotation
was implemented by randomly pairing bribers and public officials each round. The basic RBG
design has since been augmented to allow for whistle-blowing (Schikora, 2011a; Lambsdorff &
Frank, 2010), an outside informed monitor (Schikora, 2011b), payoff variations that mimic high
non-bribery wages (van Veldhuizen, 2011; Armantier & Boly, 2008), and ‘citizen’ and probabilistic
punishment (Abbink et al. , 2002; Serra, 2012; Cameron et al. , 2009). Abbink (2004) cautions
though that the fixed briber-official setup of the RBG (where the experimenter determines the
possible alliance) does not fit situations where unobserved alliances already exist before policy
interventions take place, nor where the composition of the alliances is completely indeterminate
ex ante, i.e. where potential partners have to find each other rather than be paired by the
experimenter.
In our new experimental design, in each of the 25 rounds of our baseline experiment, a player
(the ‘allocator’) nominates one of three others as a co-worker (the ‘receiver’), which determines
the group production that period to be the productivity of the receiver, where the productivity
2Our paper adds to the experimental literature on coordination with negative externalities, including Frank
& Schulze (2000); Schulze & Frank (2003); Abbink (2004); Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt (2006); Armantier & Boly
(2008); Schikora (2011b); Bu¨chner et al. (2008); Schikora (2011a); Lambsdorff & Frank (2011); van Veldhuizen
(2011); Barr et al. (2009); Barr & Serra (2009)
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of all potential receivers is randomly drawn each round. Yet, the receiver also gets a bonus and
becomes the allocator in the next round, allowing the receiver to return the favour independent
of the productivity of their partner. Alliances thus form if two individuals keep choosing each
other as receiver even when their productivities are lower than that of others in some rounds,
creating a cost to every other individual in the 4-person experiment. The key innovation with
regards to the existing literature is that it is not given before the experiment who will be harmed,
who will form alliances, and who will benefit from alliances, allowing us to look at the dynamics
of alliance formation and the effect of policy intervention on both the emergence of new alliances
and the break-up of existing ones.
Our first treatment is Rotation, which mimics a ‘staff rotation’ policy by introducing a degree
of randomness in who makes the discretionary decision each round. This intervention is imple-
mented in an additional 25 rounds with the same players, hence with possible existing alliances
in place. Whilst such a policy reduces the payoffs of alliances and hence should reduce the rate
of formation of new alliances, it is not clear whether they will help break up existing alliances.
In our second treatment, the bonus is reduced, again for an additional 25 rounds after the baseline
experiment. The reduction in the bonus is sufficient to make a meritocratic strategy, wherein
every allocator chooses the highest productivity player each round as receiver, more profitable
than being in an alliance, as long as everyone else also plays meritocratic. We interpret this
treatment as reducing the level of discretion, which in real organisations might take the form
of having strongly enforced rules, or as Congleton (2014) explains, the bureaucratisation of
individuals into “cogs in an organizational machine”. This treatment is also informed by rent-
seeking theory which suggests that the size of rents available is a primary determinant of the
efficiency cost of rent-seeking activity (Lambsdorff, 2002b), and hence we call this a Low Rent
treatment.
In a separate set of treatments, we prime alliances by giving players stories about fictitious player
friendships to read before the experiments. This priming is meant to increase expectations of
reciprocity and thus allows us to see whether the effectiveness of institutions changes with the
strength of the existing alliances.
As a prelude to our results, males and business students are found to be more likely to make
choices leading to back-scratching alliances. In the baseline treatment 26% of rounds are identi-
fiable as alliance-play, and we find that primed relationships do indeed more often form alliances,
with 70% of rounds identifiable as alliance-plays. Primed alliances also change the anti-corruption
treatment effects: Rotation is effective where players are anonymous and alliances emerged in
the previous 25 rounds, but not in the ‘primed alliance’ set of treatments where subjects remain
loyal to their pre-existing relationships despite rotation. Our Low Rent treatment however, is
somewhat effective in the primed condition, but not when anonymous, perhaps because in the
primed experiments there is a general expectation of individuals to favour their pre-assigned
partners, which means that there is less expectation of revenge if individuals deviate from their
alliance when the payoffs make them unproductive (i.e., the partners ‘understand’ it is actually
better for both not to play alliance).
Section 2 discusses the literature our paper adds to. Section 3 introduces the experiments, after
which Section 4 presents and analyses the empirical results. In Section 5 we develop a simple
theoretical framework to see whether the choices of the participants in the experiments can be
interpreted as Nash-equilibria in player-types, where players have to choose before the game
what type of player they will be and hence how they will react to the choices of others (e.g.
strictly meritocratic or tit-for-tat reciprocal). We present simulations that suggest a reasonable
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fit between the experimental choices and this theoretical framework. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Background
The paper falls within two related strands of experimental literature: the literature on corruption
experiments that use the repeated bribery game (RBG), and the wider literature on coordination
in the presence of negative externalities from which we discuss the experiments closest to ours.
As mentioned earlier, we mainly tie into the RBG experiments. Abbink & Serra’s (2012) survey
of these and other corruption experiments report a large willingness to form alliances on the
part of both briber and official. For instance, Cameron et al. (2009) found that even with the
chance of punishment by a third player 78- 93% of players will offer a bribe, with 77-93% of
bribed officials reciprocating by making an allocation decision that favours the briber but that
has negative consequences for the third player.3 Whether a higher negative externality makes a
difference to the actions of the official is uncertain: Abbink et al. (2002), Bu¨chner et al. (2008)
and Cameron et al. (2009), find it makes no difference in the RBG and its variations. Yet,
Barr & Serra (2009) do find an effect. They implement a one-shot petty corruption experiment
where externalities automatically come from accepting bribes, and fall on passive members of
the experimental session not involved in making the bribery decisions. In their setup higher
externalities are related to fewer and smaller bribes, both offered and accepted. In our setup,
where alliances are endogenous rather than fixed by the experimenter, the externalities come
from alliance formation, which makes it unclear how greater externalities would affect alliances:
the greater harm on others might make alliance partners more fearful of reprisals should they
make someone outside of their alliance the allocator, potentially strengthening the alliance.
Lambsdorff & Frank (2011) extend the RBG design by having the briber be a potential whistle-
blower on the public official if that public official does not reciprocate on the bribe. Interestingly,
they find that men and economics students are more corrupt in general as they are more likely
to bribe and accept the bribe. Men and economics students also were more likely to punish
the public official if their accepted bribe wasn’t reciprocated, which suggests that in our exper-
iments too we might expect men and economics students to form more stable alliances, even
though in our design they have to find each other without knowing the other’s gender and other
characteristics.
A very different design is that by Greiner & Schneider (2015). In their study, subjects interact
over 100 rounds in fixed groups. In the first stage of each round, subjects vote on who will be
the dictator in the second stage and thereby gets to allocate group resources. Despite it being
the case that there is no stable coalition if everyone were rational and selfish (because then
every member should vote for themselves), they find strong and long-lasting coalitions, usually
a minimum majority who get all the resources distributed amongst them by a dictator in that
coalition, excluding the others. This setup mimics the emergence of large coalitions, like clans or
ethnicities within larger societies, and also shows that laboratory participants quickly recognise
the possibility of forming a reciprocal alliance with a subset of other players that benefits them
at the exclusion of others. Yet, given that the size of the pie is fixed in their setting, there is no
efficiency loss of such coordination and hence also no direct welfare implication.
3Participants in India were on average 15 percentage points more likely to bribe than the participants in
Australia, 9.9 percentage points more likely to bribe than participants in Indonesia, and 5.4 percentage points
more likely than participants in Singapore.
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The general literature on how coordination on an efficient outcome arises is vast, much of it using
the public good games setup in which individuals have to contribute to a common project, with
the efficient outcome being that everyone contributes maximally, though the optimising selfish
strategy is to contribute nothing whilst hoping that others do contribute. Pro-social behaviour
is then an individual decision in a one-shot game, though individuals can learn from others in
repeated games. In a survey of the literature, Chaudhuri (2011) finds that individuals are more
likely to coordinate on high contributions when their contributions are observed; or when there
is the possibility of punishing non-contributors or rewarding high-contributors.
It is not clear whether the findings on coordination in public goods games should be expected
to hold for our design. For instance, in our design punishment is also possible in the sense
that allocators can decide who will become the receiver and who will not, but this punishment
has ambiguous effects: just as much as other players can punish someone for not having played
meritocratically in previous rounds, snubbing an alliance attempt might mean that the next time
the snubbed person is the allocator he or she will attempt to form an alliance with someone else.
This possibility of ‘forming an alliance with someone else’ is not a part of the public good game
since the pro-social behaviour is towards the whole group, not a sub-set of it.
Regarding the role of information in public goods games, Choi et al. (2011) show that when a
player can see that others have contributed in previous rounds, they are likely to contribute more
themselves, pointing to the role of transparency in achieving efficient outcomes. In our setup too,
the history of players’ decisions is known (yet not actively displayed), but only individuals who
become allocators get to make decisions, meaning that those who are not chosen as allocators
may never get a chance to ‘punish’ others who have not played pro-socially, making it unclear
whether this public goods result would hold in our setting too.
Rand et al. (2011) had a local public goods design that included the possibility of players using
information on the previous actions of others to infer who are likely to be contributors in future
rounds. Their design had individuals pair up with several ‘neighbours’ whom they could send 50
units, with the neighbours receiving 100. Individuals could then choose new neighbours in later
rounds, and were found to want to pair up with those individuals who indeed sent 50 units to
their neighbours in previous rounds, indicating that individuals expect pro-social behaviour to
be a persistent trait. This is very salient to our experiment where individuals looking to form an
alliance will also be trying to team up with reciprocators contributing to the alliance, though in
our case the question is how such reciprocation can be discouraged rather than encouraged, as
there is a group loss.
The literature on who forms alliances with others, i.e. how in-groups and out-groups form and
maintain, often follows the work of Tajfel (1970), who found that arbitrary allocation into groups
by the experimenter induced a striking degree of bias towards fellow group members, for instance
on no other basis than that individuals are handed the same colour shirt or the same group label
(‘A or B’). Experiments of this type require priming of subjects with group identities, a process
that has been repeatedly found to effectively invoke pro-sociality within groups or pairs (see
Cameron et al. (2012) for a review).
Typically the priming occurs by arbitrary nomination into named identifiable groups by the
experimenter (Tajfel, 1970; Chen & Li, 2009), using writing tasks (Yopyk & Prentice, 2005;
McLeish & Oxoby, 2011), sharing information such as surnames or pictures of other players
(Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Charness & Gneezy, 2008; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004),
simple messages or stories (Taka´cs et al. , 2014), or in some cases using mutual gaze, touch or
tapping rhythms in synchrony (Kurzban, 2001). We adopt the story-telling method in our groups
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of primed player pairs.
Summarising, the main innovation in our design is that we have an easy-to-implement dynamic
setup in which alliances that have endogenous externalities arise even without priming, and
in which we can see whether policy interventions can prevent alliances from emerging and/or
break down existing alliances. The lack of enforceability or punishment of alliances in our design
arguably corresponds well to real world favouritism which is often very hard to observe and can
only be indirectly discouraged.
The external validity of experimental studies of questionable aspects of behaviour is a prime
concern. On this point, Barr & Serra (2010) show that in an RBG game the degree of corruption
by undergraduate subjects was predicted from the corruption index of their country of origin,
suggesting that laboratory choices regarding bribery and corruption indeed captures an aspect of
real-world behaviour. Additionally, Armantier & Boly (2008) ran a field experiment in Burkina
Faso where recruited exam-markers were unaware of their participation in a bribery experiment
and were offered bribes folded in some exam papers. They found, consistent with their their
laboratory results in Canada that had the same design, that higher wages for exam-markers
decreased the prevalence of accepting bribes, showing a correspondence between the behavioural
change following an institutional treatment in the lab with the same institutional treatment in
the field.
Finally, approaching our design from a theoretical perspective is a challenge, with group forma-
tion theories generally characterised by multiple equilibria (Konishi & Ray, 2003; Nash et al.
, 2012; Ray & Vohra, 2014). In simple terms, if it is beneficial to form a sub-group within a
population in order to capture rents, then it will usually be beneficial to form a sub-group within
the initial sub-group for the same reason. Backward induction immediately implies that rational
selfish agents in our setup would always choose to pick the most productive player in each round
as the receiver, because this is optimal in the last round and thus also in each round before. To
nevertheless rationalise the finding that alliances do form, we appeal to strategic games wherein
individuals choose to be a certain type of player before any of the 25 rounds, allowing us to see
if, for instance, being a pure meritocrat would be a rational choice when all others are recipro-
cators. By picking a set of possible types, we use simulation analysis to explore the expected
earnings from the interaction of strategy choices, the existence of Nash-equilibria in strategies
and a trial-and-error mechanism for updating strategies.
4.3 Experimental Design and Research Questions
Subjects play in groups of four whose composition is fixed for the duration of the experiment,
and are identifiable to each other by a unique coloured shape4. The game proceeds in rounds, of
which there are 50 in total covering two treatments of 25 rounds. Each round, one player, the
allocator, chooses which of the other three players to receive a 25 Experiment Currency Units
(ECU) payment (with the first round allocator randomly chosen). The receiver of the payment
in a round becomes the allocator for the next round, providing the potential for back-scratching
to emerge.
The payoff structure creates a conflict between maximising group and individual payoffs via back-
scratching, with a ‘productivity number’ device that determines the group payoff in a round. Each
round the three potential payment receivers are given a randomly shuffled productivity number,
4One might think it is better to be one shape than another, but no such pattern was found.
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from the set {1, 2, 3}, which the allocator can observe before making their decision. Each of
the four players in the group receives a payoff in each round equal to the receiver’s productivity
number. The receiver’s payoff that round includes the 25 ECU payment in addition. We call
a choice meritocratic if the receiver has the highest productivity number. Table 5.1 lists player
payoffs for the three possible choices available in a round in the situation that the ‘Circle’ is the
allocator, the Triangle happens to have productivity 1 that round, Square has 2, and Pentagon
has 3.
Table 4.1: Payoff structure for a stage game
Circle Triangle Square Pentagon
Choice Allocator Prod. 1 Prod. 2 Prod. 3
Triangle 1 26 1 1
Square 2 2 27 2
Pentagon 3 3 3 28
With selfish rational players, the equilibrium for both the one-shot game, and by backwards
induction the repeated game, is what we call the meritocratic strategy of allocating to the highest
productivity player. It is the institutional structure, whereby the payment receiver makes the
allocation decision in the next round, which provides scope for a wide variety of cooperative
outcomes in the repeated game. Since the receiver of the payment is able to discern whether the
allocator has favoured them (i.e. their productivity number was less than 3), the allocating player
can use a non-meritocratic choice as a costly signal to the receiving player of their intention to
form an alliance; the cost arises from the reduced individual payment to the allocating player from
making a non-meritocratic choice. In all there are six potential two-player alliance combinations
possible.
We limit the information provided to players each round in order for alliances to emerge under
a veil of ignorance. Players not allocating in a round are able to see only their own productivity
number, though they do know the distribution of all productivity numbers. After a round, players
see only their new total earnings and not the specific earnings from the round, ensuring that
only observant players who remembered their previous earnings balance, or had a productivity
of 3, could infer whether or not the previous decision was meritocratic. We do this to reflect the
normally hidden nature of any individual favourable decisions.5 Images of decision, waiting and
notification player screens are in Figure 4A.1 of the Appendix.
4.3.1 Treatments
Our two policy treatments mimic commonly prescribed anti-corruption measures, and we specifi-
cally test the efficacy of these treatments in breaking down alliances while deterring the formation
of new alliances. As such we use a within-subject, or group, design in which the receiver in the
final (25th) round of the baseline treatment becomes the allocator in the first round of a second
policy treatment.
5In later work we change this element of the design and find no difference in choices from providing complete
information to all players, so this turned out to be an innocuous part of the original design.
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Rotation
We reduce the ability for immediate reciprocation in this treatment by reducing the receiver’s
probability of being the next allocator from 1 to 0.5, which allows all other players to have a 0.17
probability of being the next round allocator. This treatment mimics policies of staff rotation
in senior positions. To be clear, the person nominated by the allocator as receiver still gets the
bonus (and can hence deduce that he was chosen by the allocator), but that receiver has a 50%
chance of not being the allocator in the next round.
Low Rent
This treatment mimics policies designed to reduce the size of rents that can be allocated with
discretion, and is achieved by reducing the bonus payment allocated each round from 25 ECU
to 3 ECU.
4.3.2 Theoretical Effects of treatments on optimal choices
Selfish rational players should choose meritocratically. To nevertheless account for the logic of
alliances, we here restrict ourselves to looking at two different types of players, neither of which
is fully rational: the first is the meritocratic player type who chooses the highest productivity
person as receiver in each round that they are the allocator. The second type is a tit-for-tat
reciprocator who conditionally chooses the player who made them receiver in the previous round
as long as that allocator displayed a willingness to reciprocate. A tit-for-tat reciprocator strategy
is as follows.
• If the previous round is not meritocratic, choose the previous round allocator.
• If the previous round is meritocratic and the two rounds prior allocator is me, choose the
previous round allocator (continue an alliance).
• If the previous round is meritocratic and the two rounds prior allocator is not me (or
it is the second round), choose productivity 2 player, or the productivity 1 player if the
productivity 2 player is the previous allocator.
• If the first round, choose the productivity 2 player.
With these two types in mind, we can see how the treatments change the incentives for being
either a meritocrat or a tit-for-tat reciprocator (TFT), depending on the order of being able to
make a choice in the game. The important situations in terms of a Nash-equilibrium are:
1. An individual chooses to be a meritocrat when all others choose to be a meritocrat. The
first receiver’s expected payoff is then 245, whilst the expected payoff of all other players
is then 227.
2. An individual chooses to be meritocratic when all others are TFT. Since choosing a type is
only salient if a person gets to make a choice, we look at the individual being a meritocratic
allocator in the first round. Their expected payoff is 51, and for the first receiver (who is
TFT), the expected payoff is 375, as the receiver immediately switches to choosing someone
else with whom a stable alliance is then formed.
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3. An individual chooses to be a TFT when all others also choose this. The expected payoff
for the first allocator is then 350, with 375 for the first receiver, and they immediately form
an alliance lasting the whole treatment.
4. An individual chooses to be a TFT when all others are a meritocrat. The expected payoff
to the first round allocator is then 219, while the first receiver (who is a meritocrat) can
expect to get 245.
What this shows is that in the baseline game, there are two Nash-equilibria in these player types,
i.e. where everyone plays TFT or where everyone plays meritocratic. In the TFT equilibrium,
there is a winning alliance that gets formed in the first round and is sustained all 25 rounds, with
the winning alliance members getting more than they would in the meritocratic equilibrium,
meaning that the TFT equilibrium dominates the meritocratic equilibrium in expected payoffs
for the winning alliance.6
Table 5.2 shows the expected payoffs for the baseline and the treatment scenarios, for first round
allocators, first round receivers, and other players. The Nash-equilibria are in bold font and show
that the same equilibria hold in the Rotation and Low Rent treatment as in the baseline, but that
in both these treatments, the meritocratic equilibrium payoff dominates the TFT equilibrium,
even for the winning coalition.
Table 4.2: Expected payoffs from TFT and meritocrat strategies in ECU
Allocator First receiver (others)
Strategy Meritocrat TFT
Baseline
Meritocrat 227, 245 (227) 51, 375 (201)
TFT 219, 245 (214) 350, 375 (50)
Rotation
Meritocrat 227, 245 (227) 160, 245 (223)
TFT 218, 240 (219) 214, 225 (194)
Low Rent
Meritocrat 93, 95 (93) 50, 90 (69)
TFT 85, 88 (85) 86, 89 (50)
4.3.3 Anonymous or Primed
To mimic the situation where agents within institutions have prior relationships, we prime player
pairs with bilateral expectations of friendship in a selection of experiment groups. Before the
game, they had to read a brief recount of their imaginary ‘in-game’ relationships with a connected
partner, effectively being told that one of the symbols was their friend that helped them in the
past. The full description of this priming device is in the Appendix. A sample of hand-written
participant notes in Table 4A.1 of the Appendix reveals that our priming method successfully ma-
nipulated some subjects’ expectations and behaviour towards reciprocity within an alliance, such
as the remark by one primed person who wrote that “Hope the player information is correct with
6It is easy to see that a simple reciprocity strategy whereby someone reciprocates to the last person who made
them receiver, is not a Nash-equilibrium: if all others are simple reciprocators then being a meritocrat increases
the payoff. Conditional on being involved in the first round, the meritocrat keeps allocating it to the highest
productivity player each time they are allocator, and keeps being chosen as receiver in the subsequent round,
leading to a payoff around 12 ECU higher than being a simple reciprocator too.
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who trusts me to pay them so they repay me.” We expect these experiments to produce faster al-
liance formation, longer lasting alliances, and less responsiveness to anti-corruption policies than
our anonymous groups in which all expectations of relationships are an emergent characteristic
of game play.
4.3.4 Data
The experiments were conducted at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, in
May and June 2013. In all 160 student subjects were recruited from the university student
body using the ORSEE online recruitment system (Greiner, 2003), with experiments conducted
in a university computer lab using CORAL software (Schaffner, 2013). The full experimental
program, data and code is available at the research website7. Each subject played 50 rounds
in total and received their accumulated experimental currency earnings converted to Australian
Dollars at a ratio of 20:1, earning between $5 and $34, with the average payoff $21 for around a 1
hour experiment session, slightly above the minimum wage, with earnings inclusive of a show-up
fee.
Each session began with a brief introductory talk and written instructions provided to each sub-
ject for later reference. Subjects playing in primed groups received a single additional printed
sheet with their priming device, which they were directed to read and consider prior to com-
mencing the computerised part of the session. Prior to commencing both the baseline and any
treatment, subjects answered a series of hypotheticals to ensure they had a complete under-
standing of the experiment and payoff structure. At the completion of two sequential 25 round
treatments, subjects answered a socio-demographic survey and were paid in cash upon departure
via sealed envelopes.
Altogether 28 anonymous groups played the baseline, with 14 each continuing to either Rotation
or Low Rent treatments. An additional 12 primed groups played in a second set of experiments,
with each policy treatment implemented on 6 groups. A diagrammatic summary of the experi-
mental setup is in Figure 4.1. Subjects were also given blank paper and pens in order to make
notes during the experiment, which were collected upon completion in order to gain additional
insight into the thought processes occurring during the game.
Treatment sequence
25 rounds 25 rounds Groups Subjects
Anonymous Baseline Rotation 14 56
Baseline Low Rent 14 56
Primed Baseline Rotation 6 24
Baseline Low Rent 6 24
25ECU bonus per round
Productivity numbers from set {1,2,3}
Figure 4.1: Experiment setup
7http://buddyexperiment.blogspot.com.au
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4.3.5 Research Questions
We define two choice variables of interest that we later use as measures of policy success and that
are useful in terms of formulating the research questions: Alliance Initiation (AI) and Alliance
Reciprocation (AR). Alliance initiation is any non-meritocratic decision (allocation to a player
with a productivity number less than 3) outside of a current alliance, and hence can be seen as an
attempt at alliance formation. An alliance reciprocation is any non-meritocratic choice during an
alliance period involving the same duo as the alliance initiation. An alliance is then a unbroken
chain of choices involving an alliance initiation and at least one Alliance Reciprocation, ending
when a different receiver is chosen than the duo in the alliance. These two alliance behaviour
variables are roughly inverse to the frequency of meritocratic decisions, but they capture slightly
different tendencies; AI captures active effort to form alliances, while AR captures willingness to
sustain an alliance. We structure our enquiry around the following questions.
Question 1. Does implementing a rotation policy increase the frequency of meritocratic choices
and total group payoffs?
This question is motivated by of the success of Abbink’s (2004) experiment, and by the wide
adoption of such policies in sensitive areas of large bureaucracies (World Bank, 1992). The
intuition behind this hypothesis arises naturally from the expected payoffs summarised in Table
5.2, which shows that it is no longer a payoff-dominant strategy to play TFT, even for the alliance
members that become receiver in the first round. If some individuals ‘re-set’ their strategy before
the treatments (or after a few rounds) towards the payoff dominant equilibrium, then we should
see more meritocratic play. Yet, since TFT play is still a Nash-equilibrium, strong expectations
of alliance play on the part of others might prevent alliance members from switching strategies.
Question 2. Does a Low Rent treatment increase the frequency of meritocratic choices?
Like our first question, Question 2 arises due to the expected optimal strategy choices in re-
sponse to the new payoff structure, making the meritocratic choice the payoff dominant Nash-
equilibrium. Mainstream economic theories of rent-seeking also suggest that Low Rent environ-
ments are welfare enhancing due to lower rent-seeking activity (Lambsdorff, 2002a).
Question 3. Do primed groups have i) earlier Alliance Initiation, ii) more frequent Alliance
Reciprocation, iii) longer lasting alliances, and iv) less responsiveness to anti-corruption policies?
Question 3 is motivated by the increase in certainty players will have about the strategy of the
player they are now connected with via a primed relationship. Previous experimental evidence
showed that priming relationships does increase cooperation within those relationships, and
hence, we are likely to observe greater cooperation in alliance pairs than between the experimental
group as a whole (Cameron et al. , 2012). Our expectation that our policy treatments will be
less effective is informed by the general findings of cooperative games summarised in Chaudhuri’s
(2011) review, whereby norms formed early in a repeated game are often persistent. Hence, our
rotation policy may simply allow the continuation of two bilateral alliances based on the primed
relationships, while our low discretion treatment may be insufficient to break the norm of alliance
formation for fear of losing the outranking winning position of the alliance.
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Question 4. Can socio-demographic characteristics predict individual alliance choices, AI and
AR?
Question 4 is informed by previous studies revealing biases associated with particular demo-
graphic traits, such as gender and profession (Frank & Schulze, 2000; Ones & Putterman, 2007;
Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Chaudhuri, 2011), and offers some insight into what sort of personal
qualities to look at when trying to select new members of a group that are not corruption-prone.
4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 4.3 provides basic descriptive statistics of the experiment outcomes and player character-
istics. In all, we have reasonable amounts of variation in gender, political views, wealth, and
between local and international students. In the baseline treatment, 74% of groups saw an al-
liance formed at some point8, and of those, with the first alliance formed on average in round 8,
and with 29% of all baseline rounds spent in an alliance. We see significant variation in many
indicators including individual earnings (ranging from 53 to 384 ECU), alliance lengths (rang-
ing from 2 to 25 rounds), and share of rounds in an alliance (ranging from 0 to 1). Together
these basic metrics indicate that back-scratching alliances within larger groups can easily form
in experimental settings of repeated games featuring discretionary decisions.
We can note that primed groups had fewer AI choices (0.14 compared to 0.28 share of rounds)
and more AR choices (0.38 compared to 0.17 share of rounds), indicating that alliances were
indeed both more rapidly formed and sustained for longer on average: when alliances form and
are stable there are fewer rounds to initiate an alliance.
To examine Olson’s (1982) claim that groups will steal from the economic pie even if the cost
to others is greater than their gain, we calculate a measure of gains minus losses for a group
as the difference between the maximum group payoff under meritocratic play and the realised
group payoff. Group losses are 59ECU on average (74ECU for primed groups), or 6.4% (8.0%)
of the total expected group payoffs under the meritocratic outcome. If we take out the effect
of bonuses on payoffs and only focus on the productivity payoffs, then the losses become 20%
(25%) of total expected group payoffs from production.
Figure 4.2 shows the smoothed distribution of group payoffs across the baseline and treatments.
A bimodal distribution appears to be present, particularly for anonymous groups; a result of
groups ending up in one of the two equilibria, either alliance play or meritocratic play. A
striking feature here is the degree to which primed groups fail to display increased payoffs in
the Rotation treatment compared to the anonymous groups, indeed suggesting that Rotation
couldn’t break existing alliances.
It is worth noting how the interactions of player choices creates rather complex outcomes. Charts
of individual payoffs by round for all groups are in Figure 4A.3 of the Appendix, though a sample
of payoff charts capturing unexpected complex interactions is in Figure 4.3.9 The 4 payoff lines
8We define an alliance as a period of exclusive dealing between two players where in the first round, and at least
one other, the allocation choice is non-meritocratic (meaning the payment receiver had a productivity number in
that round of less than 3).
9From left to right, the relevant treatments belonging to the graphs are: Anonymous Low Rent, Primed
Rotation, Primed Rotation
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for Anonymous and Primed groups
Anonymous Primed
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
Share Meritocratic rounds 0.60 1 0.24 0.48 1 0.24
Share Alliance Initiation 0.23 0.60 0 0.14 0.48 0
Share Alliance Reciprocation 0.17 0.72 0 0.38 0.72 0
Share Rounds in alliance 0.28 1 0 0.62 1 0
Mean alliance length# 8 25 2 13 25 3
Round of first alliance# 8 24 1 6 24 1
Number of alliances/group 0.9 3 0 1.2 2 0
Group earnings! 868 925 825 847 925 809
Individual earnings! 217 384 53 213 376 46
Equality (group Gini) 0.15 0.39 0.01 0.20 0.39 0.03
Gains minus losses -59 0 -124 -74 0 -116
Age 21 34 18 22 39 18
Group male share 0.53 1 0 0.52 1 0.25
Group business student share 0.32 1 0 0.35 1 0
Happiness (1= V. Unhappy ... 5=V. Happy) 3.89 5 1 3.95 5 2
Political (1= Left ...10= Right) 5.63 10 1 5.65 10 1
Family wealth (1= Wealthy ... 3= Poor) 1.92 3 1 1.71 3 1
Native english speaker (1= Yes) 0.60 0.65
International student (1=Yes) 0.44 0.48
Club members (1= Yes) 0.66 0.67
People v skills (1=People...5=Skills) 2.72 5 1 2.38 5 1
# For groups with any alliance
! Except Low Rent treatment
completely characterise all the choices in an experiment, with the person being chosen as receiver
in a round showing a jump in the payoff line. In the left panel, blue and green players form an
initial alliance (alternating the jump in payoff reflecting the bonus), only for green to renege and
form an alliance with orange for about 10 rounds, after which green again teams up with blue
till round 25. In rounds 26-50 (a Low Rent treatment), orange and red eventually team up for
most of the rounds.
A strange situation occurred in the centre panel, where green and red formed an alliance till
round 13 when red chose blue as the receiver who promptly formed an alliance with green for
the rest of the 25 round treatment. In rounds 26-50 (a Rotation treatment), blue and green
maintained an alliance throughout most of the rounds, with occasionally red and orange being
randomly chosen as allocator who then chose the other some of the time.
In the right panel, blue reneges on a prior alliance with orange in round 9 by choosing green,
who promptly formed an alliance with red for the rest of the 25 rounds. In rounds 26-50 (a
Rotation treatment), the two alliances (red-green and orange-blue) remained loyal to each other
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Figure 4.2: Smoothed frequency distribution of group payoffs (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 9)
and hence only lost the allocator rights in some rounds due to random rotation.
These examples demonstrate that allocating meritocratically outside of the alliance can be pun-
ished either by 1) being replaced from your alliance with an outside player (as in the centre and
left panels), or 2) giving power to an alliance of the two outsiders (as in the right panel). Fully
capturing this kind of play in a theoretical model would be a challenge, as one might imagine,
for the obvious reason that the players left outside an alliance almost certainly were surprised
by the actions of the other players. Table 4A.1 in the Appendix gives more examples of ‘strange’
strategies as noted by some of the participants.
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Figure 4.3: Individual payoffs by round with complex interactions
4.4.2 Treatment effects
We test for changes in the distribution of key outcome metrics between our baseline and policy
treatments and report the results in Table 4.4. The primary outcome of interest is the change
in the number of meritocratic rounds which ultimately determines the size of the group payoff.
In the anonymous Rotation groups, meritocratic choice frequency increases slightly to 0.62 from
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0.60 in the baseline, whilst the Low Rent treatment decreases it to 0.56, though neither change is
statistically significant. For primed groups, Rotation reduced meritocratic play to 0.42 from 0.47
whilst Low Rent increased it up to 0.57, again neither change being significant. Yet, the number
of realised alliances (out of a maximum of 6 different pairs) per group decreased for anonymous
groups under Rotation (1.1 to 0.8), but increased for primed groups (1.2 to 1.5) under Rotation,
showing that under Rotation the two primed pairs typically choose each other when given the
chance via random rotation.
Additionally, Alliance Reciprocation increased from 0.14 to 0.24 for anonymous groups in the
Low Rent treatment (if there was an alliance, which was less likely, it lasted longer), but fell for
primed groups under Low Rents, from 0.44 to 0.35 (slightly more meritocratic choices). Together
these measures indicate that Rotation policies are more likely to result in two alliance pairs in
primed groups than in anonymous groups, while Low Rent policies do reduce the likelihood of
alliance initiation in anonymous groups, but the alliances that then do form last longer, leading
to no net gain.
Table 4.4: Treatment effects for Anonymous and Primed groups
Anonymous Primed
Baseline Rotation Low Rent Baseline Rotation Low Rent
Share Meritocratic rounds 0.60 0.62 0.56 0.47∗ 0.42 0.57
Share Alliance Initiation 0.25 0.31 0.12∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.08
Share Alliance Reciprocation 0.14 0.06 0.33 0.44∗∗∗ 0.28 0.35
Share Rounds in alliance 0.26 0.11∗∗ 0.48 0.70∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.67
Mean alliance length 6.2 3.8∗∗ 18.8∗∗∗ 14.8∗∗∗ 6.4∗∗∗ 16.8
Round of first alliance# 8.4 10.3 3.3∗∗ 6.5 6.7 4.6
Number of alliances/group 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.5 1.0
Share groups any alliance 0.75 0.5 0.64 0.92 1 0.83
Mean group earnings! 867 870 312 851 838 315
Mean individual earnings! 217 218 78 213 210 79
Equality (group Gini)! 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.27∗∗∗ 0.18 0.09
Gains minus losses -58 -55 -63 -74 -87 -60
Treatment change (M rounds) 0.04 -0.07 -0.07∗ 0.11∗
Treatment change (AI rounds) 0.01 -0.09 0.20∗∗ 0.01
Treatment change (AR rounds) -0.06 0.16 -0.13 -0.13∗∗
Statistical comparisons of distributions of treatment measures are: Anon Rotation v Anon Baseline,
Anon Low Rent v Anon Baseline, Primed Basline v Anon Baseline, Primed Rotation v Primed
Baseline, Primed Low Rent v Primed Baseline.
Statistical comparisons of distributions for treatment changes are: Primed Rotation v Anon Rota-
tion, Primed Low Rent v Anon Low Rent.
p values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
# Of groups with any alliance.
! No statistical tests with low discretion treatment because of changed payoff structure.
Recall that all of our groups play two consecutive treatments during continuous game play, and
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that the first round allocator in the policy treatments received the payment in the final round
of the baseline treatment. These averages are hence capturing a ‘policy plus learning’ effect
with this setup, meaning that we can only identify the relative policy effects. To this end, the
final three rows in Table 4.4 shows whether the combined effect is significantly different in the
primed groups. We find that for the Rotation treatment the change in Meritocratic choices is
0.04 in Anonymous groups, and -0.07 for Primed groups (p = 0.06), while the change in Alliance
Initiation choices is 0.01 in Anonymous groups, and 0.20 for Primed groups (p = 0.02), indicating
that Primed groups are more likely to form two alliance pairs under Rotation than anonymous
groups resulting in fewer meritocratic choices and lower groups payoffs. In contrast, the Low
Rent treatment resulted in a -0.07 change in meritocratic choices in Anonymous groups and a
0.11 change in Primed groups (p = 0.02), while also creating a 0.16 change in AR choices for
Anonymous groups and a -0.13 change for Primed groups (p = 0.03), suggesting that Primed
groups responded to the Low Rent policy in a way that increased their group outcomes, while
Anonymous groups did not. To visualise these relative differences, Figure 4A.4 of the Appendix
plots these three choice types by round across all treatments, with these difference in the direction
of treatment effects visible by the change in the trend lines for AI and AR choices between
anonymous and primed groups in each treatment.
In order to separate learning from policy effects, we can look at whether the choices in the
experiments converge at some point before the 25 rounds of play, which would allow us to
compare later rounds in the baseline with later rounds in the treatment experiments. To this
end, Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of alliances in the 6 types of experiments (baseline plus 2
treatments, with anonymous and primed groups). Whilst there are clear trends in many of these
six groups in the early periods, there are no significant trends in the anonymous groups from
round 12 onwards, which we take as an indication that learning effects have been incorporated
by that round.10
To isolate the policy effects from group composition and other effects, we analyse two success
variables. The first is the relative change in the frequency of meritocratic choices across the
whole 25 rounds of the baseline and policy treatment, calculated as (M2j − M1j)/M1j . The
second removes the learning effects by using only rounds 12 to 23, which reflects the period of
stable alliances11, calculated as (M122j−M121j)/M121j . We have 40 observations on these two
success variables Sj , which we then model as
Sj = X
′
j(αj + βjX
′
j) + j
where Sj is either (M2j −M1j)/M1j or (M122j −M121j)/M121j ; and X ′ represents a matrix of
group-specific variables, such as the number of alliance reciprocation decisions in the baseline,
the policy treatment and a control for the primed groups, together with a group level error term.
The interaction effects between these variables are of particular interest. The results are in Table
4.5.
Table 4.5 goes through different specifications with each having a limited number of variables.
The closest fit is found in column 4, which shows that the primed group has a 0.34 lower ratio
of meritocratic plays than in the baseline rounds, but a 0.14 higher meritocracy ratio (=-0.34-
0.19+0.67) in the Low Rent treatment. The Low Rent intervention in the anonymous group (the
default) reduces the meritocratic ratio by 0.19, significantly different from the positive effect
10We also tried using the interval 15-24 rounds, or 10-25, which qualitatively made no difference to the analyses.
11Alliances were observed to be significantly more likely to break down in the final two rounds of every treatment.
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Figure 4.4: Establishment of stable norms in treatments
amongst the primed groups. None of the other treatments affects the ratio (M2j −M1j)/M1j
significantly.
The bottom panel shows that the same results hold qualitatively for the ratio (M122j−M121j)/M121j
as well: Rotation has no significant effects; primed groups play less meritocratic; Low Rent poli-
cies reduce meritocratic play in the anonymous groups; and amongst the primed groups Low
Rent leads to relatively more meritocratic play.
We can summarise this as:
Result 1: Anti-corruption policy success is conditional on existing relationships
This result means that neither of our first two research questions can be answered with confi-
dence. Rotation policies were not successful in breaking up primed pairs and merely allowed for
sequential ‘reigns’ of the two existing pairs in a group. Amongst anonymous groups, rotation
policy similarly had no net significant effect. Low Rent policies do turn out to be relatively
more successful in situations where loyal alliances already exist, though they have no success in
anonymous situations.
Result 2: Primed groups have longer lasting alliances
In line with our third research question, we can say that aligning player expectations with our
priming device does result in faster alliances and longer lasting alliances, though it does not
preclude the situation of players finding new alliances within the game outside of their primed
alliances, as shown in the centre panel of Figure 4.3. Choosing personnel without existing loyal
relationships is then arguably a prerequisite of establishing a group norm of meritocracy.
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Table 4.5: Policy success models
(M2j −M1j)/M1j
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AR1j 0.02
∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.02 0.00
Primed (Pri) -0.01 0.28 -0.34∗ 0.00 0.02
Rotation -0.06 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.04
LR -0.08 -0.09 -0.19∗ -0.17 -0.17
Pri x R -0.21 -0.58∗∗
Pri x LR 0.52∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
AR1j x R 0.00 -0.02
AR1j x LR 0.04
∗∗∗ 0.03∗
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.12 0.07 0.11
(M122j −M121j)/M121j
AR121j 0.09
∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.04
Primed -0.09 0.24 -0.58∗ -0.09 -0.06
Rotation -0.13 0.14 0.02 -0.06 -0.05
LR -0.15 -0.06 -0.28∗∗ -0.23 -0.22
Pri x R -0.19 -0.72∗
Pri x LR 0.73∗∗ 0.96∗∗
AR121j x R 0.05 -0.03
AR121j x LR 0.11
∗∗ 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.15
Pri is primed group, R is Rotation treatment, LR is Low Rent treatment, AR1j
and AR121j are the Alliance Reciprocation frequency in a treatment.
4.4.3 Individual characteristics
Another option available to combat back-scratching is to select group members on observable
socio-demographic characteristics. But which ones are more likely to be associated with meri-
tocracy?
We look at three individual level choices - meritocratic play, alliance initiation and alliance
reciprocation - across the all decisions in the experiments. There are 1,126 M choices across
out of the 2000 opportunities to be meritocratic in all treatments, 411 AI choices (out of 1126
opportunities), and 465 AR choices (out of 697 opportunities). We model the decision variables
Mijt, AIijt, ARijt ∈ {0, 1} as a linear probability model:
Dijt = X
′
itαD + vt
where Dijt denotes one of the three choice variables (Mijt, AIijt, ARijt ∈ {0, 1}) by player i
in group j in round t. X ′ represents a matrix of player-specific variables, αD is the vector of
coefficients, and vt is an error term clustered by group, being ej + eijt. We adopt a number of
specifications to explore the relationship between socio-demographic variables and their impact
on player choices in the game. Table 4A.2 in the Appendix shows the regression results.
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First, we see that males are indeed 9% less likely to make meritocratic choices which is significant
at the 10% level), 5% more likely to initiate, and 19% more likely to reciprocate alliances.
Business students show a similar pattern, with 9% fewer meritocratic choices and 10% more
likely to initiate alliances. In terms of predicting meritocratic choices, each additional year
of age makes one 2% less likely to play meritocratic, a small but significant negative effect.
Somewhat unexpectedly, higher family wealth was not associated with less meritocratic choices
or more alliance initiation: if anything, it was associated with less alliance reciprocation.
When we look at the effects of social opinions in the middle panel, we first see very low ex-
planatory power12, which disappears as soon as we add the demographics back in, so there is no
indication of separate contributions from social views and opinions. This can be summarised as:
Result 3. Men and business students are more alliance-prone
This result adds further evidence to a growing body of literature that looks at the socio-
demographic determinants of cooperation in general, and corruption in particular. Males have
a higher tendency to form alliances, as do business students, suggesting that back-scratching is
likely to be more prevalent in institutions and sectors of the economy dominated by men with a
financial or business education.
Looking at the effects of the policies in these choice models, we see the same effects earlier
observed: primed pairs are more likely to reciprocate in their alliances, and Low Rent policies
seem to have positive effects amongst primed groups, but not in anonymous groups. This suggests
that the fear of ‘missing out’ is a much bigger factor in anonymous groups than in primed groups
where individuals are more secure in their partnering. Support for this contention also comes from
participant’s hand-written notes, with many commentators noting the risk involved in attempting
for form alliances due to conflicting expectations. Notes to the effect of “I hope my friend trusts
me” were common. A list of such notes about strategies and friendships are Table 4A.1 of the
Appendix. In terms of policy interventions pertaining to existing institutions, it is perhaps the
clearest message of the paper: with strong crystalised pairings, one can more easily coordinate on
a new equilibrium wherein everyone abandons alliance play altogether, whereas with uncertain
pairings the introduction of additional uncertainty of lower rents does not diminish the fear that
others may form alliances at all.
4.5 Theoretical analysis
The main experimental results do not correspond to that of selfish rational agents under which
meritocracy is the only Nash equilibrium. Yet, the reality is a murky mess of alliance seekers,
back-scratchers, back-stabbers, and meritocrats: in the baseline experiments, stable alliances
only emerge after round 10 or so, with the first alliance initiation typically taking till round 8.
At best, players seem to be using a trial-and-error process of moving towards an equilibrium in
strategies, or types, that would represent the establishment of stable expectations.
To capture some of this behaviour, we want to see here whether the main results can be ratio-
nalised if we presume that there is a small set of types that individuals belong to; a type which
is chosen prior to any of the 25 rounds of the experiment. We restrict the set to three strategies
12Apart from the AR coefficient for the Skills v people variable, which may represent an opinion based on the
experience within the experiment itself, whereby those in alliances answered the survey that people matter more
than skills.
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with one round of memory and two strategies relying on two previous rounds of play to inform
the choice. The three one round strategies we consider are
1. Meritocratic (M) - makes the meritocratic choice every time.
2. Reciprocator (R) - allocates to the previous allocator.
3. Loyal partner (LP) - allocates exclusively to one player.
The two round prior strategies allow strategic interaction and the development of social norms.
1. Tit-fot-tat reciprocator (TFT), who is a conditional alliance reciprocator.
(a) If the previous round is meritocratic
i. And two rounds prior allocator is not me (or it is the second round)
A. If productivity 2 player is not previous allocator, then productivity 2 player
(this is the first round default)
B. If productivity 2 player was previous allocator, then productivity 1 player
ii. And two rounds prior allocator is me, then chooses previous round allocator
(reciprocate)
(b) If the previous round is not meritocratic
i. Chooses the previous round allocator (reciprocate)
2. Social Norm follower (SN), who is a conditional group cooperator.
(a) If the previous round is meritocratic
i. And two rounds prior allocator is not me, then chooses productivity 3 player (this
is the first and second round default)
ii. And two rounds prior allocator is me, then chooses previous round allocator
(reciprocates)
(b) If the previous round is not meritocratic
i. Chooses the previous round allocator (reciprocates)
These five strategies where selected for this analysis following participant feedback, observed
prevalence of conditional cooperation strategies in repeated public goods games13 (Chaudhuri,
2011), and from players’ decisions in the experiments: the meritocratic strategy is consistent
with 60% of all experiment decisions, while the reciprocator strategy is consistent with 21% of
decisions. From the two round strategies, SN is consistent with 61% of decisions, and the TFT
with 35% of decisions.
4.5.1 Strategy equilibria
We calculate the expected payoffs to a first-round allocator who is one of these five types,
conditional upon the expectation of a single type for all others, by simulating the 25 rounds
of a treatment 10,000 times with that mix of player types, which allows us to look for pure
13Whereas TFT reciprocates in order to form and alliance conditional on the other players reciprocating, and
SN allocates meritocratically, conditional on others allocating meritocratically, or else reciprocates.
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Table 4.6: Best response to type expectations
Baseline Rotation Low Rent
Expect. M R SN TFT LP M R SN TFT LP M R SN TFT LP
A
ll
o
c.
st
ra
t M 231 216 231 60 64 231 212 231 165 178 94 75 94 52 52
R 225 205 316 179 159 225 206 256 205 186 88 69 88 66 63
SN 231 210 231 108 110 231 210 231 175 186 94 69 94 57 58
TFT 225 210 328 207 131 225 206 262 205 183 86 69 88 69 60
LP 225 203 316 164 206 225 206 251 194 207 88 69 88 64 69
symmetric strategy equilibria. Table 4.6 documents the results of this exercise, presenting the
expected payoff for the row type conditional on the type of others in the columns.
In Table 4.6 the best-response types for the allocator are shaded, and of these the symmetric
pure Nash equilibria in types occur along the diagonals and are denoted in bold. The equilibria
in the baseline treatment are meritocratic (M), loyal partner (LP), and tit-for-tat reciprocator
(TFT). The logic of why it is not an equilibrium for all players to be the reciprocal type is that
if I believe that others will play strategy R, then my best response is to play M.14 A similar logic
holds if I expect all others to play SN, for which the best response is TFT.
Note here that the existence of multiple equilibria depending on expectations aligns very closely
with the story so far in that early rounds of play create a persistent social norm, which in the
parlance of this exercise translates to ‘early play aligns expectations about strategies’, hence
allowing groups to settle on an equilibrium in strategies by way of the reasoning “if that’s how
everyone else is going to play, then I’ll do the same”. The bimodal distribution of experimental
outcomes in Figure 4.2 closely match the distribution of group and player payoffs from the
meritocratic and alliance equilibria. Hence, this analysis leads us to believe that the emergence
of groups norms is the product of aligning strategy expectations.
Can this exercise provide insights into the divergent policy treatment effects? The key change
to equilibria in the policy treatments is that the SN strategy can potentially be rationalised as
an equilibrium under a Low Rent policy, though here the strategy choices are like to collapse
back to the meritocratic equilibrium. How a group moves from an alliance equilibrium of either
LP or TFT to SN or M in response to a policy change is not clear, and our experimental
evidence suggests that only groups on the LP equilibrium are more likely to move to an SN or
M equilibrium under the Low Rent treatment. Clearly though, the three equilibria in strategies
in the baseline are not themselves affected by the policy treatments.
4.5.2 Evolutionary strategy fitness
To account for the existence of a mechanism allowing groups to move from one equilibrium to
another, we simulate the evolutionary competition between strategies as follows. We take a
random selection of four out of our five strategies to play a 25 round selection stage. Selection
occurs after each stage, whereby the player with the lowest payoff updates their strategy to one
14Obviously this relies on prior reasoning, as observing someone playing strategy R will be indistinguishable
from playing M, SN, or TFT if the reciprocate to the highest productivity player.
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of the other four available strategies, randomly chosen, and the group plays another 25 round
stage. We look at 10,000 simulations of a sequence of 50 selection stages.15 Under this selection
mechanism, no strategy can become fully extinct, as it has a 0.2 chance of being randomly
chosen as a replacement strategy in any selection stage, and hence a minimum limit of the fitness
measure (how widespread the strategy is in the population) in this selection process is 0.05, and
the maximum is 0.5.16 What this means is that all strategies are potentially available when we
introduce a policy change in this evolutionary simulation after a sequence of 50 baseline selection
stages, and hence can look a the direction of change in the fitness of each strategy under each of
our two treatments.
In Figure 4.5 we plot the results of these simulations. The top left panel shows the relative
fitness of LP, and while it is relatively fit compared to the other strategies under the baseline
conditions, neither the Low Rent or Rotation policy, significantly alters its fitness. For the Low
Rent treatment the first few selection stages after the policy change do see a slight decline in
the fitness of LP and TFTR being matched by an increase in M and SN; a change that is not
persistent, though in keeping with the direction of policy treatment effects in the primed groups
in which the Low Rent treatment appeared to generate a shift towards meritocratic play.
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Figure 4.5: Evolutionary strategy fitness
The bottom left panel shows that under the Low Rent policy a TFT strategy maintains a high
level of relative fitness, while the Rotation policy clearly reduces the fitness of the strategy, a
15The results are robust to the number of rounds in each selection stage, and equally apply with 5 or 25 rounds.
After just ten selection stages the fitness of each strategy shows stability.
16A one fifth chance of being randomly chosen by the lowest one of four players generates the minimum of 0.05,
while any fitter strategy at best can sustain two out of four players who form an alliance in the group.
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reduction matched by an increase in the fitness of M and SN strategies, which again supports our
main experimental results. If players in our anonymous experimental groups rarely settle into a
LP strategy, they are likely to be following an alliance-forming strategy that is indiscriminate in
partner choice, such as TFT. It makes sense that the policy treatments led to different results
for primed groups (which are more likely to find the LP equilibrium), and anonymous groups
(which are more likely to find the TFT equilibrium). In all, the consistency of these changes in
evolutionary fitness of strategies with the direction of our experimental results suggests that in
a trial-and-error process of strategy selection is a useful way of approaching this problem.
Result 4. Policy success may depend on the composition of strategies within a group
Analysing collective behaviour in this environment of potential back-scratching as a repeated
interaction of strategies shows a high degree of consistency with the experimental results. Not
only do multiple equilibria exist in the static sense, which reflect potential meritocratic and
alliance-forming norms, but implementing a trial-and-error process of players finding, or shifting
between equilibria reveals that the direction of policy effects will be conditional on prior strategies
or norms. In particular, our simulation result that a Rotation policy will be more effective
in groups where players are anonymous to their alliance partners, consistent with the actual
difference we find when we compare the primed and anonymous groups.
4.6 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we introduced a new experimental design aimed at producing welfare-reducing
reciprocity, or back-scratching, in the laboratory. The basic design involves three alliance-related
choices: alliance initiation, whereby a player not yet in an alliance chooses a receiver non-
meritocratically; alliance reciprocation, where a player reciprocates non-meritocratically to the
previous round’s allocator and hence is seeking to sustain an alliance; and meritocratic, where
players choose meritocratically that round. We looked at the frequency of these choices and the
characteristics of who makes them, as well as the effect of policy interventions.
In our baseline setup, 26% of rounds could be identified as part of an alliance, defined as a
sequence of at least two reciprocating rounds following an alliance initiation and involving an
alliance reciprocation. These alliances were established by the 8th round and lasted for 6 rounds
on average. The primed group baseline treatment had 70% of rounds as part of an alliance,
and much longer lasting alliances of 15 rounds on average. Alliance reciprocation increased from
14 to 44% of rounds while meritocratic rounds decreased from 60 to 47% on average. Males
were 20% less likely to play meritocratic, and business students 21% less likely, suggesting that
these groups quickly recognised the opportunities to gain from alliance formation. We were thus
able to generate significant back-scratching in the laboratory even within groups of anonymous
student participants.
Our staff rotation policy, whereby the next round allocator is the previous receiver with only a
50% chance, reduced alliance rounds from 26% to 11% in the anonymous groups. Yet, the share
of meritocratic decisions was unchanged showing that the entire effect is due to rotation policy
breaking alliances rather than reduced intentions to form and reform alliances. The increase in
alliance initiation attempts from 23% to 31% of rounds, coupled with the decrease in the number
of alliances per group (from 1.1 to 0.8) and mean alliance length (6.2 to 3.8 rounds on average),
show that attempts to reinitiate alliances were more frequent but less successful, and that players
attempted to form new alliances rather than remain loyal to their partner.
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For the primed groups this policy led to a slight reduction in meritocratic rounds (from 47%
to 42%), with a signifiant increase in alliance (re)initiation from 8% to 31%, and an increase
in the number of alliances per group, showing rotation didn’t prevent members from the two
established alliances pairs in each group reforming their alliances whenever possible.
The Low Rent treatment did not increase the frequency of meritocratic rounds in the anonymous
groups, and even significantly decreased it when we compare the stable periods of play, apparently
because alliances that were already formed persisted, increasing the average alliance length from
6.2 to 18.8 rounds. In the primed groups, there was an increase in meritocratic choices (from
47% to 57% of rounds).
The prima facie policy conclusions from these experiments are that existing alliances matter in
terms of the success of institutional interventions aiming to curtail back-scratching. Rotating
staff from a pool of people with already established alliances is unlikely to deter them from
taking advantage of their temporary position to favour their alliance partners. This points to a
significant trade-off in the choice of personnel for regulatory agencies between greater industry
experience and being free of previous alliances. Having low rents from alliance formation helps
to induce more meritocratic play amongst groups with strong existing alliances, though not with
weak existing alliances, perhaps because with weak alliances the role of the fear of losing the
dominant position and then being punished is stronger.
Our design can be extended in many directions, such as increasing the transparency of previous
choices, varying the groups size, varying the cultural background of participants, and introducing
the possibility of punishment. An open question is to how to nudge groups towards coordinating
on the meritocratic equilibrium in the first place and hence preventing alliance formation from
ever happening.
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Appendix
Figure 4A.1: Clockwise from top left: Allocator decision screen, non-allocator wait screen, noti-
fication of decision for non-receivers, notification of decision for receiver
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Figure 4A.2: Instructions given to players in Friendship condition to simulate ongoing social
relationship and manipulate expectations
101
Rotation Low Rent Embedded
P
la
ye
rP
ay
of
f
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
Rotation
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
Low Rent
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
0 25 50
200
400
600
0 25 50
Round
Figure 4A.3: Accumulated player payoffs by group, round and treatment
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Table 4A.1: Examples of participant’s written comments
My friend and I are greedy except when they are 1 and others are 3.
Not going to get it back until I get a 3 again
Hope the player information is correct with who trusts me to pay them so they repay me.
Never use productivity number 1 even if it’s a mate. Always go for highest productivity.
Check to see if he repays me, try to get repayment continuous b/w the two. Same tactic for round 2
Seems best to continuously allocate to the player with the highest productivity number
Round 20 didn’t get from hexagon. Then they didn’t give to me when I was 3 despite me giving it to
them when the were 2 and others were 3. But I took it they they were 1.
It’s always good to have support. If they support you, you should support them
Choose red circle every time and hopefully they realise they are best off choosing me.
For one note that this game would be played very differently if people were face to face.
Secondly, I an pretty sure a cultural bias exists, where Asians (the majority) would exhibit
more group consciousness. My guess is however that you are testing the relationship between
leadership and group consciousness? (altruism / egotism)
Strategy: pick one player and always allocate to that person. What if I get isolated?
Isolate the other two?
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Figure 4A.4: Choices by round and treatment including fitted linear model
104
Table 4A.2: Choice models
Demographics Social Treatments Combined
M AI AR M AI AR M AI AR M AI AR
Age -0.02∗ 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00
Gender -0.09∗ 0.05 0.19∗ -0.08 0.06 0.07
Relationship -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.08
Inter. student 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.08
Bus. student -0.09 0.10 0.11 -0.09 0.11 0.05
Happiness -0.02 -0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.06
Family wealth 0.05 -0.01 -0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.05
Politics -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
Skills v people 0.03 0.01 -0.09∗ 0.01 0.01 -0.03
Clubs 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Leadership -0.01 -0.03 0.18 0.02 -0.05 0.08
Rotation 0.02 0.02 -0.23 0.02 0.02 -0.21
Low Rent -0.04 -0.11 0.33∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.10 0.27∗∗
Primed -0.13∗ -0.09 0.46∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.10 0.40∗∗∗
Rotation x Pri -0.07 0.21 -0.01 -0.10 0.22 -0.01
Low Rent x Pri 0.14 0.09 -0.39∗ 0.11 0.06 -0.33
N 2000 1318 697 2000 1318 697 2000 1318 697 2000 1318 697
R2 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.30
p values are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01 with standard errors clustered by experiment group.
Gender = 1 for male. People skill is 1-5 where mostly skills is 5, and mostly people is 1. Politics is 1-10 where 1 is Left
and 10 is Right.
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Chapter 5
Whose back are you scratching?
Transparency’s dual effect on
corruption
Abstract
We look at the effect of improving information transparency and implementing identification via
photographs on the incidence of costly back-scratching in a laboratory setting. In our experimen-
tal design players have an incentive to form a bilateral alliance in which they favour each other
at the expense of other players. We find the probability of alliance formation is unchanged when
photographs identify players, a result which is the product of two countervailing forces; more
rapid alliance formation due to the use social cues from the photos as a coordination device, and
more prosocial forces at the group level that lead to shorter alliances. For policy makers there
are lessons about when and where transparency may curtail corruption, and where it may in fact
facilitate it.
5.1 Quid pro quo corruption
In recent decades many international organisations have adopted transparency in their charters
with the expectation of reducing corruption. This includes the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI), whose signatories include the US, UK, France, and many African
countries, which commits resource companies to disclose all payments made to governments. It
includes the 2005 United Nation Convention against Corruption that calls on each State Party
to “enhance transparency in its public administration”. The IMF includes the “transparency of
government accounts” in its 1997 definition of good governance, and the EU 2011 Transparency
Register was similarly developed to provide citizens with information about who is involved in
European decision making. These initiatives and others build on a large development literature
on corruption summarised by Tanzi (1998), who concludes that “[i]n many countries, the lack of
transparency in rules, laws and processes creates a fertile ground for corruption”. Kolstad and
Wiig (2009) re-emphasise that conclusion 10 years later, though they also draw attention to the
importance of factors accompanying transparency, such as accountability.
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Obtaining empirical evidence of the success of anti-corruption transparency policies is hampered
by the strong incentive for concealment by corrupt parties, leading many researchers to seek
evidence of the potential success of anti-corruption policies in laboratory experiments (see Ab-
bink & Serra (2012) for a review of this literature). In this paper we study the importance
of the visibility of back-scratching on corruption in the laboratory, where corruption entails a
reciprocation of favours between parties that incurs a cost on others. To this end we use a new
experimental game specifically designed to allow for mutual back-scratching at the expense of
others, and then ascertain whether having all the players see pictures of all other players reduces
the amount of backscratching observed, even in the absence of official punishment possibilities.1
The main contribution of our paper over and above the experimental literature we add to is to
use a simple experiment that specifically captures the ‘I scratch your back, you scratch mine’
bilateral nature of corruption in a setting that allows for the choice of back-scratching partners
(players can renege on alliances with one partner and establish new alliances with another) and
a salient negative externality from corruption.
Our study explores a process somewhat outside the standard definition of corruption of “acts
which utilise the power of public office for personal gain in a manner that contravenes stipulated
rules” (Jain, 2001). Yet contravening poorly designed rules may be both corrupt and economically
beneficial, ‘greasing the wheels’ of economic production (Aidt, 2009).2 We instead focus on a
particular social process that is sometimes classified as corruption, depending on the rules in place
at the time, but which contains the important economic elements of corruption. We call this
process back-scratching, and define it as forming loyal reciprocal groups by trading favours for
mutual gain at the expense of others.3 This view differs from traditional notions of rent-seeking
insomuch as there is no lottery-type contest for rents Konrad (2007). Instead we consider that the
process of alliance, or group, formation dominates the allocation of rents when the opportunity
to preference loyal group members is available in a long run game of qui pro quo (Reuben, 2002).
This approach has a long history in the study of the political influence of interest groups (Olson,
1965; Heinz et al. , 1990; Mitchell & Munger, 1991; Reuben, 2002; Beyers et al. , 2008; Grossmann
& Dominguez, 2009), and broadly incorporates the phenomena of nepotism, cronyism, and the
revolving door of personnel between elite positions in government and private sector (Etzion &
Davis, 2008; i Vidal et al. , 2012; Moore, 2014).
To capture this back-scratching process in our experiment, in each of the 25 rounds of a treatment
there is a discretionary decision made by a single subject (the ‘allocator’) from a group of four
or six subjects about which of the other subjects will receive the payment (the ‘receiver’). Non-
allocator players are given a randomly drawn productivity number4 each round which determines
the group payoff for that round (an amount received by all subjects). Each subject’s payoff
equals the chosen receiver’s productivity number that round, while the receiver’s payoff includes
1The game we use to study transparency is an extension of Murray et al. (2015) and sits in between the
traditional experimental corruption literature centred around the repeated bribery game (RBG) of Abbink et al.
(2002), and a number of literatures on coordination in repeated games such as the public goods game, and
games of group formation and in-group bias (Abbink & Serra, 2012; Burnham, 2003; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004;
Hewstone et al. , 2002; Efferson et al. , 2008; Abbink et al. , 2002; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010; van Veldhuizen,
2011; Schikora, 2011b; Burnham, 2003; Charness & Gneezy, 2008).
2The social losses arising from systemic corruption are widely recognised and the ‘greasing the wheels’ hy-
pothesis is not widely supported empirically (Aidt, 2009; Rose-Ackerman & Søreide, 2011). Indeed, if corruption
greases the wheels for some, it typically comes at a cost to others (Kaufmann, 1997).
3Loyalty to a political connection or political party is repeatedly observed in empirical analysis of lobbying
and political donations, adding to the evidence that corruption is a relationship-based process (Harrigan, 2008;
Koger & Victor, 2009; Bertrand et al. , 2011; i Vidal et al. , 2012).
4Productivity numbers are a shuffled set of sequential integers up to the number of non-allocating players.
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the discretionary payment for that round5 in addition. The ‘twist’ is that the receiver is the
decision maker next round. Group payoff maximisation arises from allocating the payment to
the highest productivity player each round, which we call a meritocratic strategy, but there is a
strong incentive for individuals to form alliance pairs and keep the allocator position within that
alliance at the cost of the other players. Players face the conflict of maximising individual earnings
through forming an alliance pair, and maximising group earnings by playing meritocratically.
Within this experimental setup we study the effect of transparency on alliances in two experi-
ments. Our first Transparency experiment implements a treatment which improves information
available to subjects from a prior ‘veil of ignorance’ baseline treatment. This is achieved by
publishing to all players each round the monetary loss compared to meritocracy (if any) from
the choice made, and publishing the allocation choice that would have maximised the group
payoff. Our main Identity experiment implements a treatment where the six subjects in a group
are shown photographs of each other, rather than being anonymously represented by coloured
symbols, in order to provoke a cooperative response. In short, we systematically lift the ‘veil of
ignorance’ under which back-scratching alliances typically operate by mimicking possible trans-
parency regulations, such as publishing occurrences of favourable treatment or the identities of
decision makers and their favoured partners.
While improved information should increase the importance of a social norm of meritocracy and
thus to reduce the incidence of alliance formation, because player photos also convey information
about other members of the group, we anticipate that particular types of players who are recog-
nised to be alliance-prone would be more likely to form an alliance simply because the odds of
mistakenly trying to form an alliance with someone who does not want to are lower when they
are identifiable. We do find that providing photos allows some players to use visible social cues
to more rapidly form alliances, particularly business students and players rated as more beautiful
by their group, confirming a number of previous findings (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999; Rosenblat,
2008; Frank & Schulze, 2000). On balance however, neither the transparency nor identity treat-
ments resulted in greater meritocratic play, and hence higher group payoffs. Men and business
students are found to be more prone to form costly alliances, while religious subjects, particularly
Buddhists, are much less so; a finding that supports previous studies (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011;
Chuah et al. , 2014). These results suggest a degree of caution regarding blanket calls for greater
transparency as an anti-corruption policy, particularly where transparency is not a precursor to
the option for punishment.
5.2 Background
The experimental literature on the micro-level dynamics of corruption, and the broader literature
on the role of transparency on cooperation and group behaviour. inform our approach. Abbink
et al. (2002) pioneered an experimental design, the repeated bribery game (RBG), to look at
the micro-level dynamics of corruption whereby repeated bribery opportunities were encountered
by two subjects, one in role of a firm (a potential briber) and the other a public official, and
where acceptance of a bribe is associated with a cost to other players in the experimental session.
This setup has since been extensively modified to examine a number of elements in corruption,
with the most relevant to our paper being Schikora (2011b), who implement a four eyes policy
in which the role of public official is given to two players who must jointly make the decision
to accept or reject the bribe, and how to allocate payoffs between themselves and the potential
520 experimental currency units (ECU) in the four player version, and 25 ECU in the six player version
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briber. Rather than a reduction in bribery from this transparency policy, the 10 round four
eyes treatment lead to a higher frequency of corrupt transactions, even when the bribe was split
between the two public officials. Transparency of corruption to a third party in this case merely
fostered that third party’s involvement and more efficient bribery and favouritism between the
new corrupt group of three. This result is supported in a field study by Olken (2007), who
found that grassroots monitoring is ineffective at reducing missing expenditures in construction
projects.
Where our game differs substantially from the RBG is the nature of externalities arising from
corruption. Typically either of two ad hoc approaches are used; a small deduction is made
from the earnings of other subjects in the same laboratory session (but who are not part of the
matched briber-official pair), or a deduction is made from a charity donation by the experimenter
(Abbink et al. , 2002; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010; van Veldhuizen, 2011). In either case there is
relatively low salience of the externality insofar as the choice as to who suffers it remains detached
from the choice whether or not to engage in corruption. A more common corruption situation
involves direct discretionary choices about favouring a future alliance partner over identifiable
others who suffer the cost, but could have been favoured instead. For example, a public officer
choosing between contractors will, by explicitly choosing the winning contractor to be their
alliance partner, implicitly choose the loser as well, and by doing so potentially forgo the chance
of forming an alliance with the losing bidder.
In our setup transparency provides additional information to those subjects who are suffering
the negative externality from corruption, but who could be favoured instead, whereas the four
eyes variation of the RBG does not offer transparency to those suffering the externality, nor can
they be chosen to be part of a corrupt alliance. The incentive change from transparency in our
setup is therefore quite different, though Schikora’s (2011b) results suggest that knowing corrupt
alliances can be observed may serve to reinforce them; continuing to be corrupt even when being
observed could signal a greater commitment to the alliance.
Our experiment differs from other cooperative games, such as dictator games, ultimatum games,
public goods games in the sense of having more complex payoff conflicts, but transparency in
these setups has been extensively studied and is hence informative. Bohnet & Frey (1999) find
cooperative behaviour increases nearly twofold in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game when indi-
viduals can see each other in the laboratory, increasing further when they can also communicate,
indicating that cooperation is not only reciprocity-based but also identifiability-based. Burnham
(2003) runs standard dictator games that allow sharing a $10 endowment with take-it-or-leave-it
offer. In the anonymous treatment only 1 in 26 dictators offered a 50-50 division, yet when either
recipients or dictators could see a picture of the other player 25% of dictators offered an equal
split, demonstrating the importance of visibility for the social norm of equality to affect choices.
However, no significant difference in the frequency of $0 allocations between treatments was
found, indicating that the effect of revealing visibility is conditional on the decision to already
make a positive offer and cooperate to some degree. In a public goods game where the level
of information available on the group members was varied, Andreoni & Petrie (2004) find that
providing both photos of the other group members, and information as to their contributions,
increased public good contributions by around 80%, though the effect of photos or information
alone was insignificant.
Using a slightly different form of transparency, Charness & Gneezy (2008) finds an almost 50%
increase in offers in the dictator game if the dictators are given the last name of the recipient,
though they find a non-significant increase in offers in the ultimatum game where receivers could
reject an offer and where the initial offers were higher to begin with. In a group dictator game
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Burnham & Hare (2007) find that adding a set of ‘robot eyes’ to the screen of the dictator
increased public good giving by 29%, again indicating a direct effect of being watched.
One would expect from these existing papers, particularly the two most closely aligned studies
of Burnham (2003) and Andreoni & Petrie (2004), that providing photos would increase pro-
social behaviour. Yet, in the context of back-scratching it is not entirely clear what ‘pro-social’
behaviour actually is; cooperating with one other player increases payoffs for both ‘partners-in-
crime’ at the cost of the anonymous others, though playing meritocratically represents a wider
form of pro-sociality to the group as a whole. More fundamentally, sustaining a back-scratching
alliance relies on some form of trust, but only between a particular pair, in order to overcome
the Nash equilibria of whole group cooperation which arises by backwards induction.
Experiments by De Kwaadsteniet et al. (2012) support the idea that transparency is not au-
tomatically effective at improving cooperation at the broadest level and that information about
others can be a cue to facilitate tacit coordination. When players in their experiment were faced
with choosing a colour that matched the colour choice of another player, information about the
gender, field of study, or a player’s additional choice of a university building, facilitated coordina-
tion. In ultimatum games where photographs of players are revealed, men and attractive players
were offered higher allocations (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999), suggesting some underlying biases
in preferences for cooperative partners. In terms of the strength of in-group favouritism when
choosing team mates, Hammermann et al. (2012) conduct experiments where players choose
team mates given a group signal (of their field of study) or a performance signal based on a real
effort task, and find a strong bias towards team mates choices being made on group, rather than
performance, signals. In terms of our setup, these results suggest that revealing players identities
through photographs may offer social cues about players that facilitate particular alliances in
addition to providing incentives for pro-social behaviour at the group level.
Where we add to this considerable literature is our new experimental design capturing the process
of corruption as costly back-scratching, and whereby players are able to choose alliance partners
from a group, hence implicitly choosing who will bear the cost of the alliance, and where players
are able to break and reform alliances with other subjects. The effect of transparency on choices in
our experiment is not clear cut; revealing player’s identities via photographs may generate social
pressure from the group and encourage cooperation, but it may also provide social cues as to
which other players are more likely to reciprocate and form an alliance. Improving information
about other player’s choices may have little effect as it does not fundamentally change the
nature of the ‘who is with me, who is against me’ identification problem of corruption as a
back-scratching alliance.
5.3 Experimental Design and Research Questions
5.3.1 Basic design
We report two experiments, which we call Transparency and Identity, featuring a common design
first developed in Murray et al. (2015). The baseline computerised experiment consists of
subjects in groups of 4 (Transparency) or 6 (Identity)6 whose composition is the same for the
6We increase the group size for the Identity experiments to ensure greater anonymity of subject choices under
the baseline condition. Identifying players to each other with photographs enables subjects to determine who
may have been an alliance pair in the anonymous treatment. A larger pool of players increases the difficulty
of identifying any alliance pairs after the experiment. Earlier experiments showed that subjects excluded from
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whole duration of the experiment, and who are identifiable to each other by a coloured shape on
the screen. Each round one player, the allocator, chooses which of the other players to receive
a 20 experimental currency units (ECU)7 payment (with the first round allocator randomly
chosen). This payment represents a discretionary allocation of rent. The receiver of the payment
in a round becomes the allocator for the next round, providing the potential for back-scratching
to emerge.
The payoff structure creates a conflict between maximising group and individual payoffs via back-
scratching with a ‘productivity number’ device that determines the group payoff in a round. Each
round the players not allocating are given a randomly shuffled productivity number, from the set
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} which the allocator can observe before making their decision.8 Each of the players
in the group receives a payoff in each round equal to the receiver’s productivity number. The
receiver’s payoff that round includes the payment in addition. We call a choice meritocratic if
the payment is allocated to the player with the highest productivity number as it maximises the
total group payoff that round. The payoff matrix for a single round is summarised in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: One round payoff structure
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 Player 6 Group Total
Choice Allocator Prod. 1 Prod. 2 Prod. 3 Prod. 4 Prod. 5 Payoff
Player 2 1 21 (26) 1 1 1 1 26 (29)
Player 3 2 2 22 (27) 2 2 2 32 (33)
Player 4 3 3 3 23 (28) 3 3 38 (40)
Player 5 4 4 4 4 24 4 44
Player 6 5 5 5 5 5 25 50
Transparency experiment payoffs are shown in parentheses. They differ due to the 25ECU, rather
than 20ECU, payment.
Randomising productivity numbers captures the idea that choosing an alliance partner to favour
when making a discretionary decision often means forgoing the most efficient choice for the
group - choosing the less talented person for a job, choosing the less efficient contractor for a
job, and so forth. Meritocratic choices are, in contrast, always the most efficient, or productive,
choice for the group as a whole. The conflict between incentives to form an alliance pair or play
meritocratically are made clear in Table 5.2, which compares the expected payoffs to players
within a bilateral alliance and others in the group under fully meritocratic play (all players make
all decisions meritocratically and maximise the group payoff) and under full alliance play (two
players allocating only to each other) from the first round of a 25 round treatment. Notice that
although the number of players and size each round’s payment is different, the incentive in terms
of a 56-57% increased payoff from forming an alliance is almost identical in both experiments,
and comes at a cost to the remaining players, and at cost to the efficiency of the group as a
whole.
Under standard rationality assumptions the only behaviour that is individually optimal is mer-
itocracy. Any another strategy unravels with backward induction; in the last round, income-
maximisation requires choosing the player with the highest productivity, independent of the
alliances could be quite emotional about the experiment result, and we wanted to avoid any real life conflict after
the completion of the experiment. Subjects in groups were also randomised in their seating position in the lab,
and between treatments the location of players on screen was randomised.
7In the four player Transparency experiment the payment was 25 ECU.
8Set is {1,2,3} in the four player Transparency experiment
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Table 5.2: Expected payoffs from successful alliance and meritocratic strategies in ECU
Experiment Strategy In my alliance Out of my alliance Group
Payoff Change Payoff Change Payoff Change
Transparency
Meritocratic 231 231 925
Alliance 363 57% 50 -78% 825 -11%
Identity
Meritocratic 208 208 1,250
Alliance 325 56% 75 -64% 950 -24%
Meritocratic play maximises group payoff in Transparency (25×25+3×25 = 925) and Identity
(20 × 25 + 5 × 25 = 1, 250), which is equally divided amongst players as their expectation
prior to the first round. For alliance play in the Transparency experiment the expectation
for players able to form an alliance by being the first round allocator or receiver is jointly
(25× 25 + 2× 25 = 725), which under an equal share is 362.5 per alliance member, though the
first allocator will receive 337.5 and the first receiver will receive 387.5 due to the sequence of
play and the odd number of rounds in a treatment. In the Identity experiment the joint alliance
payoff is (20× 25 + 3× 25× 2 = 650), an equal share being 325, with the first allocator getting
315 and the first receiver 335. For alliance play the players not in the alliance will each receive
(2× 25 = 50) in Transparency and (3 × 25 = 75) in Identity.
history of the game. This makes it optimal to also be meritocratic in the penultimate round, and
so on, till round one. Hence, non-meritocratic behaviour only makes sense where expectations
that others will reciprocate can be generated. It is these expectations that can be affected by
improving the transparency of decisions being made, and by revealing the identity of players in
the group using photographs.
5.3.2 Treatments
Transparency
In the Transparency experiment, 14 groups of 4 first play a baseline treatment for 25 rounds,
before receiving further instructions about the transparency treatment. The baseline treatment
involves withholding some information from players about the state of the game in any round.
Under the ‘veil of ignorance’ the players not making the allocation decision are unable to observe
the productivity numbers of others. Nor, once the allocation decision is made, do they see the
resulting group payoff from that round, or their own earnings for the round. Only their new
total balance of earnings is displayed on the screen as per the top left panel of Figure 5A.1 of
the Appendix. While in principle all players can still infer whether a decision was optimal for
the group as a whole from their new earnings balance in a round, and from observing which
player becomes the allocator in the next round, making this connection requires active recording
and monitoring by each player.9 This setup mimics the situation whereby monitoring of back-
scratching alliances is imperfect to those outside the alliance.
The transparency treatment involves a change to the information profile such that all players
are fully informed of all the conditions of the game each round, including the productivity
numbers of all players, and after a decision is made each round they are informed of their
9Players who receive the payment without the highest productivity number can immediately see they have
been given a favour by virtue of receiving the payment, while the player with the highest productivity number
can infer whether a group-optimal decision or an alliance-forming decision was made.
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earnings, the allocation decision, what was the meritocratic decision, and the earnings of the
player chosen to receive the payment (as per the top right panel of Figure 5A.1 of the Appendix).
In this experiment the receiver of the payment in the 25th round of the baseline becomes the
allocator in round one of the transparency treatment, thus representing a continuous environment
of players and relationships in which the transparency policy is implemented. We adopt this
setup in order to understand the likely effect of a policy change in an institutional environment
where ‘resetting’ people is not viable. Such regime-change experimental settings are uncommon
in the RBG literature, yet as Abbink (2004) noted, such a setup is much more reflective of
possible real life policy implementation. The interpretation of the treatment effect is therefore
whether implementing transparency reforms outweighs both the incentive to sustain already
formed alliances and prevent the formation of new alliances.
Identity
In the Identity experiment 10 groups of 6 subjects play either two baseline treatments, or one
baseline and one identification treatment in either order, with 30 groups in total. Instead of
improving information about decisions and payoffs like the transparency experiment, the identi-
fication treatment subjects see a photo of the others in their group instead of a symbol, which
they take using the iPad camera immediately prior to the identification treatment. Players
maintain the same baseline information profile in both treatments.
Unlike the Transparency experiment, the first round of a treatment involves a new random draw
of the first round allocator, as well as randomising player positions on the screen so that subject
cannot tell who played what in a previous treatment. Rather than a test of whether revealing
identities within a continuous social environment can break down or deter new alliance formation,
this experiment tests the raw effect of identification monitoring compared to anonymity in two
different institutional setups of the back-scratching game.
For clarity a diagram of the design of the two experimental setups, including treatment order,
groups details, number of subjects, and other details, is in Figure 5.1, where B is a baseline, T
is transparency treatment, and I is identity treatment.
Transparency (T) Identity (I)
4 players per group 6 players per group
25ECU payment 20ECU payment
25 rounds 25 rounds
14 groups B T
Information change
Allocator is previous receiver
25 rounds 25 rounds
10 groups B B
10 groups B I
10 groups I B
Photos of players
Allocator random draw
Figure 5.1: Experimental setups compared
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5.3.3 Procedures
The experiments were conducted between April and July 2013 with 236 students participants10
recruited from the University of Queensland and Queensland University of Technology in Bris-
bane, Australia, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2003). They took place in university computer labs,
using desktop computers for the Transparency experiment, and iPads for the Identity experiment,
using CORAL software (Schaffner, 2013). Each subject played two treatments with 50 rounds
in total and received their accumulated experiment earnings converted to Australian Dollars at
a ratio of 20:1 (25:1 in Transparency), making the average payoff $AUD 21 for an average of 50
minutes of play, above the minimum wage.
After receiving experimental instructions subjects went through a set of hypotheticals to en-
sure they understood the instructions and the basic dynamics of the game. At the end of the
experiment subjects completed a socio-demographic survey. Participants playing identification
treatments were asked additional survey questions at the end of the experiment about whether
they recognise the other subject in their group, and if so, what their relationship is, as well as
being asked to rate attractiveness of other subjects and answer a series of questions about their
strategic considerations during the experiment. For selected analyses, we are also able to draw
upon the basic data of Murray et al. (2015) in order to inform us about the characteristics of
individuals in alliances, and by doing so obtain data on an additional 28 groups of 4 subjects.
In those experiments the alternative treatments involved variations on the institutional design,
reflecting staff rotation and low payment policies.
5.3.4 Research questions
We are mainly concerned with choices involved in the dynamics of alliance formation and main-
tenance, and we define a number of choice types to that end. First, a meritocratic (M) choice is
any allocation of the payment to the player with the highest productivity number in that round.
An alliance initiation (AI) is defined as a choice to allocate the payment in a round to a player
with a productivity number less than the maximum, and where those players are not already
in an alliance. This choice variable captures intentions to form alliances through costly signals,
or favours, that a player hopes will be reciprocated in future rounds. An alliance reciprocation
(AR) choice is a non-meritocratic reciprocal allocation of the payment in the round immediately
following an alliance initiation, or any other non-meritocratic decision within an alliance period.
AR choices capture a slightly different element in alliance formation, which is the willingness of
players to respond to the choices of others, or in general terms, to follow social norms being set
by others after an alliance is formed by being loyal to that alliance. A round is classified as in
an alliance (IA) if it forms part of a period of exclusive dealing between two players in which the
first decision is an AI, and at least one other is non-meritocratic (being an AR). We look closely
at the effect of the experiment treatments on this suite of choice types, along with other basic
descriptive measures of group outcomes, in order to answer the following research questions.
Question 1: Does transparency decrease alliance play and increase group payoffs?
Implementing a policy of increased information transparency in corruption and cooperation
games has previously found to be ineffective (Schikora, 2011b; Azfar & Nelson, 2007). Be-
cause our experimental design captures a different type of cooperation, whether these results can
1056 in the Transparency experiment and 180 in the Identity experiment
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be replicated in our back-scratching setting, where the choice of alliance formation is directly
linked to the choice of those who suffer a negative externality, is of interest. We assess changes
in alliance play as changes to the alliance choice types.
Question 2: Does identification decrease alliance play and increase group payoffs?
Our expectation from the literature is that there will be a decrease in alliance formation in
the identification treatment, and hence an increase in group payoffs representing an efficiency
dividend (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Charness & Gneezy,
2008). We look at the net effect identification on the alliance choice types of AI, AR and M, and
on other metrics of group performance.
Question 3: Who are more likely to form alliances, and do social cues from identification
facilitate alliance formation between these players?
In general the demographic determinants of alliance choices is of interest. More importantly, the
cooperation literature suggests that social cues from improved information, such as photographs,
can be used as a coordination device (De Kwaadsteniet et al. , 2012; Hammermann et al. , 2012).
In our setup this would mean an increase in the likelihood of back-scratching alliances between
certain player types in the identification treatment compared to the baseline. Even if alliance
formation declines on the whole from identification, an observed increase in the incidence of
particular types of alliances will condition any policy guidance offered by these experiments.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics
We present in Table 5A.2 descriptive statistics for our two experiments encompassing patterns of
play, payoffs and player characteristics, and in the Figure 5A.2 of the Appendix we plot individual
player earnings for each group in the identification experiment by round, visually displaying the
complexity of actual alliance behaviour.11 On average groups in the Identity experiment earned
173ECU (or 14%) less than the maximum possible, while groups in the Transparency experiment
earned 60ECU (or 6%) less. Meritocratic choices made up a little over half of all choices and
32% of rounds were in an alliance on average.
Some other features are worth highlighting. First is the wide range of outcomes in terms of
experimental earnings for individuals and groups in both our experiments. The highest Identity
group earnings were 39% higher than the lowest group, with group Gini coefficients varying
between 0.38 and 0.05, with such variation the result of some alliances lasting a whole 25 round
treatment. For individuals the highest earning subject in Identity made a payoff five times higher
than the lowest earner, with the same difference being nine times in Transparency. Given the
repeated nature of the game such divergence is to be expected, and is in accordance with the idea
that a social norms of meritocracy or back-scratching can emerge in response to early decisions
which generate expectations about the play of others and the likelihood of reciprocation from
attempted alliance formation.
11An alliance is observable in these graphs as an alternating step-change in payoffs of two players in a group.
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Additionally, we see that players often renege on an alliance, only to later from an alliance with a
different player, with groups in the Identification experiments having up to 5 unique alliance pairs
formed in a treatment (with an average of 1.3), and groups in Transparency having a maximum
of 4. This possibility is a new feature in our experimental setup, and allows our later analysis on
the socio-demographic determinants of back-scratching to be more robust to the experimental
design, since players are able to choose in and out of alliances repeatedly during the experiment.
In terms of socio-demographics our participants cover a broad sample of university students,
though with a large share of international students (38% in Identity, 46% in Transparency),
a high representation of business students, and a roughly even gender split. In order to look
at social cues in the identification treatment, racial appearance is of interest, as it offers one
social signal upon which to base decisions about with whom form an alliance. Subjects are
classified by the experimenter12 in categories of Caucasian, Black, Indian and Asian, and are
predominantly Asian (46%) and Caucasian (44%). Subjects in the Identity experiment also self-
report their religion, with most subject reporting being Atheist (42%) or Christian (28%). For
groups playing the identification (photo) treatment the attractiveness of subjects was rated by
others in their group, and they also recorded whether they were friends with other subjects, with
only 7% of subjects having a friend in their own group.
5.4.2 Treatment effects
To answer our first two research questions we compare indicators of alliance behaviour across
treatments for each experiment. Table 3 summarises the mean treatment outcomes of a variety
of indicators of interest, including the earlier-defined alliance choice types, and compares the
distributions of baseline and treatment effects in both experiments. The frequency of these
alliance choice types by treatment and round is plotted for the Identity experiment is Figure
5A.3 of the Appendix in order for a visual comparison. In the Identity experiment we are
able to compare the pure change between the baseline and the identity treatment, ignoring
learning effects, though we can extract the average learning effect by comparing the first and
second treatments played by groups in this experiment. We thus make two comparisons for the
Identity experiment; between the baseline and identity treatments, and between first and second
treatments played by groups. In the Transparency experiment the treatment involved a change
in the rules during continuous group play, meaning there may be additional learning effects to
consider over the course of the game.13
In the Transparency experiment, the treatment condition had significantly fewer alliance initia-
tion (AI) decisions than the baseline, but this was counteracted almost completely by increased
alliance reciprocation (AR), leaving the number of meritocratic (M) rounds statistically indis-
tinguishable across treatments. While the average number of AR decisions is much higher in the
transparency treatment, 37% instead of 18% in the baseline, the change in the distribution of
the number of AR choices across groups means they cannot be statistically distinguished. While
more groups have zero AR choices under transparency (6 groups instead of 4), those groups who
12Classifications were made based on inspection of player photos immediately following the experiment. Players
classified as Indian may merely have some South-Asian ancestry, while players classified as Black may have some
African ancestry.
13In Section 5.4.7 we check for the robustness of these results by comparing specific sets of rounds in each
treatment. However we believe that the groups in this experiment had found an equilibrium prior to the 25th
round, and that had the rules not changed, the latter round dynamics would have been sustained for an additional
25 rounds.
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Table 5.3: Treatment effects: Transparency and Identity (photo) experiments
Transparency Identity
Baseline Trans. Baseline Identity First Second
(photo) Treatment Treatment
Share M rounds 0.61 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50
Share AI rounds 0.25 0.08∗∗∗ 0.23 0.30∗ 0.30 0.21∗∗∗
Share AR rounds 0.15 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.29∗∗
Share IA rounds 0.25 0.49 0.34 0.30 0.24 0.41∗∗
Share of groups (any IA) 0.71 0.57 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.83
Mean alliance length# 5.8 15.7∗∗ 7.3 4.9 4.3 8.9∗∗∗
Round of first alliance# 10 3∗∗ 11 7∗∗ 11 9
Unique alliances/group 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.1
Mean group earnings 867 862 1,078 1,076 1,086 1,068
Mean individual earnings 217 216 180 179 181 178
Equality (group Gini) 0.13 0.23∗ 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.16∗
Gains minus losses (ECU) -58 -63 -172 -174 -164 -182
Share same gender alliance 0.48 0.48
Share same race alliance 0.56 0.31
Share friends alliance 0.00 0.06
∗10%, ∗∗5%, ∗∗∗1% p-value significance of two-sided Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test: Trans-
parency compared to baseline; Identity to baseline; second to first treatment in Identity
experiment.
# Of groups where there as any alliance.
Same gender, race and friends alliances are only for the 20 groups who played the Identity
treatment where such data was able to be collected.
do have AR choices have more of them (mean of non-zero group AR frequency of 15 rounds in-
stead of 5 in the baseline). This reflects the creation and stability of norms of alliance formation
that were created in the baseline and sustained through the treatment.
A number of additional results support the broad view that simple information transparency
policies are ineffective at curtailing corrupt behaviour from existing alliances. First, the round
of first alliance reduced significantly in the transparency treatment, meaning that many existing
alliances continued without change. Second, the mean alliance length was far higher in the
transparency treatment. Third, the number of unique alliance pairs per group decreased from
an average of 1.0, to 0.7 in the transparency treatment, indicating that the few alliances that
existed in the baseline where sustained through the treatment. In all, this evidence offers support
for our prior expectation with regard to our first research question of no effect from information
transparency, and corroborates earlier results on the effect of Schikora (2011b) and Azfar &
Nelson (2007).
Regarding our second research question about the effect of player identification via photographs,
we find very little support for our expectation that providing photos of players in our game
improves group outcomes on average. The share of M rounds is marginally lower in the identity
treatment, yet the mean alliance length and share of rounds in an alliance is also marginally
little lower, though none of these are significant changes. Together with the observed increase in
AI rounds and unique alliance per group, these results suggest that the effect of photos in this
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game is to both facilitate more rapid alliance formation, and also to increase the social pressure
to renege on ‘unfair’ long alliances. The net effect of these competing effects is no change in
the observed individual or group earnings across treatments. In all there is no clear directional
effect of the identification policy in this experiment, but the results suggest a quite complex
behavioural response to player identification as an institutional change in the back-scratching
game.
In terms of alliances between particular players of recognised groups, we find no significant change
in the same race and same gender alliances due to the identity treatment, however we see that
players who identified each other in the experimental survey as being friends outside of the lab
were able to find each other and form alliances. Thus, at this level the results provide little
support for our expectation that players will use photographs to form alliances with others from
recognisable social groups, such as race and gender.
Lastly, our comparison of first and second treatments of the Identity experiment appear to show a
learning effect in terms of alliance formation, whereby second treatments had significantly higher
AR choice frequency (0.29 share of all rounds instead of 0.16 in the baseline). Additionally, there
are more rounds in alliances (0.41 compared to 0.24), longer alliances (8.9 rounds on average
compared to 4.3), and subsequently lower group earnings and greater group inequality.
5.4.3 Who initiates an alliance?
Our third research question regarding who is more prone to form alliances motivates us to
explore the characteristics of players seeking to form alliances based on alliance choice types.
As described earlier, an alliance initiation attempt (AI) is defined to occur if a player i chooses
player j to receive the payment when player j does not have the highest productivity in that
round and where those players are not already in an alliance. We first wish to know what the
characteristics of an alliance initiator are, for which we estimate a linear probability model of
the decision variable AIigt ∈ {0, 1},
AIigt = WiX
′
itα+ vigt
in which an individual i in group g is said to initiate an alliance at time t if at that time (s)he is
the allocator and makes an AI choice. For most individuals and periods, AIigt is thus a missing
variable since the only players who can make an AI choice are the allocators of a round who
are not currently in an alliance. X ′it is a matrix of socio-demographic variables and treatment
controls. The error term vt is clustered by group g, being eg + eigt.
We deal with the unbalanced sample of decisions across players by also weighting each decision
by the inverse of the frequency of decisions by that player in the vector Wi, to provide a player-
balanced estimation of the vector of coefficients, α, in addition to the estimation results in an
unweighted model. Table 5A.3 of the Appendix shows the results of these estimations, which
are estimated for the Identity experiment, the combined Identity and Transparency, and also
including the baseline data from earlier comparable experiments in Murray et al. (2015).
A number of socio-economic variables closely relate to individual AI choices. International stu-
dents are around 12% more likely to initiate an alliance when given the opportunity, while men
and subjects in relationships are around 10% more likely. In terms of the Identity experiment
only, for which data on race14 and religion was available, we also observe a number of interest-
14For players who played the identity treatments only
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ing results. Indian and Asian participants are 10% and 27% more likely to initiate alliances,
though the small number of Indian participants may be contributing to the size of that result.
Participants identifying with a particular religion had not-significantly lower alliance initiation
activity compared to the non-religious players. Participants from wealthier families and private
schools showed no differences in their initiation behaviour. As expected, players who believed
that forming an alliance was a fair way to play the game, after they played it, were more likely
to have initiated alliances.
In terms of our research question about whether some types of people are more likely to form
alliances, we can summarise that non-religious international student males in relationships appear
the most ‘alliance-prone’ in terms of their initiation choices. In terms of our question on the effect
of identification policies on alliance formation, identification (photo) treatment results in 5% more
alliance initiation attempts, with second treatments seeing a 3% decline in initiation attempts,
supporting the previous treatment comparisons.
5.4.4 Who reciprocates an alliance?
Each individual j who is subject to an alliance initiation has the choice whether or not to
reciprocate the next round (if available) and choose individual i. Further, even when players have
reciprocated at least once, they face the decision of how long to sustain the alliance, knowing the
limited number of rounds and the losses from doing so to the group as a whole. The degree to
which players reciprocate is thus another variable of interest in order to understand who forms
an alliance with whom. The choice space of this variable is when the previous round was an
alliance initiation, or a non-meritocratic allocation during an alliance period (the first round of
which was an alliance initiation, and at least one round of which is a non-meritocratic decision).
In the Identity experiments, 158 of the 180 participants found themselves at least once in a
position to reciprocate (or not), of which there are 544 opportunities to do so. On average,
we can already say that 62% of individuals reciprocate, whereas one would only expect this to
be 20% under full meritocracy because the odds that i happens to be the highest productivity
person the next round is 20%. More formally, we estimate a linear probability model of Alliance
Reciprocity ARjt ∈ {0, 1} : :
ARjgt = WjX
′
jtα+ vjgt
in which an individual j in group g is reciprocates an alliance, X ′jt is a matrix of socio-demographic
variables and treatment controls, and the error term vt is clustered by group g, being eg + eigt.
Again we weight the observations to balance the data at the player level. Table 5A.4 in the
Appendix shows the characteristics of alliance reciprocators using the Identity experiment data,
combined with Transparency data, and again combined with baseline data from Murray et al.
(2015).
Subjects in relationships show similar propensity to reciprocate alliances as they did to initiate
them, being 22% more likely to reciprocate. However business students, who showed little
propensity to initiate alliances, are 23% more likely to reciprocate, indicating that they are better
at responding to alliance play than creating it themselves. The reverse is true of international
students, who show no greater tendency to reciprocate, but who were 12% more likely to initiate
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alliances.15 The second treatments played had 12% more AR choices, perhaps due to learning
effects, while the direction of impact of the identity treatment is not clear, supporting previous
treatment comparisons. Again, player reporting that forming an alliance is a justifiable strategy
were 15% more likely to have reciprocated.
5.4.5 Who are in an alliance?
To answer the question of whether players use social cues from photos to coordinate back-
scratching, we first look at the effect of the combined characteristics of players in an alliance,
even in the absence of visible signals about the other player. Even though mostly anonymous,
the joint characteristics of successful alliances can matter merely as a result of interaction of
heterogenous players in the repeated experimental setting. To this end estimate a Probit model
of the odds that person i is in an alliance with j at round t, denoted as Aijt ∈ {0, 1}, with errors
clustered by individual, vijt = ei + eijt, in the following form:
Aijt = X
′
iα+X
′
ijβ + vijt
where the variables of particular interest are now in X ′ijt, denoting joint variables, including
whether or not both players are of the same gender, same ethnicity, same age, students in
the same degree course, and so forth. The high number of observations comes from the many
potential alliance combinations in each round, which for a group of n players is (n2 − n)/2. For
each individual in a group we know in each of the 25 rounds whether or not they have formed
an alliance with each of the others. Table 5A.5 of the Appendix shows model results for both
Identity and Transparency experiments and for the extended dataset.16
We see again that males and subjects in relationships are more likely to be in alliances, and that
subjects reporting as religious (either Buddhist, Christian, or Hindu) have a lower prevalence
of being in an alliance. Though self-reported club membership and leadership roles had no
significant relationship to alliance initiation or reciprocation, such characteristics are related
to whether a subject is in an alliance, though not a common joint characteristic of alliance
partners. Considering the joint characteristics of potential alliance partners, we see negative
coefficients in political views, wealth, age, happiness and marital status indicating a mixing of
these players in alliances pairs. International students are more likely to be in an alliance when
their alliance partner is also an international student (joint coefficients from 0.12 to 0.22), and
business students, who displayed on tendency towards reciprocation, are less likely to be in
an alliance with each other than expected by chance, even though they are more likely to be
in some alliance. Hence there is a suggestion that player types with a higher level of alliance
initiation choices, rather than reciprocation choices, will establish alliance pairs with common
15The pattern for international students suggests that the AI result could partly be driven by player error
rather than planned alliance formation. As a robustness check we test the same models using only rounds 10 to
24 of a treatment and compare with results using only rounds 1 to 15. If the result holds more in later rounds
compared to earlier rounds we have a clue that either there are more persistent mistakes occurring. We find that
in later rounds the coefficient for alliance initiation is higher and significant, while for reciprocation it is lower
and remains insignificant, suggesting the possibility that international students both form alliances and renege on
them faster than other players.
16The low Pseudo R2 and low marginal average effects (for example the marginal average effect is 1% for
the marital status dummy variable which has a coefficient of 0.23 in the Probit model) are due to the large
counterfactual sample size. Of the 45,000 observations, alliances can at most occur in 3,000 observations in the
case that one out of the 15 potential alliance pairs in a group occurred in every round of the full experiment. The
significance and direction of the effect is the primary interest in this analysis.
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characteristics. When using the data from groups who played the identity (photo) treatment
only, the change in magnitude and direction of the fitted coefficients for some joint variables,
such as happiness (-0.23 to 0.11), clubs (0.05 to 0.27), and business students (-0.09 to 0.04),
suggests that indeed the identity treatment had some influence of the joint characteristics of
alliance partners.
5.4.6 The effect of identification
The previously estimated effects of joint characteristics of alliance partners might of course be due
to an accident of selection of group composition. We now take the additional step of conditioning
these joint characteristics on the identity (photo) treatment to answer our question of whether
social cues from identification of players facilitates the formation of certain alliances. To that
end we use the data from the 20 groups who played the identity treatment to estimate the Probit
model with errors clustered by individual:
Aijt = α+X
′
itβ +X
′
ijt(γ + Zitδ) + vijt
where Zit now includes indicators for whether we are looking at the baseline or identification
treatments. Results are in Table 5A.6 of the Appendix. The coefficients on particular joint player
characteristics interacted with the identity treatment show that identification can increase the
ability of some ‘alliance-prone’ individuals to find each other, while deterring others.
Subjects in relationships are more likely to be in an alliance (marital coeff. 0.27), though in terms
of joint characteristics they are more likely to match with similar marital types only in the identity
treatment than in the non-identifiable baseline. Wealthy subjects follow a similar patterns of
being more likely to be in alliances, but find similarly wealthy alliance partners only when
photos of other players can be seen. Business students, while not being in alliances more than
the average, seem able to find each during the identity treatment (coefficient of joint interaction
0.37), though not at other times (coefficient of joint business -0.09). Identification did not
facilitate common gender or age alliances, and alliance paris that had a common race or religion,
or were common club members, formed alliances to a greater extent without identification, and
reduced their alliance formation when being monitored in the identification treatment.17 In
general certain types of players are able to use social cues in terms of wealth, field of study,
and martial status, to find each other, though certain types of players are more sensitive to
the monitoring effects of identification, such as alliance pairs of the same race or religion, or
involvement in club activities.
5.4.7 Robustness checks
A number of checks are made to examine the robustness of these results. First, we look at the
problem of interpreting the finite experiment as a proxy of an infinitely repeated one. In the
Identity experiment we reverse the treatment order to control for backwards-induction during
later rounds biasing the treatment effect, yet in the Transparency experiment we conflate both
17Players who reported being friends outside of the experiment were more likely to find each other in the
identity (photo) treatment. Though our statistical analysis is limited due to the very low prevalence of friends
being assigned into the same experimental group, and the zero number of cases of friends forming alliances outside
of the identify treatment.
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a learning effect and an ‘end-of-game’ effect in the treatment effect. We check the frequency
of alliance breakdown near the end of each treatment with a Wilcoxon signed rank test of the
changes to alliance frequency in the final three rounds of the second treatment played by each
group. We find a significant increase in alliance breakdown in only the final three rounds or
less of a group’s second treatment played (p value 0.03 for third last round). To control for
these ‘end-of-game’ effects we reproduced the above analysis stripping out the choices made in
the final three, four and five rounds, and also the first five rounds to account for a degree of
learning. In all cases the direction and magnitude of regression coefficients are similar, and our
interpretations thus appear robust to learning and ‘end-of-game’ and learning effects.
A further question arises about player motivations as they relate to the two apparent effects
of revealing identities; the social pressure to be fair, and the ease of forming alliances. It is of
interest to see whether those players observed to be in an alliance attempted to conceal these
alliances, and how justified they believed alliance formation was. Our survey at the end of the
Identity experiment asked “Were you part of an alliance that excluded the player with highest
productivity number at any point throughout the whole game?”. The multiple choice answer
allowed players to reveal in which treatment they formed an alliance, if any. We match these
answers with our own alliance specification to determine the degree of honesty in self-reported
alliance formation, with results in Figure 5.2. Players not in an alliance did report being in one
to some degree, which we attribute to recollection errors. Assuming errors are symmetric, the
high level of dishonesty by those who were in alliances suggests a degree of public concealment
or self-deception at play, perhaps due to guilt from acting ‘unfairly’.
Another survey question asks “In your opinion, forming an alliance in this game is...”’ with
multiple choice answers from never justifiable to always justifiable. We find a large and significant
correlation18 between player’s actual and self-reported alliance formation and their reported
justifiability. This suggests a degree of ex post rationalisation of alliance behaviour coexisting
with efforts to conceal such behaviour from others. Moreover, players who formed alliances in
the
Honest
Dishonest
Actual alliance
Honest
Dishonest
No Alliance
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Figure 5.2: Frequency of player self-reported alliances according to observed alliances
A high degree of path-dependence has been observed in this experimental setup (Murray et al.
, 2015), and we test for whether player outcomes are sensitive to early round play. We find a
slight negative correlation between a player;s first round being allocator and their total payoff,
though first round allocators are significantly more likely to be the highest earning player in
a group.19 Groups themselves appear to learn social norms over time, with the number of M
18Coefficient of number of alliances in a linear model predicting 1..5 justifiability survey response is 0.64,
p = 0.00.
19P-value = 0.01 of MannWhitneyWilcoxon test that the distribution of top-ranked first allocators differs from
the expected one-sixth result.
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choices in the first 10 rounds of each treatment strongly predicting the number of M choices in
the last 10 rounds.20
In terms of the alliance behaviour, we should expect a degree of rationality to be adhered to,
in that initiating an alliance with the second-highest productivity player would be preferred to
initiating an alliance with players of lower productivity. In the Transparency experiment 60% of
alliance initiations were signalled to players with the second highest productivity (productivity or
2)21, while in the Identity experiments only 32% of initiation attempts were to the second highest
productivity player (productivity of 4).22 We also observe greater initiation towards players with
a productivity of 1 in the Identity experiment, suggesting that payoff-maximisation behaviour
may be dominated by the process of establishing alliances, and that initiating alliances with lower
productivity players may provide a more costly but reliable signal of the intention to form an
alliance. We also check to see whether the observed alliances between friends were longer lasting
in the identification treatment, as the interaction of established relationships and transparency-
based anti-corruption policies is an important question. The two friendship alliances observed
lasted only 6 and 2 rounds, which is a below average alliance length even under the identification
treatment.
5.4.8 Summary of results
Will transparency policies curtail back-scratching?
Our transparency experiment lifted the ‘veil of ignorance’ under which back-scratching behaviour
could occur, allowing players negatively affected by alliances to fully observe the individual
and social costs of alliances. Using a within-group policy test, suggested by Abbink (2004)
as reflecting implementations of transparency policies in existing institutions, our comparative
analysis between treatments showed that more rounds were in an alliance under the transparency
treatment, though with fewer unique alliance pairs. We observed no treatment effect in terms of
increasing the frequency of meritocratic choices which would improve the overall group payoff.
This result is supported by our series of choice models, where the coefficient of the transparency
treatment control was large and significantly negative in terms of alliance initiation choices, but
positive and significant in terms of reciprocation choices, indicating a commitment to existing
alliances but a hesitation to form new alliances. Thus, the policy of transparency in a game
of potential repeated back-scratching could at best be said only to assist if the social norm
of meritocracy is already established by the actions of players. Such divergence of effects of
transparency aligns with results of Burnham (2003), who found that improving transparency in
the dictator game by means of photographs, had no effect on frequency of players giving zero, but
a strong effect on shifting amounts given upwards for players already giving non-zero amounts.
Will identification decrease alliance formation and increase group payoffs?
Our Identity experiment showed that providing photos of players in our setup did not provide
any observable increase in group payoffs. Moreover, alliance initiation choices increased, as did
the number of alliance pairs formed per group, in the identity treatment. However, we also
20In a linear estimation of group meritocratic decisions, M16−25 = α+βM1−10 + , we find that α = 1.43 (p =
0.01), β = 0.62 (p = 0.00).
2163 out of 105 decisions
22119 out of 337 decisions. AI to Prod. 1= 24%, Prod. 2= 19%, Prod. 3 = 26%, Prod. 4 = 32%
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observe a decrease in the length any alliance is sustained, which could indicate that a fairness
norm of hindered longer alliances, but was insufficient to shift groups towards the meritocratic
equilibrium. Our choice models reinforce these results.
Who are more likely to form alliances, and do social cues from identification facilitate
alliance formation between these players?
On this question we find a number of reliable results. First, men and players in relationships
are much more likely to both initiate and reciprocate alliances. In general, players identifying as
religious, particularly Buddhists, are far more likely to make meritocratic choices in the interests
of the group as a whole and avoid alliance behaviours in general. Business students showed no
tendency towards higher rates of alliance initiation, though they do engage in much higher levels
of alliance reciprocation. These results are consistent with those of Lambsdorff & Frank (2011),
who found that men are more confident that bribes will be reciprocated, and Armantier & Boly
(2008) who found religious fervour negatively associated with corruption.
As expected, the identification treatment facilitates the formation of certain types of alliances.
Business students are much more likely to be in alliances together when they have photos to
identify potential alliance partners, and less likely otherwise. Players seem to respond to cues
about a player’s wealth and attractiveness, and we find alliance pairing based on these charac-
teristics in the identity treatment but not the baseline. Lastly, players who were already friends
also found each other under the identification treatment which they did not under the baseline
anonymous treatment.
5.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have studied the effect of transparency-improving anti-corruption policies in an
experimental game designed to capture the costly back-scratching process underlying corruption.
In our setup such a process entails a violation of meritocracy in order to establish an alliance
based on reciprocation of discretionary favours, and in which the costs of this process are directly
borne by those players not chosen to be in an alliance. Our main results are that introducing
information transparency policies to existing groups, by publishing the loss arising from alliance-
forming non-meritocratic decisions alongside the meritocratic choice each round, is ineffective
at curtailing costly back-scratching alliances. Identifying all participants by photographs also
generated no overall improvement in group payoffs compared to the baseline treatment where
allocation decisions were anonymous. More importantly, our Identity experiment showed that
additional information from photographs can both facilitate the coordination of alliances between
certain players, such as business students and attractive people, while at the same time increase
social pressures to act fairly by cutting short any alliances.
These results corroborate a number of previous experimental results on the link between coopera-
tion and transparency (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Charness
& Gneezy, 2008). The unique part of our setup is that there are conflicting pro-social choices;
either cooperate as an alliance pair, or cooperate meritocratically with the whole group. Iden-
tification by photographs improves both types of cooperation simultaneously. Social cues about
other players increase cooperation in alliance pairs, particularly the speed of alliance formation.
Alliance pair matching on certain characteristics in the identity treatment, in this case business
students and subjects from wealthy families, is consistent with previous results (De Kwaadsteniet
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et al. , 2012; Hammermann et al. , 2012), though the finding that identification also deterred
certain alliance pair types, such as those with common race or religion, highlights the dual ef-
fect of transparency where there are conflicting pro-social alternatives. In terms of group level
cooperation, more alliance pairs and shorter alliances in the identification treatment indicate
increased cooperation of some type at this level as well. Together these dual effects resulted in
no net benefit to identification in our experiment.
Understanding our results in terms of preferences is a challenge. While the lack of effect of
Transparency conforms to the expected utility result based solely on payoffs, such an approach
cannot predict the results of the Identity experiment in which a decrease in alliance length and
increase in the number of alliance pairs per group was observed. Nor does it predict the frequent
use of the most costly alliance initiation attempts (allocating to the lowest productivity player,
rather than the second highest). We consider therefore, that players are operating in a world of
simple strategies, the success of which is conditional in the evolving strategies or heuristics of
others, and which is not conducive to traditional analytical utility-maximisation analysis (Nowak
et al. , 1993).
A key remaining question is how our results might inform the design of institutions, and how
transparency policies in public institutions need to balance these competing coordination effects.
This trade-off is made clear the proposal by Ayres & Bulow (1998) to mandate the anonymity
of political donors in order to disrupt the trade in political favours. Without knowing who
has donated politicians have one less signal about who to favour in order for future reciprocal
favours. Our evidence confirms this reasoning. Other examples where anonymity, rather than
transparency, might reduce corruption is where highly discretionary decisions will be made by
public committee, such as the case of tendering for government contracts. If committee members
are anonymous, those firms seeking favourable treatment will be unable to focus on exploiting
relationships and establishing expectations of reciprocation with committee members, and in-
stead may be forced to compete on the quality of their tenders. We are thus hesitant to support
transparency as an anti-corruption policy in cases where discretionary choices are able to be
made without fear of punishment. However, this is not to say that where punish opportunities
exist that transparency is not a favourable policy direction, since transparency is likely to be the
first step towards punishment.
Appendix
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Baseline Transparency
(Not receiving payment or making decision) (Not receiving payment or making decision)
Figure 5A.1: Experiment screenshots
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Table 5A.1: Survey questions
Variable Survey question Response type
People v Skills Reflecting on your own life experience, how important do you think it is to 1= Mostly People ... 5 = Mostly Skills
know the right people versus having the rights skills in order to succeed?
Club Are you a member of a student club, society, or sports club? 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Leader Did your parents encourage you to be in leadership positions at school? 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Wealth Would you say that your family is ... 1 = Wealthy, 2 = Average, 3 = Poorer than average
Religion I identify as a... Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu , Atheist, Other
Politics In political matters, people talk of’ the left’ and’ the right’. How would 1 = Left ... 10 = Right
you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
Fair In your opinion, forming an alliance in this game is... 1 = Never Justifiable ... 5 = Always justifiable
Friend Before today, when did you last communicate with this person? 1 = Yesterday, 2 = Last week, 3 =In the last month
4 =In the last year, 5= Over a year ago, 6= Never
Beauty How attractive do you think the average Australian would rate this player? 1 = Very unattractive... 7 = Very attractive
Happy All things considered in your life, how happy would you say you are usually? 1 = Very unhappy ... 5 = Very happy
Age Please enter your age in years Numerical whole year variable
Gender I am 0 = Female, 1 = Male
Inter. stud. Are you an international student? 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Marital I am 0 = Single, 1 = Partnered, 2 = Married
Bus. stud. Please enter the name of you current degree Free form text input. Experimenter coded.
For the analysis partnered and married responses are groups together to create a binary single or not-single variable.
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Figure 5A.2: Accumulated player payoffs, by group and round, with identity treatment shaded
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Table 5A.2: Descriptive statistics for Identification and Transparency experiments
Identity Transparency
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
Group payoff (ECU, all treatments) 1,077 1,224 878 856 925 801
Individual payoff (ECU, all treatments) 180 336 63 216 384 44
Group Gini 0.14 0.38 0.05 0.18 0.39 0.02
Share of meritocratic decisions 0.52 0.96 0.12 0.59 1 0.16
Share of groups with any alliance 0.93 0.70
Round of 1st alliance (if any) 10 23 1 7 23 1
Unique alliances/group 1.3 5 0 0.9 4 0
Share of rounds in alliance 0.32 1 0 0.37 1 0
Alliance length! 6.3 2 25 10 2 25
Gains minus losses per group -173 -6 -372 -60 0 -124
Age 21.7 37 17 21.5 41 18
Group male share 0.54 0.83 0.33 0.48 1 0
Happiness (1= V. Unhappy ...5=V. Happy) 3.81 5 1 3.86 5 2
Political (1= Left ...10= Right) 5.53 10 1 5.52 10 2
Family wealth (1= Wealthy ...3= Poor) 1.95 3 1 1.89 3 1
Marital status (1= Partnered) 0.26 0.23
International student (1=Yes) 0.38 0.46
Business student (1=Yes) 0.21 0.27
Club members (1= Yes) 0.56 0.65
Private School (1=Yes) 0.40 NA
People v skills (1=People...5=Skills) 2.49 5 1 2.84 5 1
Has friend in own group# 0.07 0.50 0
Group share Black# 0.02 0.17 0
Group share Asian# 0.46 0.83 0
Group share Indian# 0.08 0.17 0
Group share Caucasian# 0.44 0.83 0
Group share Christian 0.28 0.67 0
Group share Buddhist 0.14 0.50 0
Group share Hindu 0.04 0.17 0
Group share Atheist 0.42 0.42 0
Subject attractiveness ∗ 4.0 6.4 1
! Of groups with any alliance
# Friendships, and racial character statistics are for groups who played the identification
treatment. The data was unable to be collected in the completely anonymous treatment
groups.
∗ Mean rating for each subject by other group members.
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Figure 5A.3: Choice frequency by treatment and order for Identity (photo) experiment
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Table 5A.3: Alliance Initiation choice models
AI Identity Id. & Trans. Combined!
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Gender 0.06 0.11∗∗ 0.10 0.05
Beauty -0.04 0.03
Black -0.09 -0.07
Indian 0.23∗∗ 0.32∗∗
Asian 0.08 0.07
Buddhist -0.10 -0.12
Christian -0.02 -0.02
Hindu -0.00 -0.19
Inter. stud. 0.11∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗ -0.12∗
Bus. stud. 0.00 0.02 0-.02 0.02
Marital 0.10 0.10∗ 0.09 0.08
Happy 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01
Politics -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00
Wealth -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Private sch. 0.02 0.05
Fairness 0.07∗∗∗
Clubs -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
Skills -0.00
Leader -0.01
Identity (photo) 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04
Transparency -0.06 -0.09
Identity Exp. 0.02 0.01
Order -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Obs. 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,556 2,106
N (AI= 1) 377 377 377 377 377 492 670
R2 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03
! Identity and Transparency experiments and baseline treatment data from Murray et al.
(2015).
# Models weighted by inverse of individual player decision frequency.
p values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Order is 1 for second treatment played by a group, 0 for first treatment.
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Table 5A.4: Alliance Reciprocation choice models
AR Identity Id. & Trans. Combined!
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Gender 0.17∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.17
Beauty 0.06 0.06
Black -0.05 -0.12
Indian 0.01 -0.03
Asian 0.06 0.09
Buddhist -0.15 -0.16
Christian -0.07 -0.02
Hindu 0.01 0.09
Inter. stud. -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Bus. stud. 0.23∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.16 0.09
Marital 0.22∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.19 0.18
Happy -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.01
Politics -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
Wealth 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06
Private sch. -0.01 0.02
Fairness 0.14∗∗∗
Clubs -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.03
Skills -0.05
Leader 0.10
Identity (photo) -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.00
Transparency 0.24 0.0.16
Identity Exp. 0.09 0.02
Order 0.15 0.18∗ 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13
Obs. 544 544 544 544 544 785 995
N (AR= 1) 338 338 338 338 338 508 609
R2 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.11
! Identity and Transparency experiments and baseline treatment data from Murray et al.
(2015).
p values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Details of variable construction in Table 5A.3 footnotes.
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Table 5A.5: Individual and joint characteristics of alliance partners
In Alliance Identity Id. & Trans Combined
Photo
Age -0.01 -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.03∗ -0.03
Gender 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.15 0.23∗∗ 0.18
Beauty -0.00 0.01 -0.02
Black 0.08 0.04 -0.01
Indian -0.02 0.10 -0.24
Asian 0.04 0.04 0.02
Buddhist -0.17 -0.15 -0.17
Christian -0.13 -0.11 -0.00
Hindu -0.14 -0.12 0.40
Happy 0.02 0.04 0.03
Inter. stud. -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.08
Bus. stud. 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.10 -0.18
Marital 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.20
Wealth 0.08 0.10 0.25∗∗ 0.01 -0.03
Private Sch. 0.01 -0.00 0.02
Club 0.15∗ 0.16∗ 0.18∗ 0.14 0.10
Leader 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.17
Ageij -0.22
∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.20∗ -0.19
Genderij 0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.11
Beautyij -0.10 -0.10
Raceij 0.05 0.07
Religionij 0.14
∗ 0.13
Inter. stud.ij 0.13 0.12 0.22
∗∗ 0.22∗
Bus. stud.ij -0.09 0.05 -0.12 -0.23
∗
Maritalij -0.06 -0.15 0.06 -0.01
Happyij -0.24
∗∗ 0.11 -0.22∗ -0.17
Politicsij -0.14
∗ -0.16∗ 0.05 0.08
Wealthij -0.08 -0.19
∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.18
Private Sch.ij 0.05 0.13
Clubij 0.05 0.27
∗∗∗ 0.14 0.11
Leaderij 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.01
Friendsij 0.11 0.19
Obs. 45,000 45,000 30,000 53,400 61,800
N (A= 1) 974 974 638 1,305 1,574
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.015 0.027 0.020 0.014
p values ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗∗∗ = 1%.
Joint common characteristics are all binary variables: Wealthij is same
response of alliance pair on 3 point family wealth scale. Ageij is age of
alliance pair within 4 years. Politicsij is within 2 on a 10 point scale.
Friendsij is having any identified relationship between alliance partners
from the survey. Beautyij is within 1 of each other on a 7 point scale.
Happyij is alliance pair within 1 on 5 point scale. All others joint variables
are 1 is binary responses for alliance pairs are the same.
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Table 5A.6: Identification effects on alliance partner choices
In Alliance
Age -0.02∗ -0.03∗
Gender 0.11 0.15
Beauty 0.01 -0.02
Black 0.19 -0.02
Indian -0.04 -0.23
Asian -0.00 0.07
Buddhist -0.18 -0.15
Christian -0.01 0.02
Hindu 0.16 0.43
Inter. stud. 0.09 0.08
Bus. stud. 0.02 0.13
Marital 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
Wealth 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗
Private sch. -0.02 -0.01
Club 0.24∗∗ 0.20∗
Leader 0.22∗∗ 0.21∗∗
Ageij -0.32
∗∗∗ -0.17
Genderij 0.09 0.02
Beautyij -0.21
∗∗ -0.06
Raceij 0.21
∗∗ 0.19
Religionij 0.61
∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
Inter. stud.ij 0.07 0.00
Bus. stud.ij -0.07 -0.09
Maritalij -0.25
∗ -0.27∗∗
Wealthij -0.52
∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
Private sch.ij 0.15 0.12
Clubij 0.66
∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
Leaderij -0.04 -0.04
Friendsij 0.06
Agepij 0.01 -0.18
Genderpij -0.08 -0.08
Racepij -0.25
∗ -0.29
Beautypij 0.12 -0.08
Inter. stud.pij 0.13 0.24
Private sch.pij -0.01 0.04
Bus. stud.pij 0.28
∗ 0.37∗∗
Religionpij -1.16
∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗∗
Wealthpij 0.66
∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
Maritalpij 0.19 0.24
Clubpij -0.61
∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗
Leaderpij 0.07 0.10
Obs. 30,000 30,000 30,000
N (A= 1) 638 638 638
R2 0.005 0.057 0.070
∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗∗∗ = 1% significance.
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Chapter 6
Reflections
Abstract
Because of the losses in economic efficiency, curtailing back-scratching is beneficial for society
as a whole. In this chapter I discuss some key points about how exactly the introduction of
rules to reduce or eliminate the ability to back-scratch might be implemented. I first look at
the barriers to undertaking research on this type of behaviour, and in particular the problems
of concealment and the privacy regulations that sustain it. Exposing to outsiders that a back-
scratching game exists, and demonstrating the costs of the game, is the first step towards making
policy changes to benefit the larger group. Second I look at some example cases where successful
‘anti-backscratching’ policies have been implemented in particular settings. The common thread
in these examples is that outsiders could appeal to a higher group within which they were nested
to enact rule changes. Finally, I look at the most challenging case where back-scratching insiders
are the ones who set their own rules, and where outsiders have no higher group to appeal to in
order to make institutional changes to curtail back-scratching.
6.1 Introduction
This thesis began with an introduction to the framework of groups and networks as a way to
conceptualise the cooperative process of back-scratching, where discretionary favours are made
to related others which come at a high cost to the non-favoured, generating losses in economic
efficiency. Subsequent chapters then studied in detail particular elements of the process of back-
scratching, and in Chapters 4 and 5 a selection of policy changes to combat back-scratching in
the absence of punishment were tested in an experimental setting. The logical next step is to
discuss some practical questions about the implementation of anti-backscratching institutions,
which is the purpose of this chapter.
A first comment in regard to these practicalities must centre on the question of exactly how to
observe back-scratching behaviour. The key ingredient in any process of change is to first observe
the behaviour one seeks to change. As argued in Chapter 3, there is a strong incentive for back-
scratchers to conceal their behaviour, particularly where there exists an external rule-maker who
might make changes that prohibit their activities. Where accounting and corporate structures
allow for concealment of interests, identifying the winners and losers from backscratching in
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the political realm becomes exceptionally difficult. More so when the disclosure requirements
of elected politicians are minimal, and their family financial interests are not required to be
disclosed at all. While much of the evidence on corruption suggests that transparency alone is
rarely sufficient to combat corruption (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009), a finding supported experimentally
in Chapter 5, it is often a crucial first step to the implementation of other reforms. It is worth
recounting some of the current limitations to accessing sufficient data to observe and quantify
back-scratching in Australian politics encountered during the research reported in this thesis.
Currently legal and accounting structures in Australia allow for a great deal of concealment of
information in terms of company and property ownership. It is rarely clear exactly who has a
controlling or financial interest in which properties or companies. The national regulator, the
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), maintains all corporate registration
records but only allows public access to those records in small batches for a fee, between $19
and $38 per individual company record type, of which multiple record types might be needed for
each company to establish a fair picture of ownership structures. A request for bulk data of over
1,000 records in order to determine corporate relationships for the work in Chapter 2 was denied
by the ASIC legal department under the guise that such a request could be used to generate a
mailing list, and as such should not be made public. Moreover, the use of private trusts and
other legal entities, which can involve many layers of ownership, can easily conceal the identity of
ultimate decision makers in these entities and makes systematic studies very difficult for anyone
but the regulator itself. In Queensland, as elsewhere, finding out who actually controls property
is also difficult, expensive, and sometimes impossible. State records are kept by the Land Titles
Office, and data can be accessed for a $25.80 fee one property at a time unless data is purchased
through a monopoly reseller of public records. Quite frustrating also is that state level taxation
departments, such as the Office of State Revenue (OSR) in Queensland, actually do keep track
of the controlling corporate structures of all land owners in the state, but are unable to release
any of this information, as it is protected by confidentiality requirements in the tax law. Taken
together, the expensive and cumbersome access to public records, in tandem with the ability
to almost conceal ownership through trust structures, makes the observation of back-scratching
between politicians and business interests a slow and difficult, and sometimes impossible process
in Australia currently.
In terms of disclosure requirements for elected politicians, the current reporting system appears
on the surface to be rather effective. It requires political parties to disclose all donors over $10,000
by the end of each year, and elected politicians to disclose their financial interests annually.
Unfortunately the system provides almost no ability to observe political involvement in back-
scratching. For example, multiple political donations can be made under the disclosure limit by
the same individual through their various corporate holdings. Nor do even properly completed
financial interest disclosures by politicians provide the information necessary to observe major
conflicts of interest. For example, disclosing property ownership does not require disclosing
property addresses or values. Disclosing share holdings can be concealed though trusts and
superannuation accounts. Beyond spouses, family member interests are not disclosed yet families
are likely to be a common ‘in-group’ in back-scratching, nor are identities of family members
themselves disclosed. At the local council disclosure requirements are even less stringent.
In both the case of public records and of disclosure of political interests, the driving force be-
hind the limited availability of information for public access are privacy concerns. Yet if back-
scratching in politics is as large an industry as suggest by the results of Chapter 2, these privacy
concerns probably do not outweigh the value of public knowledge of these important relation-
ships. Even if privacy concerns are paramount, then the public institutions who collect and
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maintain the data could also play a role in monitoring of relationships and seeking out cases of
favouritism in order to make public the situations where back-scratching is occurring. Yet the
incentive to monitor back-scratching and make this information available to outsiders is also a
product of meso-level group structures, and in politics this type of meso-level analysis reveals
just how difficult change can be.
6.2 Meso-level considerations for reform
In whose interest is it to combat back-scratching? The instinctive answer is that it is in the
interests of outsiders who suffer the negative externality. But in the case of corruption class
back-scratching, that generates not only a redistribution to the insiders but losses to joint ‘insider
plus outsider’ payoffs, it is in the interests of larger encompassing groups in the meso structure
that nest within them both insider and outsider groups. Figure 5A.1 demonstrates how rule
changes to combat back-scratching can arise where there is a larger group which has an incentive
to reduce back-scratching, and has the ability to enact and enforce rules on the back-scratchers.
On the left hand side is meso-level group structure where back-scratching insiders are a subset
of a larger group which also encompasses the outsiders and are able to appeal to this group
to make changes in their interests. A good example to demonstrate this idea is a corporate
structure where senior managers in one department may engage in trade in favourable pay rises
and promotions. The externality from this back-scratching will be imposed on other shareholders
and other parts of the company. Yet because there exists an encompassing layer to the hierarchy
of groups at the company, there is an interest in combatting back-scratching to increase the
aggregate company profits.
Insiders Outsiders Insiders Outsiders
Rule making group ?
Figure 5A.1: Outside group able to appeal to larger group in which it is nested to change rules
(LHS). When insiders are the rule-makers outsiders have no appeal to a larger group (RHS).
On the right hand side of Figure 5A.1 is an example that applies to politics. Here, if back-
scratching insiders are politicians themselves, there is no obvious rule-making group within which
the politicians and the public at large are contained, and indeed it is the politicians themselves
who are the rule makers. One might prefer to think that in a functioning democracy that outsiders
could vote out politicians who engage in extensive back-scratching, but as noted earlier, making
public political back-scratching is extremely difficult with the amount of concealment options
available in Australia and many other countries leaving many outsiders ignorant of the extent
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of their losses. Thinking about back-scratching reform as a problem of nested groups guides the
following brief examples where rules and laws have been successfully enacted to help combat
back-scratching, along with some recent examples where a lack of a larger group in the hierarchy
had hindered change.
6.3 Reforms in practice
6.3.1 Successes
Successfully implemented anti-back-scratching policy is best exemplified by the case of executive
pay, though the examples of transparency in public procurement and the public disclosure of
tax records in many countries is also informative. Typically executives are able to set their own
salaries and benefits with approval by the board of director, who together form an insiders group
able to back-scratching, while any salaries gains to this group are a transfer from a clearly defined
group of outsider shareholders. Moreover, the inside and outside groups are nested within an
encompassing nation-state group that sets the rules by which companies must operate, providing
an avenue for outsider shareholders to seek rule changes to their benefit, and to the cost of insider
executive back-scratchers.
Across the world non-binding shareholder votes on executive remuneration have been mandated
in the past decade, with a number of countries now increasing the binding power of shareholder
votes in the wake of a pattern of rapidly growing executive pay that is highly suggestive of
back-scratching Ferri (2015). Australia for example, implemented a “two strikes” rule in 2011
through the Remuneration Amendment Act 2011, which introduced the opportunity to force a
re-election of the board of directors if a 25% or greater dissent vote to executive remuneration
occurs for two consecutive years. A legal change intended to have similar effects of reducing
powers of executive to set their own pay was enacted in Germany in June 2009, known as the
“Vorstandsvergtungsangemessenheitsgesetz” (VorstAG), which mandates that executive com-
pensation be “(1) customary, (2) reflect management performance (pay for performance), and
(3) be tied to long- term performance measures” (Hitz & Mu¨ller-Bloch, 2015). In October 2013
the UK introduced a binding vote for shareholders of listed companies, where a 50% approval
vote is required for remuneration packages to be passed. Together these changes represent a suc-
cessful appeal by outsiders to implement rules to reduce the ability of back-scratching insiders
to trade in favours by building on previous rules that ensured transparency. Once there was
transparency of potential back-scratching additional rules making shareholder votes binding pro-
vided for recourse to a third party to enforce limits to back-scratching and incentivise executives
to act in the joint interests of themselves and the shareholders.1 This additional step beyond
transparency to enforcement was not available in the experiments in Chapter 5, yet highlights
the necessity for transparency prior to creating rule changes that directly target back-scratching.
Another area where anti-backscratching policy has been quite successfully implemented is in
public procurement, where there is a potential for government decision-makers to form back-
scratching groups between themselves and specific private contractors. Ohashi (2009) studied the
situation in Japan when the Mie government replaced an “opaque and discretionary procedure
with a transparent and rule-based one in order to qualify bidders” for government contracts.
1The evidence of the financial effect of exercising these additional shareholder rights is mixed Monem & Ng
(2013); Hitz & Mu¨ller-Bloch (2015).
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Rather than pure discretion by public officials the new procedure implemented a set of rule-
based minimum financial and technical requirements of bidders, allowing any firm who met the
rules to qualify as a bidder, removing the discretion of public officials in this selection phase of
the procurement process. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis they show that firm
bid prices are lower under the transparency policy, resulting in a reduction in procurement costs
of approximately 8%, or JPY 200million in their sample. This type of rule-based change by a
higher-level group that removes discretion at lower levels is the type of policy is similar in type
to the low-rent experimental treatment in Chapter 4, which in that controlled setting also reduce
back-scratching behaviour.
Yet slightly different policies aimed at transparency and accountability in the same setting of
public procurement can have quite different results. A randomised field experiment in Indonesia
that increased audit rates from 4% to 100% on road projects did reduce discrepancies between
project costs and independent cost estimates by around 8% (Olken, 2007). However the high
auditing treatment also increased the number of project jobs given to family members of project
officials, suggesting that either alternative forms of corruption are present, or that the trust
inherent in family relationships was necessary to ensure that team members did not engage in
activities that could have been picked up by the audit. In that same study a set of treatments
involving ‘grass-roots monitoring’ via village-level “accountability meetings”, or the ability to
anonymously report corruption to officials, made little difference overall but did lead to peculiar
reductions in missing labour costs, but not in materials costs, indicating that plugging one
corruption leak creates incentives for groups to find alternative methods of back-scratching.
Taking this theme to a broader level, the public disclosure of tax records is another way to
make recipients of back-scratching financial favours unable to conceal their activities and provide
outsiders the information needed to seek rule changes from an encompassing rule-making group.
A marked difference in the public disclosure of individual and firm tax information exists across
the developed world. Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway are exceptional in that they publicly
disclose individual level tax information, with Norway’s online searchable access of tax records
making it the most transparent of any country at the current time. This is in stark contrast to
the other countries such as the UK, US and Australia, where tax information is confidential and
tax authorities cannot release information collected while administering relevant tax laws. The
question at hand is whether the potential privacy benefits from such a system are outweighed
by the benefits to group cooperation from the transparency of behaviour of potential back-
scratchers. Evidence suggests that when tax returns go online business owners, who have some
discretion about self-reporting incomes, go up approximately 3% (Bø et al. , 2015). This indicates
that simply making behaviour transparent improves the compliance with proper tax reporting.
Exactly what group dynamics lead to the stark difference in terms of tax disclosure are not clear
by looking at this broad country level, as the exceptional northern European countries disclosing
tax information have a long and convoluted governance history that resulted in current laws.
A good recent example to understand the group dynamics involved with making policy changes
towards tax disclosure occurred in Australia, where legislation was passed in 20132 to make
public the tax records of all companies with a turnover above $100million annually, which would
be published on a federal government website starting in July 2015. This push towards public
disclosure also resulted in an Senate Inquiry into corporate tax avoidance, which aimed to further
expose incidents of back-scratching amongst corporate interests, auditors, accountants, lawyers
and others involved in shielding incomes from the tax authority. In this case the tax authority
was itself an outsider, losing out from back-scratching, and made appeals the encompassing
2The relevant legislation is the Tax Laws Amendment (2013 Measures No. 2) Bill 2013.
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political body that was able to use its rule-making power to provide the transparency necessary
to gather the relevant information to guide new anti-back-scratching policy changes.
What makes the Australian case of tax disclosure so interesting is that the new Liberal Party
government, elected in late 2013, reversed the tax transparency bill prior to any information being
made public. Like debates in other countries, the ‘ransom defence’ was used as the argument
against this transparency. The premise of this defence is that publishing the incomes and assets
of the largest companies would make their senior personnel targets for kidnapping. However
what this political behaviour indicates is that the new political party in power was probably
more involved in the back-scratching trade of favours amongst large companies than the prior
government, and the tax authority was left with no encompassing group to appeal to in order to
make policy changes. This is the classic problem faced when trying to combat back-scratching
in political environments.
6.3.2 Failures
Failures to combat back-scratching typically occur in the political realm where no encompassing
group exists with an interest in stopping the cost behaviour. Political decisions of winners and
losers occur in many areas, from choosing winners of government contracts, to approving private
sector development proposals, to locations of public infrastructure. Because these decisions
occur regularly amongst a fairly consistent cohort of politicians and businesses there is a large
scope for back-scratching to emerge. Exactly this type of scenario was studied in Chapter 2.
While the ability to elect a different group of rule-makers by outsiders is available in a well-
functioning democracy, often many political parties are involved in the same back-scratching
groups, essentially limiting the scope for change in the absence of the rise of new political parties
formed by disaffected outsiders.
Some recent Australian examples demonstrate how back-scratching groups that contain both ma-
jor political parties, such as the hedging groups observed in Chapter 3, lead to back-scratchers
being somewhat protected from political retribution. In 2014 the New South Wales Independent
Commission Against Corruption (NSW ICAC), a statutory body with powers to investigative
corruption in the public sector, made findings against thirteen state politicians involved in mis-
conduct, from bribery to concealing political donations and gifts, and other exchanges of favours
with property developers who had been given approvals beyond the scope of normal planning
requirements. This lead to calls by the national Greens political party to institute such an au-
thority at the national level to make similar investigations of national politicians. Yet when the
vote went to parliament both major parties, Labor and Liberal, voted unanimously against it.
In the framework of back-scratching in groups this merely serves to indicate that the interests of
these political parties is not one encompassing the insiders and the outsiders from corruption, but
is aligned with that of the insiders. In essence by voting against the reform they had implicated
themselves in a game of back-scratching.
As a direct example relating to Chapter 2, the new Queensland Labor government in 2015
announced a review of planning laws. Yet their public release of this review was made at a
property industry function hosted by the largest property lobby group, the Property Council of
Australia. The confusing behaviour of implementing a process of planning reform, ostensibly to
combat back-scratching, while at the same time signalling reputations to the industry involved
in that back-scratching, suggests that the reforms will not arise in the interests of outsiders,
but rather will continue to facilitate a trade in favours amongst insiders. Further evidence in
favour of this ‘reform illusion’ interpretation comes from the analysis in Chapter 2 where hedging
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donors where the dominant type in the rezoned landowner sample, indicating the participation
in a favour exchange game by both sides of Queensland politics.
6.4 Concluding remarks
Taken together this thesis has offered a coherent framework within which to view the econom-
ically important behaviour of back-scratching as an exchange of favours within a group at the
expense of outsiders. Each main chapter has then looked a specific elements of this broad theme
to demonstrate the magnitude of the transfers associated with political back-scratching in even
routine policy decisions, the expected patterns of signalling behaviour in various political environ-
ments, and used experiments to test types of policy rules that might deter back-scratching in the
absence of direct punishment possibilities. Finally, this chapter has remarked on the challenges
of implements rule changes to combat back-scratching when there is no obvious encompassing
rule-making group with an interest in maximising joint payoffs of back-scratching insiders and
outsiders. The main policy lesson from this body of work is that institutional changes to com-
bat back-scratching require an encompassing rule-making group that has an interest in the joint
outcomes of insiders and outsiders.
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